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ABSTRACT
The ability to formulate and implement social strategies has 
become increasingly important as a means for firms to manage the 
socio-political elements in their environments. This dissertation is 
an exploratory study designed to examine the internal process of 
corporate social strategy implementation. Specifically, the study is 
an in-depth, one-firm research case analysis of the implementation 
process in an organically structured organization.
The literature is in agreement that in today's turbulent 
socio-political environment it is necessary for a firm to formulate 
and implement effective social strategies. Yet, only two previous 
studies (Ackerman and Murray) have examined the process of imple­
menting social policies. Both studies were conducted in highly 
mechanistic organizations. This study attempts to broaden the 
research base by examining the implementation process in an 
organically structured firm facing a turbulent environment.
The primary foci of this dissertation were to examine (1) the 
role of the performance measurement, reporting, evaluation and reward 
systems in the implementation process and (2) the nature of the 
process itself. The data were gathered by interviewing managers at 
five levels of the hierarchy and by archival analysis. The major 
finding is that there are similarities to and differences between the 
social strategy implementation process in an organic organization and 
the process in mechanistic organizations as described by Ackerman and 
Murray.
xi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is an exploratory study designed to examine 
the internal process of corporate social strategy implementation. 
The study entails an in-depth, one-firm research case analysis of the 
role of the performance/control systems in the implementation of 
corporate social strategy in an organically structured organization.
Scope and Definitional Orientation
In examining the process of social strategy implementation, a 
major focus of the study is on the administrative systems of per­
formance measurement, reporting, evaluation, and reward (referred to 
hereafter as performance/control systems). The purpose is to 
investigate the role of these variables in social strategy implemen­
tation and not to determine the appropriateness or the effectiveness 
of these systems per se. Therefore, the scope of this study is 
limited to an examination of these variables as they relate to the 
implementation of the firm's social strategy.
To analyze the organization's social strategy with respect to 
a number of social issues, it is necessary to define what is meant by 
social strategy. For the purposes of this study, corporate social 
strategy is defined to include those social policies and programs 
designed to address specific social issues in the organization's
environment. Although the social programs examined in this study may 
vary in many respects, for analytical purposes they can be classified 
in two basic categories--voluntary (or discretionary) and required by 
law.
Limitations
A limitation of this study is that it is a qualitative case 
study. Although this limitation will be discussed more thoroughly in 
the methodology chapter, it should be noted here that the author has 
applied the most current case methodologies in an attempt to minimize 
this limitation.
The organic structure of the sample organization may be a 
limitation in that, by definition, the performance/control systems 
are informal and unstructured therefore making them more difficult to 
examine. Even so, analysis procedures will be use that are designed 
to improve analytical accuracy (to be discussed in depth in the 
methodology chapter). Further, it is believed that the examination 
of such an organization will significantly add to the understanding 
of the social strategy implementation process (to be discussed in the 
next section).
Another limitation is a restricted amount of travel funds. 
Therefore, the scope of this study will be confined to the sample 
organization's domestic operations.
Justification
In justifying the study it seems appropriate to use the three 
criteria developed at the University of California at Berkley to
identify areas of future research in social issues. Edwin Epstein, 
in his address to the Social Issues Methodolody Workshop at the 1981 
Academy of Management Meetings (San Diego, California, August 2, 
1981), said that the criteria that should be used to identify areas 
of possible social research are: 1) usefulness in policy development
and management education, (2) contribution to the development of the 
discipline, and (3) the development of competence in the profession. 
The following sections attempt to justify the importance of this 
study based on these criteria.
Usefulness in Policy Development and Management Education
Ansoff indicates that during the 1980s and 1990s the firm's 
survival will depend directly on its ability to develop effective 
societal strategies to deal with the ever increasing socio-political 
trends, threats and opportunities.^ Since this study is an in-depth 
investigation of how one firm has actually implemented its social 
programs in an effort to develop a viable social strategy, its 
results should be useful to corporations engaged in the development 
of policies designed to put social strategies into effect.
There have only been two previous studies of social program
2
implementation. Neither study (one by Robert Ackerman and the
*H. Igor Ansoff, "The Changing Shape of the Strategic 
Problem," in Strategic Management ed. by Dan Schendel and Charles 
Hofer (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1970), pp. 35-43.
2Robert Ackerman, The Social Challenge to Business (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1975).
and Edwin Murray^-), focused on the performance/control systems per se 
although both state that these systems are critical to successful 
social strategy implementation. This study will investigate directly 
the role of the performance/control systems in the social strategy 
implementation process. By providing research data on the per­
formance/control systems as they relate to implementation, this study 
should contribute to a better understanding of the implementation 
process and thereby to management education.
Contribution to the Development of the Discipline 
Due to the sensitive nature of this study the sample firm has 
been disguised. The firm is located in a major city in the United 
States and will be called the Heath Corporation. The organic 
structure of the Heath Corporation permits this study to "contribute 
to the development of the discipline" for three reasons. First, both 
the Ackerman and Murray studied mechanistic organizations whose 
performance/control systems were highly structured and formalized. 
This study was conducted in a highly organic organization whose 
systems are quite flexible and informal. This study should therefore 
provide new information on social strategy implementation in organic 
organizations. These research data on organic systems should be 
helpful to organizations facing turbulence in their environments.
^Edwin Murray, "The Implementation of Social Policies in 
Commercial Banks," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1975).
In fact, the research of Terreberry indicates that most large organi­
zations are today facing turbulent environments.^-
Secondly, many other experts believe that the turbulent
2
environment may be the dominant one of the 1980s. The research of
3 4Burns and Stalker and Lawrence and Lorsch suggests that organiza­
tions facing turbulent environments should employ a more organic 
structure to ensure effectiveness and long-term survival. Thus,
based on the fact that most experts predict that the business
environment will become even more turbulent during the upcoming 
decades, business organizations will likely be moving toward more 
organic systems. By providing actual research data on the imple­
mentation of corporate social strategy in an organic organization, 
this study should contribute a greater and more in-depth 
understanding of the process of strategy implementation as it relates 
to the predominant organizational structures of the future.
A third reason why studying a structure of this type will 
contribute to the development of the discipline is that it will
increase the generalizability of the current social strategy
implementation process literature. As mentioned, the only actual
"4>. Terreberry, "The Evolution of Organizational Environ­
ments," Administrative Science Quarterly vol. 13 (1968): 590-613.
2
Stephen P. Robbins, Organization Theory (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 147-148.
3
Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation 
(London: Tavistock, 1961).
Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Organization and Environ­
ment (Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1967).
studies of this process have been performed by Ackerman and Murray. 
Since their research was conducted in mechanistic organizations, it 
seems logical that conducting similar research in an organic 
organization would aid in identifying those results of Ackerman and 
Murray which may be applicable in other (very divergent) structures. 
Thus, any consistences found between this study and those of Ackerman 
and Murray can be considered to be more generalizable in light of the 
fact that they were found in such divergent settings.
Development of Competence in the Profession 
A field study in social policy is often a very difficult 
undertaking due to its sensitive nature. Furthermore, this sensitiv­
ity is increased when the study focuses on such internal variables as 
the evaluation and reward systems. As a result, access into organi­
zations is often difficult, so there exists little actual data in 
this area (as will be demonstrated in the review of the literature 
chapter). Therefore, this study will be an exploratory investigation 
of the social strategy implementation process, thus generating 
hypotheses for future research in this area. The generation of 
hypotheses for future research should indeed add to the competency of 
the profession— Epstein's third criteria. Thus, assuming the 
worthiness of the criteria as established by Epstein and his 
colleagues, this study should be valuable in generating data that 
will significantly add to the research base in social policy.
7Environmental Analysis 
The nonmarket environment of business organizations is a very 
important element to this study. It is the purpose of this section 
to present a historical perspective of the social demands which have 
been encountered by business organizations in the last two decades 
and to present an analysis of the industry environment and the sample 
firm chosen for this study.
The Socio-Political Environment: 1960-1980 
An organization's general environment includes cultural 
values, the economic and educational climate, and socio-political 
considerations. Since this study will examine the implementation of 
social strategy, it is the purpose of this section to review the 
demands arising from the socio-political segment of the general 
environment during this time period.
During the decade of the Sixties a social revolution took 
place that has had a lasting and growing impact on American life and 
institutions. It was an incredible decade. Consider the events of 
1968 alone: the Tet offensive; the assassinations of Robert Kennedy
and Martin Luther King within 62 days of each other; the Civil Rights 
march to Washington, D.C.; the Democratic convention in Chicago where 
Major Daly's police battled the Yippies and newsmen; the Women's 
movement; Apollo 8 when we first saw the dark side of the moon; the 
Pueblo Incident; the year of the riot - SDS, Columbia and the Latin 
Quarter; President Johnson decided not to run for reelection and the 
Nixon-Agnew ticket was nominated by the Republicans; and Carlos and
Smith were dismissed from the U.S. Olympic team by the U.S. Olympic 
Committee for raising their hands in protest.
The decade of the Sixties was a period of major social change 
which has had ramifications throughout the seventies. "Most 
important of all the changes was the emergence of protest as a legi­
timate activity for large groups of Americans who have heretofore 
been apolitical."'*' During this period there was a sense that things 
could be changed, and people organized to try to effect that change. 
Individuals questioned the existing values and goals of dominant 
American institutions, and those institutions unified in their 
resistance to change. The legacy of the 1960s is "a politicized
society in which the decision-making process at all levels is fair
2
game for exposing and influencing."
The Youth Movement
By 1965, over 75 percent of American youth were graduating
from high school and over half of this group were going to college.
3
In 1969 60 percent of high school graduates were going to college. 
During this period there emerged in the United States a stratum of
^James H. Laue, "The Movement: Discovering Where It's At and
How to Get It," Urban and Social Change Review vol. 3 (Spring 1970): 
8 .
2Ibid.
3
Alvin Renetzsky and Jon S . Greene, eds., Standard Educa­
tional Almanac (Los Angeles: Academic Media, 1971), p. 75.
young people who collectively made a break with the constraints of
present-day society. They carefully examined some of the most
traditional values of American life and rejected them. This new
generation, who were predominantly from the middle class, had been
brought up in the midst of consumer abundance. Their parents, with
the economic depression of the 1930s still fresh in their minds,
sought the "good things of life" - a third car, T.V. sets, the right
house in the right neighborhood, etc. The youth culture rebelled
against this compulsive consumption and the social and ecological
problems associated with it. The new value system which emerged
rejected the value that happiness and a meaningful life were found in
material things.*
Although major areas of conflict which engaged the youth of
the Sixties and early Seventies were the civil rights movement, the
2
Vietnam war and the reform of the university, there was also a 
growing disaffection with business. One of the complaints voiced 
against business organizations was that the work situation demanded 
conforming behavior and thwarted apptitude and creativity. Organi­
zations were seen as "vast bureaucracies in which men do not govern
*Fred Davis, "Why All of Us May Be Hippies Someday," Trans- 
Action vol. 5 (December 1967): 13.
2
John R. Howard, The Cutting Edge, Social Movements and 
Social Change in America (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company,
1974), p. 176.
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by rules but in which rules govern men."^ The novel, Man in the Gray 
Flannel Suit, was a widely accepted stereotype of the traditional
businessman. Tom Rath, the novel's main character was quoted as
saying,
I should quit, but I want to eat, and so, like a 
half million other guys in gray flannel suits, I'll 
always pretend to agree until I get big enough to be 
honest without being hurt. By then, of course, it'g 
too late, for dishonesty has become a way of life.
This view of business was widely held by the college youth of the 
Sixties. These students also ^viewed business as overly concerned 
with profits and not sufficiently concerned with public responsibili­
ties. Ninety-four percent of college youth endorsed this view as
3
well as 92 percent of the non-college youth. Thus, began the
growing anti-business mood of the Seventies.
There is a considerable body of empirical research that
explores the value systems and occupational goals of these students.
Ondrack found in 1973 that contemporary students were no longer
interested in working in bureaucratic organizations and desired more
4
individualized employment opportunities. DeSalvia and Gemmill 
conducted a similar study which measured the value systems of college
^"Robert D. Clark, "Bearded Youth and Stereotype Gray 
Flannel," Financial Executive (March 1967): 45.
o
Sloan Wilson, The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1955), p. 180.
3
John S. Fielden, "Today the Campuses, Tomorrow the Corpora­
tions," Business Horizons (August 1968): 17.
^D. A. Ondrack, "Emerging Occupational Values: A Review and
Some Findings," Academy of Management Journal vol. 16 (September 
1973): 430-431.
students and managers. In terms of organizational goals, their study
revealed that profit maximization was more operative for managers,
while organizational stability and social welfare were more operative
for students.^ The study also suggested that students veiwed
managers in the "organization man" stereotype and perceived business
organizations as being unlikely to be able to fulfill their personal
2
goals and desired life style. This research indicates that there 
was an occupational value gap between the values held by students and 
traditional business values. In many ways the research showed an 
idealistic group of occupational values emerging during this time 
period.
The Ecology Movement
Although air and water pollution have been matters of concern 
to some for many years, the ecology movement gathered a large con­
stituency during this time period. With the publication of Rachel 
Carson's Silent Spring in 1963, the public became increasingly aware 
of the social costs of environmental degradation from industrial
pollution and pesticides. This awareness was gradually translated 
into federal legislation aimed at controlling pollution.
f
Numerous acts were passed during this period which dealt with
air and water pollution. The 1965 Water Quality Act attempted to set
^Donald M. DeSalvia and Gary R. Gemmill, "An Exploratory 
Study of the Personal Value Systems of College Students and 
Managers," Academy of Management Journal vol. 14 (June 1971): 
236-237.
systematic federal standards for water quality. In 1967 the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Administration (FWPCA) was created to oversee 
the regulatory process. The regulators however had difficulty in 
obtaining data on emissions and exercising sanctions. The Environ­
mental Protection Agency (the successor of the FWPCA), created in 
1970, also had difficulties regulating industrial polluters. Not 
until the passage of the Water Pollution Control Act in 1972 was 
there a comprehensive framework of standards and compliance 
procedures. This act required permits for all firms that discharged 
waste into an interstate waterway. The act also required companies 
to employ the "best practicable control technology" by July 1, 1977 
and by July 1, 1983, they must have "the best available technology."*
The legislative history of air pollution control is similar 
to that of water pollution. The first legislation in this area was 
the 1963 Clean Air Act. The 1967 Air Quality Act required states to 
specify standards and implement programs. The 1970 the Amendments to 
the Clean Air Act required national air standards and strengthened 
EPA's enforcement capabilities. In 1971 the EPA set standards for 
six common classes of pollutants, and the next year issued per­
formance standards for several industries. The states were to see
2
that these standards were met by June 30, 1975.
The legislative history of air and water pollution controls 
indicates that as more and more people became aware of the social
*This legislative history was summarized from Ackerman,
The Social Challenge to Business, pp. 33-36.
2Ibid.
costs of industrial pollution, the legislation became more 
comp rehens ive.
Despite all of the legislation that had been passed in the 
preceding ten years, a 1972 Yankelovich survey indicated that eight 
out of ten people strongly favored even more rigorous anti-pollution 
controls, particularly for air and water.^ Thus, the ecology move­
ment spawned greater social demands on business organizations to 
internalize many of their external costs of production.
The Civil Rights Movement
During the 1960s there also emerged a national movement for 
civil rights. The civil rights movement was initially a campaign for 
social changes such as desegration of public accommodations and 
facilities. The movement, however, turned to the more complex 
problems of discrimination in housing and employment, which in turn 
challenged the economic and political structure of society. The idea 
of equality of the races forced established institutions to respond 
to the challenges of discrimination. As in the case of the ecology 
movement, these social demands were translated into legislation.
Although President Kennedy in 1961 signed Executive Order 
10925 which prohibited discrimination by government contractors, the 
effect was minimal. The bona fide occupational qualifications were 
broadly construed and there were no enforcement mechanisms. 
The passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 extended
^Daniel Yankelovich, "Business in the '70s: Decade of
Crisis," Michigan Business Review vol. 24 (November 1972): 29.
these nondiscriminatory provisions to all employees as well as estab­
lishing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In 1965, 
Executive Order 11246 (amended by Executive Order 11375) was also 
signed. This order required federal contractors to develop and imple­
ment written affirmative action plans for minorities and women, and 
it created the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) to over­
see the regulatory process.'*' Other acts were also passed which dealt 
with specific areas of discrimination. In 1963 the Equal Pay Act was 
passed which prohibits sex-based discrimination in rates of pay to
employees; and, in 1967, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was
2
passed to deal with discrimination in employment based upon age. 
(See Table 1 for a complete listing of the acts passed.) Thus, a 
body of legislation evolved to protect individuals' civil rights.
When Title VII was first passed, Congress viewed it as solely 
a prohibition against disparate treatment based on race, color, reli­
gion, sex, or national origin. Over the next decade, however, the 
courts developed other categories of discrimination. The most sig­
nificant development in the laws prohibiting discrimination has been 
the development of two other categories besides disparate treatment:
(1) perpetuating in the present the effects of past discrimination 
and (2) disparate impact. Both of these categories assume that there 
is no intent to discriminate by those accused of employment dis­
crimination and that the practices complained of are neutral on their
^Ackerman, The Social Challenge to Business, pp. 36-38.
2
Barbara L. Schlei and Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimina­
tion Law (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1976),
pp. 370-373; 393-396.
face. Therefore, organizations' employment practices must not have 
a disparate impact on minorities or perpetuate discriminary practices 
regardless of whether there is an intent to discriminate. This has 
tremendous implications for organizations in that they must con­
tinually monitor their employment practices to ensure that they are 
not discriminatory.
Since the passage of Title VII, there has been a significant 
body of case law developed to deal with charges of discrimination. 
This body of case law is still developing at a rapid rate. Thus, the 
civil rights movement has created greater social demands on business 
organizations to respond to the challenges of discrimination.
Consumerism
During the 1960s consumers began to feel that business organ­
izations were not always living up to their responsibilities of 
providing safe, quality goods at reasonable prices. Product safety 
became a social issue after Ralph Nader's book, Unsafe at Any Speed 
(1964), and the thalidomide disaster. The result of this dis­
satisfaction was the emergence of the consumer movement. Consumerism
has been defined as "a social movement seeking to augment the rights
2
and powers of buyers in relation to sellers."
As with other social issues, consumer demands were translated 
into a wave of social legislation. Between 1962 and 1974 fifteen
*Ibid., pp. 1-8.
2
Philip Kottler, "What Consumerism Means for Marketers," 
Harvard Business Review (May-June 1972): 49.
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major consumer laws were enacted (see Table 1). Even with all of 
this legislation, a 1977 survey revealed that the "public feels by a 
margin of 3 to 1 that they are consistently shortchanged on product 
quality and product safety, by shoddy repairs, by warranties and 
guarantees that are not what they are supposed to be, and by manu­
facturers who are perceived as generally not really caring about the 
customer.11* Thus, the consumer movement has created greater social 
demands on business organizations to increase product quality and 
safety.
Occupational Health and Safety
The safety of working conditions also received increased
attention during the I960 and 1970 decades. By 1970, approximately 3
percent of the labor force was injured badly enough each year to
require sick leave. By 1974, surveys revealed that one of every ten
employees in the private sector suffered a job-related injury or
illness during the year; 200,000 work-related illnesses were
2
reported; and there were 5,900 job-related deaths. Thus, minimizing 
accidents, injuries, and illnesses resulting from work became a 
national priority.
With the creation of the Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration in 1970, Congress gave OSHA the power to require
*Louis Harris, "Quality of Life," The Harris Survey, November 
1977, p. 1. 
o
Annual Report of the National Center for Productivity and 
Quality of Working Life (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1977), pp. 95-96.
employers to provide each employee a job free from hazards that are 
likely to cause death or physical harm. In addition to OSHA, 
Congress created the National Institute of Occupational Safety and 
Heatlh (NIOSH) to conduct research on workplace hazards, and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) which hears 
appeals of OSHA charges against employers. This legislation 
reflected the increased concern of the labor movement for the
protection of its members at work. Employee safety and health is now
one of the major social concerns facing organizations.
In sum, the social legislation of the 1960s and 1970s 
reflects the increasing social demands the public has placed on busi­
ness organizations. In fact, social legislation increased more 
rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s than other kinds of governmental 
legislation. Table 1 summarizes the social legislation that was
passed during this time period. By the end of the 1970s it was
apparent that economic regulations were being relaxed (air trans­
portation, trucking, railroads), while social regulations were still 
growing.^" During this same period, new regulatory agencies also 
appeared such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission. These 
regulatory bodies and the legislation they represent all impose some 
kind of limitation on corporate social behavior.
^Keith Davis, William C. Frederick and Robert L. Blomstrom, 
Business and Society (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1980),
pp. 274-277.
TABLE 1
SOCIAL LEGISLATION OF THE 1960s AND 1970s
Year Year
Passed Name of Law Passed Name of Law
1962 Food and Drug Amendments 1970 Poison Prevention Packaging Act
1962 Air Pollution Control Act 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments
1963 Equal Pay Act 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act
1964 Civil Rights Act 1971 Lead-Based Paint Elimination Act
1965 Water Quality Act 1971 Federal Boat Safety Act
1965 Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 1972 Consumer Product Safety Act
1966 Fair Packaging and Labeling Act 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act
1966 Child Protection Act (toys) 1972 Noise Pollution and Control Act
1966 Traffic Safety Act 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act
1966 Coal Mine Safety Amendments 1973 Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
1967 Flammable Fabrics Act 1973 Vocational Rehabilitation Act
1967 Wholesome Meat Act 1973 Highway Speed Limit Reduction
1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1973 Campaign Finance Amendments
1968 Consumer Credit Protection Act 1974 Federal Energy Administration Act
(Truth-in-Lending) 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security
1968 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act Act
1968 Wholesome Poultry Product Act 1975 Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
1968 Radiation Control Health and Safety Act 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act
1969 National Environmental Policy Act 1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
1970 Public Health Smoking Act 1980 Superfund Legislation
1970 Amendments to Federal Deposit Insurance Act
1970 Securities Investor Protection Act
Adapted from Keith Davis, William Frederick and Robert L. Blomstrom, Business and Society (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1980), p. 275.
The Industry Environment and the Sample Firm 
The Heath Corporation— the sample firm chosen for this case 
analysis— is a member of the construction industry. Heath's task 
environment includes those external organizations, individuals, and 
institutions within the construction industry that it must interact 
with. Social demands and expectations, competition, regulation, 
industry structure, etc. all influence how Heath Corporation 
formulates its strategies. Therefore, the purposes of this section 
are to examine the construction industry and to then focus on the 
Heath Corporation as it relates to its industry.
The Construction Industry
Construction is an important component in the overall func­
tioning of the American economy. Construction expenditures 
constitute a major part of public and private investment which in 
turn influences fluctuations in the general level of economic 
activity. Construction, however, is an unusual sector of the economy 
in that the nature of its production process is quite different from 
that found in manufacturing or service industries. Since the produc­
tion process generally involves "fabrication and assembly of 
specially designed products at a special location determined by the 
customer,"'*' firms and labor markets in construction are usually 
tailored to meet the industry requirements. Thus, there are a great 
many specialized firms in the industry.
^Daniel Quinn Mills, Industrial Relations and Manpower in 
Construction (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1972), p. 3.
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One of the major characteristics of the industry is that it
is composed of many firms that are geographically dispersed (unlike
many industries that are concentrated in a few geographic areas).
The 1977 Census of Construction showed that there were 474,936
establishments operating within the industry.'*' Most of these firms
are localized in operation. In 1977, the receipts from the home
state of the firm constituted some 86.3 percent of total receipts of
2
all construction firms.
The Standard Industrial Classification lists twenty types of 
construction firms with three major divisions within the industry—  
general building contractors, heavy and highway contractors, and 
special trade contractors. The largest firms in terms of employment
and receipts are usually found in the heavy and highway division.
Construction receipts may come from either private or public expendi­
tures. The 1977 Census of Construction revealed that public
expenditures accounted for 20.7 percent of all construction receipts
3
by contractors. Public expenditures were of more importance to some 
sectors than to others. For example, heavy and highway contractors 
received 45.3 percent of total receipts from construction of publicly 
owned projects, while public funds only made up 13.4 percent of
^ 1977 Census of Construction Industries (U.S. Department of 
Commerce: Bureau of the Census), p. 5.
2Ibid., p. 21.
3Ibid., p. 18.
general building contractor's receipts and 13.9 percent of specialty
trades contractors' receipts.*
Another characteristic of the industry is that it is composed
of many small firms. In 1977, over half of the firms in the industry
only employed one to four employees. The average number of employees 
2
per firm was nine. The labor force is composed of twenty crafts and
many more specialities. Different branches in the industry require a
different combination of crafts in the production process. The labor
force in some branches is more unionized than in others, but there is
no continuous data reporting of the degree of union organization for
3
the industry as a whole or its branches.
Another feature of the industry is that more than half the 
firms are privately owned. Since the majority of firms are privately 
held, there is no public disclosure of these firms' operations. This 
gives them a great deal more freedom and flexibility in their 
operations than publicly held organizations.
The firms within the construction industry need flexibility 
in operations because of the unstable economic environment in which 
they must operate. The unpredictable nature of construction arises
*Ibid., p. 13.
2Ibid.
3
Mills, Industrial Relations and Manpower in Construction,
p. 16.
from the seasonality of some types of construction work as well as 
from fluctuations in market demand due to high interest rates, 
unemployment, etc. Construction is closely tied to the cyclical 
fluctuations in economic activity, so firms require flexibility for 
profitable operations. For example, firms in the industry require 
the ability to hire and lay off employees as job conditions demand 
it. Thus, the economic environment of a firm in the construction 
industry can be characterized as turbulent— one in which "the 
accelerating rate and complexity of interactive effects exceeds the 
component system’s capacities for prediction and, hence, control of 
the compounding consequences of their action."^
On the socio-political front, firms in the construction 
industry with federal contracts must develop and implement written 
affirmative action plans for minorities and women, a requirement of 
Executive Order 11246 (as amended by Executive Order 11375) which was 
signed in 1965. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) 
oversees this process and requires written monthly compliance reports 
from those firms with federal contracts.
Another regulatory body which is an important element in the 
environment of the construction firm is the Occupational Health and 
Safety Administration. OSHA has the power to require a safe work­
place for all employees. OSHA publishes a specific set of safety and 
health regulations for the construction industry.
^S. Terreberry, "The Evolution of Organizational Environ­
ments," p. 600.
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In sum, the construction industry faces an environment which 
can be characterized as both complex and dynamic. The dynamic 
dimension is evidenced by the intensity and unpredictable change in 
economic conditions. The complexity dimension arises from the number 
of different environmental components organizations within the 
industry must interact with, such as OFCC and OSHA. The nature of 
the production process also increases environmental complexity. For 
example, each project must be tailored to meet a specific market 
demand and thus no two projects are exactly the same. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that organizations within the construction industry 
face a turbulent environment— in terms of both environmental dynamics 
and complexity. The next section will examine the Heath Corporation 
and its relationship to its enviroment.
The Heath Corporation
The Heath Corporation is a privately held organization with 
offices in the Americas, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. 
Heath was started in 1946 by Randall Heath.'*' The company began with 
no meaningful financial resources. The only resources that Mr. Heath 
had available were several thousand dollars he won shooting craps as 
a buck private in the Army. Hi's first job was in 1946 when he 
received the contract to build a bridge near Macomb, Illinois. 
Mr. Heath served as general superintendent, concrete mixer, operator,
^The history of the Heath Corporation has been summarized 
from a speech entitled, "Heath: A Story of Continuous Beginnings,"
given in 1981 by Randall Heath to the Newcomen Society.
carpenter and laborer on the project. He met his first payroll with 
his G.I. insurance refund. Over the next several years he plowed 
back into his operation every available cent. During the Fifties, 
Heath Construction experienced sporadic growth. The Company expanded 
in terms of the complexity of the projects undertaken as well as geo­
graphically. Mr. Heath maintains that the Company was actually 
bankrupt three different times in their first twenty years.
It was during the Sixties that Heath faced the fact that 
orderly growth and development was almost impossible to plan and 
implement due to the turbulent nature of the construction industry. 
Thus, Heath embarked on a diversification strategy into areas that 
would complement the construction operation and utilize similar 
managerial skills. This strategy led to the development of the Texas 
Gas Company and into limestone and granite quarries to supply 
particular projects. In the late Sixties Heath began acquiring coal 
reserves and accumulated over 240,000 acres of coal lands with over 
one billion tons of reserves in Wyoming. Coal mining was a very 
profitable diversifications. The coal mining operations have 
recently been sold to a major oil company for an estimated $500 
million. Heath has also continued to expand internationally where 
projects consist of construction of pipelines, highways and bridges, 
and water supply systems. Recently Heath was awarded the contract 
for construction of the peace-keeping facilities to be used by the 
United Nations in the Sinai. The organization's history can be 
summarized in Randall Heath's words, "The Heath story is one of
continuous beginnings. And we are on the threshold of another one, 
for today we have capabilities we could not even dream of a decade 
ago."
The Heath Corporation today is one of the largest construc­
tion companies in the United States. In 1979 it was ranked among the 
top 25 percent of the largest construction companies in the U.S. by 
Engineering News Record (an industry trade journal). Heath employs 
on the average 1400 employees. The labor force is all nonunion 
unless there is a job site agreement stipulating the use of union 
workers. The organization owns the seventh largest fleet of 
construction equipment in the United States and has annual revenues 
of approximately $325 million. Thus, the Heath Corporation has grown 
in the past three decades to a prominent member of its industry.
Heath's primary activities consist of (in Randall Heath's 
words) "heavy construction, engineering design, land development, 
pipelines for natural gas transmission and water systems, electric 
generating plants and plain 'ole wheeling and dealing.'"^ The three 
main divisions within the organization are highway, industrial pipe­
line, and heavy utilities. This places Heath in the classification 
(SIC Code 16) of heavy construction general contractors. In 1977, 
there were 31,296 establishments in this category with average total 
receipts of $1,541,000 and an average number of employees of 29.
*Ibid., p. 7.
Heath's domestic operations are regionally localized. The organi­
zation's strategy, however, is to move toward a broader geographical 
base in the 1980s. Thus, Heath is included in the 12 percent of 
heavy construction firms doing work outside their home states. 
Approximately 66 percent of Heath's receipts come from public 
expenditures. In comparing the Heath Corporation with its industry, 
perhaps the most distinguishing feature is that it is much larger in 
size (number of employees, annual revenues, geographic dispersion) 
than the typical construction firm.
The Heath Corporation's organizational structure can be 
characterized as organic. The nature of Heath's management systems 
and relationships exhibit many of the characteristics described by 
Burns and Stalker.^ For example, there exists only a handwritten 
organization chart (Figure 1) which includes top management and the 
corporate officers. "The structure of the organization," commented 
one staff person, "is like meatballs and spaghetti: there is the
corporate level (meatballs) and then everybody else (spaghetti)." 
This characteristic is clearly identified by Burns and Stalker. One 
manager in the electronics firm (the organic system they studied) 
attacked the idea of an organizational chart as a dangerous method 
of thinking about the workings of management since it specified
^Burns and Stalker, The Management of Innovation, p. 92.
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individual tasks. The organic system does not depend on the manage­
ment hierarchy as a structure of defined functions and authority, but
2
rather relies on employee interactions to adjust and redefine tasks. 
This characteristic is evident at the Heath Corporation. According 
to Randall Heath, "There are no lines of authority here— we all share 
the load."3
Another organic characteristic at the Heath organization
includes communication channels which are lateral and verbal. This
researcher noted an aversion to written memos and policy statements.
Managers indicated that they felt complete freedom in seeking needed
information wherever it existed in the organization. Another organic
characteristic of Heath is that the knowledge and the control of the
tasks were located anywhere in the organization and managers were
given complete freedom in terms of task accomplishment. Each project
manager, for example, has complete control of his project— from
bidding it to completing it. Since each project is different,
individual managers' jobs are as little defined as possible. As Mr.
Bob Heath puts it: "There are few titles and positions here. It is
4
totally a team effort." And Mr. Randall Heath also reiterates this 
philosophy: "We don't make rules and punch time clocks. Individuals
1Ibid.
2Ibid.
3Mr. Randall Heath, July 14, 1982. 
^Mr. Bob Heath, July 22, 1982.
are encouraged to seek their own levels of attainment."^ In sum, it 
appears that the Heath Corporation exhibits most of the organic 
characteristics described by Burns and Stalker. In speaking of his 
company's flexibility Randall Heath says, "Although Heath has become 
a large and diversified company, it still retains the organizational 
flexibility to quickly respond in a controlled manner to customer and 
market needs virtually anywhere in the world and to meet ever- 
changing market requirements or even fast-changing climatic 
conditions." Thus, the Heath Corporation can be described as a very 
large firm in the construction industry with an organic organi­
zational structure.
As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the Heath 
Corporation has a highly positive, visable social image in the areas 
in which it operates. At Heath social responsibility is considered 
good business, and this has led to the development of viable social 
programs. The next section will demonstrate the importance of such 
programs.
Social Strategy in Perspective
The environmental analysis developed in the preceding
i
sections demonstrates how important socio-political factors have 
become in an organization's environment. The purpose of this section 
is to demonstrate that today the development and implementation of 
viable social strategies to meet these socio-political factors are 
important elements in the overall strategy of the firm.
XMr. Randall Heath, July 14, 1982.
Historically, corporate strategy and planning have been based 
on only economic and technological inputs —  where economic inputs 
supply macroeconomic forecasts of future GNP, consumption and invest­
ment expenditures, productivity, inflation, etc., and technological 
inputs supply predictions about state of the art developments in new 
products, new systems, and new materials. These two inputs have been 
relied on to give the organization all the data necessary for 
strategic decision making.^ Therefore, traditionally management has 
acknowledged only two sources of uncertainty: 1) product or
technological uncertainty and 2) market uncertainty.
During the tumultuous Sixties and Seventies, however, a new
source of uncertainty for business organizations emerged— social
uncertainty. Social uncertainty may be labelled many things: social
unrest, changing social values and expectations, a rejection of
2
traditional values, or a concern for the qualify of life. Since 
business planning and decision making have always been concerned with 
the assessment of risk and since there now seems to be new dimensions 
to risk, organizations have now begun to incorporate this new element 
into corporate strategy. In other words, today the organization
Ian H. Wilson, "Reforming the Strategic Planning Process: 
Integration of Social Responsibility and Business Needs," in The 
Unstable Ground ed. by S. Prakash Sethi (Los Angeles: Melville 
Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 245-255.
2
Rebecca A. Gould and Eugene J. Kelley, "An Integrated Com­
munications Model of Corporate Adaptation to Uncertainty," in The 
Unstable Ground ed. by S. Prakash Sethi (Los Angeles: Melville 
Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 279-292.
cannot assume "other things equal" in making decisions because social 
and political factors now have a bearing on organizational survival.
Further, this environmental turbulence is as much related to 
the changing structure of the strategic problem facing organizations 
as it is to the increasing complexity of traditional business 
problems. According to Ansoff, firms today, in addition to the 
traditional product/market/technology problems facing them, must also 
deal with rapidly changing resource supplies, real limits to growth, 
non-economic challenges to the firm's legitimacy, and significant 
social and political pressures. This means that "the historical 
preoccupation with product/market/technology strategies must be 
broadened to include other types of strategies" - resources, socio­
political, etc.'*' Boulding also contends that organizational
survival during the next few decades depends more on an organiza-
2
tion's non-market than its market environment.
Kenneth Andrews contends that social strategy formulation 
should be a basic component of the strategic planning process. 
According to Andrews, "the formulation of specific corporate social 
policy is as much a function of strategic planning as the choice of 
product and market combinations, the establishment of profit and
*Igor H. Ansoff, "The Changing Shape of the Strategic 
Problem," pp. 30-44.
^Kenneth Boulding, "The Legitimacy of the Business Institu­
tion" in Rationality, Legitimacy, Responsibility ed. by Edwin Epstein 
and Dow Votaw (Santa Monica, Cal.: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1978),
pp. 87-87.
growth objectives, or the choice of organization structure and
systems for accomplishing corporate purposes."^- Andrews maintains
that one of the major aspects of strategy formulation should be the
"identification and acceptance of the social responsibilities of the 
2
firm." In essence, Andrews urges professional managers to come to
terms with the "morality of choice" by reconciling corporate
objectives involving profits and contributions to society. This’is
the "most stimulating and strenuous problem in strategic 
3
decision-making."
Likewise, Ackerman views social responsiveness as a matter of 
strategic choice. According to Ackerman, it is the chief executive 
who has the freedom to determine the pattern of response to social 
issues. The two basic policy questions the chief executive must 
consider are:^
(1) How should the response to social demands be incor­
porated into the firm's strategy?
(2) Which issues should the firm seek to lead social 
expectations?
^Kenneth R. Andrews, "Can the Best Corporations Be Made 
Moral," Harvard Business Review (May-June 1973): 59.
o
Kenneth R. Andrews, The Concept of Corporate Strategy (Home­
wood, 111.: Dow-Jones-Irwin, Inc., 1971), p. 175.
3Ibid., p. 119.
4
Robert W. Ackerman and Raymond Bauer, Corporate Social 
Responsiveness: The Modern Dilemma (Reston, Va: Reston Publishing 
Company, 1976), p. 40.
In answering these questions, the chief executive must assess (as 
with any other strategy) the strategic implications of utilizing the 
firm’s scarce resources and distinctive skills to address the issue. 
Thus, the corporation has the opportunity to formulate a social 
policy to govern its relationship with the socio-political elements 
in its environment. The corporation’s social strategy, however, may 
not be explicitly stated, but it can usually be identified in the 
firm's behavior over time.^
According to Post, however, the ability of an organization to
formulate effective strategic responses to a critical social issue is
highly dependent on how far that issue has progressed in its public
life cycle —  the progression of an issue from its initial public
awareness through political action, legislation and litigation to its
final acceptance and internalization. Basically, the further through
the life cycle an issue progresses, the less freedom the organization
2
has in dealing with the issue. In other words, if the organization 
waits until the latter part of the life cycle to respond to an issue, 
it will be forced to react to public pressure and new legislation, 
rather than proactively planning and implementing its own social 
programs. In essence, it is up to the CEO to determine which type of 
social response strategy (reactive, proactive, etc.) the organization 
adopts with respect to the particular social issues it faces.
1Ibid., pp. 35-40.
2
James E. Post, "Corporate Response Models and Public 
Affairs Management," Public Relations Quarterly (Winter 1979): 30.
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Ackerman also supports the contention that the ability of a 
firm to respond to a particular social issue is dependent on where 
that issue is in its life cycle. According to Ackerman, it is during 
the early phases of the life cycle (which he calls the zone of 
discretion) in which substantial uncertainties exist with respect to 
social issues that the corporation has a wide variety of options 
available. Therefore, the firm has more freedom in formulating its 
social response strategies during this period than after the issue 
has progressed through the last phase of the life cycle.*
In sum, the literature is in agreement that in today's 
turbulent socio-political environment it is necessary for a firm to 
formulate and implement effective social strategies. This study is 
basically designed to examine this implementation process in a firm 
which is facing this turbulence and has actively developed policies 
and programs to deal with it. Thus, this study provides insight into 
a process which is critical to all firms operating in today's 
changing environment. In the next chapter the available literature 
on social response patterns will be reviewed.
Robert W. Ackerman, The Social Challenge to Business, pp. 
31-41. See also Anthony Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue
Attention Cycle," The Public Interest (Summer 1972): 38 for further
discussions of the social issue life cycle.
CHAPTER 2
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Largely because of the growth in size and complexity of the
social demands facing business organizations over the last two
decades, there has emerged a body of literature which attempts to 
both describe and prescribe various organizational response processes 
which may be employed by an organization in facing its social environ­
ment. This body of literature although relatively new— with the
majority of works being published since the late 1970's— is quite 
diverse and yet complementary. In general this body of knowledge 
demonstrates that, although the content of specific social strategies 
may vary depending on the industry, current social concerns, the
legal environment, etc., the social response strategies utilized by 
firms to deal with a wide variety of social issues are basically 
applicable to all firms in all industries. The purpose of this 
chapter is to: a) present the historical development of this body of
literature and to inte'grate the various response models found in the 
literature into a taxonomy of social response patterns designed to 
classify the literature in a more generalizable and thus useful 
manner, b) identify those specific organizational variables which the 
literature suggests are related to the implementation of the firm's 
social strategy, c) develop specifically the role of the performance/
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control systems in social strategy implementation, and d) to develop 
the basic focus of this study.
The Emerging Social Response Literature:
Toward A Taxonomy of Corporate 
Social Response Patterns
The social environment of business organizations has become 
so volatile due to changing public expectations and values that 
corporations can no longer afford to ignore their nonmarket environ­
ment. In fact, it has now become imperative that organizations 
respond to and deal with social issues. The responses that 
organizations take may differ from industry to industry, firm to 
firm.* Additionally, a different set of stimuli may also prompt 
varying organizational responses. Regardless of the motivating 
factors, corporations do respond in various ways to social issues, 
and it is a review of these various response patterns which is the 
concern of this section.
In examining the early social responsibility literature only 
two authors, Eells and Walton, emerge as having attempted to build 
descriptive models of organizational social response behaviors. 
Eells conceptualizes behaviors which range from responsible (Metro 
Corporation) to irresponsible (Traditional Corporation). In essence, 
Eells only describes the polar ends of the continuum. The placement 
of a specific organizational behavior on the continuum is determined
Edwin Kuntz, Banwari Kedia and Carlton Whitehead, "Varia­
tions in Corporate Social Performance," California Management Review 
22 (Summer 1980): 35-36.
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by comparing its exhibited behavior with societal norms and expecta­
tions . *
Walton expanded Eells' work to include six models of business
conduct. These models may be conceived as points on a continuum
ranging from low to high social responsibility. Walton's models are 
2
as follows:
1. The austere model exclusively emphasizes ownership 
interest and profit objectives.
2. The household model emphasizes employee jobs, benefits, 
and paternalism.
3. In the vendor model consumer interests, tastes, and rights 
dominate the organization.
4. The investment model has as its primary focus long run 
profits and survival. It also gives some recognition to 
social investments along with economic ones.
5. The civic model focuses on corporate citizenship. It 
views the organization as going beyond imposed obligations 
toward making positive commitments to social needs.
6. The artistic model encourages the organization to become a 
creative instrument in creating a better qualify of life.
Walton's artistic model is essentially equal to Eells' metro corpora­
tion, while his austere model represents Eells’ traditional corpora-
^Richard Eells, The Meaning of Modern Business (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 38-68.
2
Clarence C. Walton, Corporate Social Responsibilities 
(Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 120-141.
tion. Both Walton's and Eells1 models are descriptive in nature in
that they are based on abstract rationalizations for behavior rather
than actual observed organizational behavior.
In an early piece on the need for a new corporate response to 
a changing social environment (based on actual case experiences), 
Sethi and Votaw discuss traditional corporate responses. In this 
pressure-response model, Sethi and Votaw articulate three traditional 
corporate responses to outside pressures resulting from social dis­
content. The responses are grouped into broad categories of organiza­
tional behaviors:^
1. The public relations response attempts to uphold the cor­
porate image so that the organization can maintain public
confidence. The issue is usually lost in a quandary of 
generalities.
2. The legal response resorts to legalistic interpretations 
of the organization's rights in responding to the claims 
of pressure groups. Again, this response avoids the 
issue and assures stronger criticisms in the future.
3. The industrial relations-bargaining response is patterned 
on long experience in dealing with labor unions. This 
response is usually evoked when the corporation cannot 
avoid the issue and therefore must deal with outside 
pressures.
S. Prakash Sethi and Dow Votaw, "Do We Need a New Cor­
porate Response to a Changing Social Environment?" California 
Management Review vol. 12 (Fall 1969): 3-31.
The essence of this model is that pressure motivates the organization 
to respond with short-term reactions. Management usually only recog­
nizes the issue at the same time it is being pressured to respond to 
it. Sethi and Votaw note the failure of this model in dealing with 
social issues and call for a new corporate response.
Another empirical model of corporate responsiveness to social
change emerged in the literature in 1973. Robert Ackerman is the
principal proponent of this business policy model. According to
Ackerman, corporate responses to social change involve three distinct
phases:'*' (1) the chief executive recognizes the issue as important
and perceives the need for an up-to-date company policy; (2) the
chief executive appoints specialists to coordinate activities and
gather information; and (3) the policy is institutionalized by
working it into the resource allocation and reward system of the
organization. Ackerman along with Raymond Bauer reaffirmed these
2
three stages in the social response process. Murray, in a follow-up 
study of the banking industry, confirmed these general patterns, but 
he also recognized that the second stage included two phases - one 
involving a period of technical learning about the problem by
"^Robert W. Ackerman, "How Companies Respond to Social 
Demands," Harvard Business Review (July-August 1973): 88-98.
2
Ackerman and Bauer, Corporate Social Responsiveness, 
pp. 119-131.
specialists, the other involving administrative learning about the 
actual workings of the organization.^-
The business policy model emphasizes managerial initiative 
and views the response process as sequentially passing from identi­
fication to commitment to implementation. Managerial initiative, 
however, may result from public pressure or the chief executives' 
commitment to various social programs. Sethi and Votaw's pressure- 
response model emphasizes legal compulsion and public pressure as the 
motivating factors as well as assuming cognizance is occuring while 
the action is taking place. The difference between these models, 
however, is with respect to how that response process actually 
operates in specific organizational settings.
As pointed o,ut above, the Ackerman model and the Sethi-Votaw 
model each assume a different set of motivating factors which prompt 
organizational responses. Hinckley and Post have suggested that an 
organization can be stimulated to act through several means, some of 
which prompt voluntary action, others involuntary. According to these 
authors, there are three general types of stimuli that underlie 
organizational responses to social issues. They are (1) legal 
mandate, which creates an involuntary response; (2) public pressure, 
which stimulates a type of voluntary response on an individual 
issue basis; and (3) the initiative of the organization, which is
"hsdwin A. Murray, Jr., "The Social Response Process in 
Commercial Banks: An Empirical Investigation," Academy of Manage—
ment Review vol. 1 (July 1976): 5-15.
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a genuine voluntary response.^ This last stimulus is comparable with 
Ackerman's business policy model, while the legal mandate and public 
pressure stimuli are the underlying factors of Sethi and Votaw1s 
pressure-response model.
Parket and Eilbirt also address the stimuli accounting for a 
firm's social responses. One such stimulus is payoff and self- 
defense, where a response is undertaken becaue of some expected 
payoff or because some criticism has been levelled at the organiza­
tion. Another motivator may center around the phenomenon of fashion. 
This explanation contends that the business organization is swept by 
fads— human relations, scientific management, etc. The last 
stimulus addressed by Parket and Eilbirt concerns the personality and 
values of the chief executive. This explanation suggests that
organizational responses to social issues are dependent on how the
2
chief executive perceives those issues.
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the type of 
organizational response is largely dependent on the business strategy 
employed by top management. Several authors have examined the busi­
ness strategy of response to social change. McAdam discusses four
George P. Hinckley and James E. Post, "The Performance 
Context of Corporate Responsibility," in The Unstable Ground, edited 
by S. Prahash Sethi (Los Angeles: Melville Publishing Co., 1974),
pp. 293-302.
2
Robert Parket and Henry Eilbirt, "Social Responsibility: 
The Underlying Factors," Business Horizons vol. 18 (August 1975): 
5-10.
social responsibility strategies and the resulting level of effort 
which is required for each. These are:^"
1. Fight all the way, which requires no action other than 
defensive reaction;
2. Do only what is required, which requires careful investi­
gation of all requirements as well as advance planning 
for likely new requirements;
3. Be progressive, which requires a large effort to deal 
with a range of issues;
4. Lead the industry, which requires substantial experi­
mentation and applied research.
Ian Wilson also suggests four alternative business strategies
of response, to social challenges: (1) reaction, (2) defense, (3)
2
accommodation, and (4) proaction. According to Wilson, "a strategy 
of mere compliance and reaction has within it the seeds of its own 
destruction; and that the best prospect for a viable measure of cor­
porate initiative and vitality for the future is to be found 
in moving quickly beyond mere compliance to developing imagina­
tive solutions that have the effect of internalizing the new social
^Terry W. McAdam, "How to Put Corporate Social Responsibil­
ity into Practice," Business and Society Review vol. 6 (Fall 1973): 
R-16.
2
Ian H. Wilson, "What One Company Is Doing About Today's 
Demands on Business," in Changing Business - Society Relationships 
ed. by George A. Steiner (Los Angeles: Graduate School of Manage­
ment, UCLA, 1975), pp. 23-53.
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expectations in the day-to-day operations of the corporate 
system.
Along these same lines of thought, Preston and Post, in 
developing their concept of public responsibility, contend that 
environmental scanning is essential in strategic decision making and 
in the implementation of publicly responsible behavior. According to 
these authors, there are four process responses which flow directly 
from the scanning activity itself. These process responses to social 
involvement are:^
1. Cognizance, which is increased knowledge of the external 
environment and relevant publics;
2. Reporting, which occurs after social issues are identi­
fied;
3. Participation, which is the inclusion of persons and 
groups concerned with the managerial activity into the 
managerial process itself;
4. Experimentation with respect to information which 
includes gathering devices for social improvement and 
taking substantive action.
In essence, corporate strategy should include involvement with the 
organization's external environment and business decisions should 
reflect this social involvement.
1Ibid., p. 53.
o
Lee E. Preston and James E. Post, Private Management and 
Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975),
pp. 106-123.
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Davis and Blomstrom, in noting that we now live in a 
pluristic society, suggest five alternative responses available to 
business. These include (1) withdrawal, (2) a public relations
approach, (3) a legal approach, (4) bargaining, and (5) problem 
solving.^- These responses can be thought of as points on a continuum 
ranging from low social involvement to high social involvement.
Crawford and Gram also view the business organization in 
light of the pluristic society in which it must operate. Noting that 
the number of special interests pressing on business has expanded, 
these authors analyze various social responses based on relationships 
between firms and social interest organizations, i.e. interorganiza- 
tional transactions. By setting the social responsibility issue 
within the context of interorganizational relationships, Crawford and 
Gram contend that the strategic options of the firm can be identified
and assessed. The range of strategies available to the organization
. , . , . 2 as it interacts with social interest groups are:
1. Conflict strategies where neither a satisfactory rela­
tionship nor an acceptable outcome appear possible;
2. Preemptive responses where the firm acts unilaterally and 
bypasses the issue of process;
^Keith Davis and Robert Blomstrom, Business and Society: 
Environment and Responsibility (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1975), pp. 85-87.
2Ronald L. Crawford and Harold A. Gram, "Social Responsibil­
ity as an Interorganizational Transaction," Academy of Management 
Review vol. 3 (October 1979): 880-888.
3- Coopting strategies where the firm incorporates key 
leaders of the social interest group into the firm.
4. Interpenetration or collaborative strategies where the 
firm and the social interest group join together on 
mutually acceptable projects; and
5. Classical adaptation responses where the firm accepts the 
necessity for action and bargains with the social interest 
organization.
With the expanded number of competing groups pressuring business in 
terms of their own interests, corporations must now formulate 
responses in order to deal with these special interest groups.
The literature on corporate social response patterns is a 
very current addition to the social responsibility literature. This 
is reflected by the fact that several seminal pieces emerged in the 
late seventies. The remainder of this section will review these 
pieces.
Archie Carroll has developed a social performance model which 
recognizes that social responsibility is not separate from economic 
performance but rather is just one part of the total responsibilities 
of business. Carroll views social responses as the action phase of 
management responding to specific issues. His social performance 
model, includes Wilson's response philosophy, but also encompasses 
the definition of social responsibility as well as an enumeration of 
the social issues involved. In sum, Carroll suggests that these are
three distinct but interrelated aspects of corporate social 
performance.^
Zenisek, in his social responsibility continuum, clusters the 
set of social demands and expectations into four phases. He views 
them from Blau and Scott's concept of prime beneficiary and Emery and 
Trist's concept of the causal texture of organizational environments. 
Each phase is represented by a model: (1) owner/manager, (2)
organization participant, (3) task environment, and (4) societal. 
Although Zenisek does not explicitly address various response 
patterns, implicit in his analysis is the idea that as the concerns 
of the firm become more societal in nature, the behavior of the firm 
must become more proactive.^
Sethi has, developed a three stage model for classifying 
corporate social behavior. In this schema stage one behaviors are 
called social obligation and are reactive in nature; whereas stage 
two behaviors are called social responsibility and are prescrip­
tive in nature. Both stage one and two are conceptualized as
response mechanisms, while stage three behaviors are called social
3
responsiveness and are anticipatory and proactive in nature. Sethi
^Archie B. Carroll, "A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of 
Corporate Performance," Academy of Management Review vol. 4 (December 
1979): 497-505.
2
Thomas J. Zenisek, "Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Conceptualization Based on Organizational Literature," Academy of 
Management Review vol. 4 (1979): 359-368.
3
S. Prakash Sethi, "Dimensions of Corporate Social Perform­
ance: An Analytical Framework," California Management Review vol. 27
(Spring 1975): 58-64. Also see S. Prakash Sethi, "A Conceptual
Framework for Environmental Analysis of Social Issues and Evaluation
describes stage three strategy as "developing and adapting new tech­
nology for environmental protectors."^
Post, in examining the patterns of corporate response in 
fifty case studies, found companies adopt three basic approaches to 
change: (1) management will allow the external environment to change
first and then respond to it (reactive, adaptive response); (2) 
management will take action to induce change in the environment that 
will help the firm achieve its own objectives (proactive response); 
or (3) management will manage the gap between public goals and cor­
porate goals over time (interactive response). The interactive 
response emphasizes the continuous corporation-society interaction. 
However, in Post's research on the international infant formula 
industry, he identified five distinct modes of response. These 
responses are based on two important dimensions. One is the
company's "stakes" in maintaining the status quo, and the other is
2
the company's perceptions of the validity of the critic's claims. 
These two important dimensions contribute a better understanding of 
why, under certain circumstances, a firm may adopt a particular 
response pattern.
In summary, the social responses adopted by the organi­
zation will depend on: 1) the stimuli underlying the particular
of Business Response Patterns," Academy of Management Review vol. A 
(January 1979): 63-74.
1Ibid (1979), p. 67. 
o
James E. Post, "Corporate Response Models," pp. 27-33.
1 2  3 4response, * * » 2) the corporate strategy of top manage­
ment,^’  ^ and 3) the number of special interest groups the
8 9organization must interact with. ’ Figure 2 integrates the 
various social responses postulated in the literature into a taxonomy 
of corporate social response patterns.
Internal Process Variables 
Since it is the purpose of this study to examine how the 
management of one organization has implemented its social policies 
over time, it is essential to review the literature in an attempt 
to identify those variables which have a relationship to this 
implementation process. In fact, a great deal of the social 
response literature suggests that administratively, implementing 
social policies is a difficult and time-consuming task. Thus, after
■''Sethi and Votaw, "Do We Need A New Corporate Response," 
pp. 3-31.
2
Acherman, "How Companies Respond," pp. 88-89.
^Hinckley and Post, "The Performance Context," pp. 293-302. 
4
Parket and Eilbirt, "Social Responsibility," pp. 5-10.
■^McAdam, "How to Put Corporate Responsibility," pp. 8-16.
^Ian H. Wilson, "What One Company Is Doing," pp. 25-53.
^Preston and Post, Private Management and Public Policy, 
pp. 106-123.
D
Davis and Blomstrom, Business and Society, pp. 85-87.
9
Charford and Gran, "Social Responsibility as," pp. 880-888.
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A TAXONOMY OF CORPORATE RESPONSE PATTERNS
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social policies have been established, the internal process of imple­
mentation is critical in managing responses to social issues. It is 
the purpose of this section, therefore, to review the literature 
concerning these internal process variables.
As previously mentioned, Ackerman observed a three phrase
response process in a case study of two decentralized companies. He
noted that in the institutionalization phase (phase III), problems
were posed by the administrative system and the inherent structure of
the firms.^ The problem, according to Ackerman, was working the
social policy into the "process through which resources were
2
allocated and ultimately careers decided." He saw three major
3
problems in the implementation process:
1. The rules governing the interrelationships between 
corporate and division levels contributed to the problem 
of obtaining responsiveness. In other words, top manage­
ment was only to evaluate divisional results, not to 
meddle in divisions' operating procedures. Thus, the 
standards for judging performance needed to be changed.
2. The financial reporting system was inadequate and ineffec­
tive in measuring social responsiveness. Thus, new 
measures of social responsiveness in each social area 
needed to be created.
^Ackerman, The Social Challenge to Business, pp. 65-83. 
2
Ackerman, "How Companies Respond," p. 94.
^Ibid., pp. 90-94.
3. The executive performance, evaluation, and reward process 
was challenged. The performance appraisal system was 
based solely in terms of the bottom line. Thus, if 
social policies were to be fully implemented organiza­
tion-wide, division and line managers should also be 
evaluated in terms of their social performance. In
essence, the only way to obtain middle managers' support 
for social policies is to have their careers depend on 
their performance in this area.
Murray, in a follow-up study in the banking industry, 
examined the social response process in centralized organizations. 
His results indicated that organizational structure was not as 
dominant a variable in implementation as he first hypothesized. 
Rather, he found that the banks administrative and procedural 
processes governed the degree and speed of the response. Imple­
mentation did not occur until management information systems, control 
reporting formats, credit training programs, and managerial reward 
and penalty systems were modified.^ In both Ackerman's and Murray's 
studies the process variables played an important role in the 
organization managing its responses to social issues.
Webster, in an empirical study of 15 organizations, also 
found that procedural elements were crucial in implementing internal 
responses to social issues. The firms that were perceived as the
^Murray, "The Social Response Process," p. 11-13.
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most successful in their social performance were those which had made 
the following process modifications:^
1. developed and communicated formal written policies 
covering the social role of the firm,
2. conducted social audits, and
3. evaluated management based upon their performance in key 
social issue areas.
Thus, these process variables, according to Webster, contributed to 
the successful management of the firms' social environments.
Gray contends that one of the biggest problems in achieving 
increased responsiveness is the organizational difficulty of incor­
porating social policies into existing operations. He cites four 
empirical studies that support this thesis and then offers a set of 
guidelines to aid in the implementation process. His guidelines also 
suggest that successful implementation is dependent on modifying the
reward, performance, and evaluation process as well as the management
2
information system to incorporate information on social performance. 
This view is also expressed by the Task Force on Corporate Social 
Performance.^
^Webster, "Corporate Social Policy: An Empirical Investi­
gation of the Effect of Structure and Procedure on Perceived Social 
Effectiveness," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1975).
2
Edmund R. Gray, "Planning for Corporate Social Programs - 
Problems and Guidelines," long Range Planning vol. 14 (1981): 49.
3
"Business and Society: Strategies for the 1980's," Report
of the Task Force on Corporate Social Performance, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 1980, p. 14-32.
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The literature also indicates that the achievement of social 
goals depends on the management processes of social measurement and 
social reporting. Social measurement involves an assessment of 
social performance and is usually done by persons within the firms. 
Raymond Bauer is a proponent of such a social measure - the manage­
ment process audit. He conceives of such an audit as a means by 
which the organization could evaluate its own status with respect to 
social issues.* Preston and Post also feel that this process of
internal reporting is a significant response in itself. They view it
2
as a first step toward more formal evaluation and appraisal. The
Task Force on Corporate Social Performance also suggests that the
more responsive firms have systems of social measurement and report- 
3
ing. Thus, reporting information concerning social performance 
appears to be an important process in helping the organization manage 
its social environment.
In summary, the literature suggests that for a firm 
to successfully implement its social strategy, modifications in some 
of its internal processes must occur. Of all the studies examined, 
modifications in the performance/control systems to include social 
objectives were critical variables in successful implementation. The
^Raymond A. Bauer, L. Terry Cauthorn, and Ranne P. Warner, 
"Auditing the Management Process for Social Performance," Business 
and Society Review (Fall 1975): 39-45.
2
Preston and Post, Private Management, p. 115.
3
"Corporate Social Reporting in the United States and 
Western Europe," Report of the Task Force on Corporate Social Per­
formance, 1980, pp. 113-124.
purpose of the next section is to review the literature which deals 
with these performance/control systems with respect to the imple­
mentation of social strategy.
The Role of the Performance/Control Systems in the 
Social Strategy Implementation Process
The evaluation of managers and the distribution of rewards 
are critical in managing any organization. The strategic management 
literature explicitly points out that successful strategy implementa­
tion is dependent on tying the performance/control systems to the 
organization's long-run strategic objectives. Although the majority 
of this literature does not directly deal with social strategy per se 
it is applicable since social strategy is quite similar in many 
respects to other types of long run strategies. If managers feel 
that the evaluation and reward system governing their careers does 
not include rewards for social policies, then they are less likely to 
give it much of their attention. The literature suggests that these 
performance/control systems are vital factors influencing corporate 
responsiveness to social issues, and that implementation of the 
organization's social strategy is contingent upon tying these systems 
to social objectives.
Short-term/Long-Term Delimma 
As mentioned earlier, the formulation of social policy and 
strategy is now considered a major component of the strategy formula­
tion process. Social strategy, like other specific strategies,
(product, market, etc.), focuses on the long run. Many organizations 
today, however, are facing a conflict between short-term and long­
term goals. This conflict results from the fact that adherence to a 
strategy aimed at the attainment of long-range goals often requires 
resource commitments and expenses that reduce current profits.
Although these expenses reduce profits in the short-run, they are 
investments that are designed to pay off in the long-run. Operating 
managers, however, are often pressured to increase annual profits 
regardless of the impact on long-term goals.
This dilemma is described by Banks and Wheelwright*
who studied this short-term, long-term (S/L) tradeoff in six organi­
zations. They found that even minor S/L tradeoffs can have an 
adverse impact on corporate strategy. These reseachers discuss 
several areas in which the S/L tradeoff is likely to occur. The 
postponement of capital expenditure programs is one of the most vul­
nerable areas they found. Capital outlay programs usually have a 
time horizon longer than a year, while costs associated with the 
program can reduce current profits. If a manager postpones the 
project, this will free the resources needed to produce operating 
profits. Banks and Wheelwright found that "capital projects
involving needs like pollution control are highly vulnerable
to the S/L tradeoff problem, since the investments are generally
^Robert L. Banks and Steven C. Wheelwright, "Operations vs. 
Strategy: Trading Tomorrow for Today," Harvard Business Review
(May-June 1979): 112-120.
capital-consuming rather than capital-generating.’1^  Obviously, the
postponement of projects like pollution control can adversely affect
the organization's social strategy. Other areas vulnerable to S/L
2tradeoffs are the deferral and reduction of operating expenses.
Expenses (i.e., minority relations, urban affairs, environmental)
vital to the accomplishment of strategic social objectives are
usually easier to defer or reduce than other operating expenses.
Thus, social programs may be postponed or even abolished in an
attempt to increase current operating profits.
The decision to favor short-term profits over long-run
strategic goals, according to Banks and Wheelwright, is influenced by
3
the manner in which performance is evaluated and measured. The
performance evaluation system was found to be a key factor in S/L
tradeoffs. Managers were aware of how success was measured within
their organization. Both compensation (salary, bonus, etc.) and
status (peer evaluation, supervisor evaluation, promotions, rank,
etc.) were found to be the key performance evaluation motivators,
4
with status the more important of the two. Thus, if the organiza­
tion places emphasis on short-run performance as the primary 
determinant of rewards and careers, then managers will tend to favor 
the short-run at the expense of long-term social strategies.
1Ibid., p. 114.
2Ibid., p. 115.
3Ibid., p. 116.
4Ibid.
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Jacob Naor also stresses the need to tie the incentive
structure to long-run objectives to encourage future-oriented
behavior on part of divisional managers.^ In a study of ten
midwestern companies, Naor found that the use of bonuses and
promotions were not directly linked to long-run plan achievement. He
noted several problems caused by tying bonuses to the fulfillment of
2
annual budget targets. The problems he identified are that they:
(1) forced managers to focus on the short term;
(2) encouraged a myopic view of the future;
(3) led to suboptimization of overall corporate strategy;
and
(4) delayed decisions requiring long lead-times as well as
discouraging risk taking for which the payoff is 
delayed.
Naor therefore calls for tying managerial bonuses and promotions to 
the implementation of long-run objectives.
Salter also discusses the need to coordinate the incentive 
compensation structure with critical aspects of strategy to ensure 
that managers behave in a future-oriented manner. According to 
Salter, the formal management appraisal and financial reward systems 
must be designed with the long-term objectives of the organization
*Jacob Naor, "How to Motivate Corporate Executives to Imple­
ment Long-Range Plans," MSU Business Topics (Summer 1977): 41-42.
^Ibid., pp. 42-44.
in mind. He points out that the choice of financial instruments is
a critical element in the design of an effective reward system. The
principal choices are between current and deferred instruments and
between cash and stock. Current rewards refelct the importance of
short-run performance, while the deferral of rewards encourages
future-oriented behavior. Frequent cash bonus rewards encourage a
focus on short-term performance, while awards of stock attempt to
link individual interest with the long-term interests of the 
2
organization. It is, therefore, important that the mix of current
versus deferred rewards reflect the relevant time horizon of the
organization's social strategy.
The measurement of the strategic components of the reward
system is, according to Salter, one of the most difficult aspects to
execute. Qualitative measures of performance tend to reflect
3
long-run objectives more effectively than quantitative measures. 
Therefore, it is important that the mix of qualitative and quantita­
tive performance measures reflect the relevant time horizon of the 
firm's social strategy. Salter also suggests that the degree 
of discretion in allocating bonus awards is an important element
in S/L tradeoffs. He maintains that nondiscretionary, formula-
4
based bonuses tend to discourage future-oriented behavior. To
^Malcolm S. Salter, "Tailor Incentive Compensation to 
Strategy," Harvard Business Review (March-April 1973): 94-102.
2Ibid., pp. 95-96.
3Ibid., pp. 96-97.
4Ibid., pp. 97-98.
prevent concentration on current performance, management should 
qualitatively evaluate the strategic implications of managers per­
formance and reward them at least partially on that basis.
In essence, Banks and Wheelwright along with Naor and Salter 
all suggest that the performance appraisal and reward systems must be 
coordinated with the long-run strategies of the organization. But, 
how? The literature suggests that there are several approaches 
available to help facilitate this integration.
Long-Term Strategy Implementation
Stonich contends that successful strategy implementation is
contingent on a proper future orientation of managers, and that the
reward system and performance measures are critical in achieving this
orientation. He discusses three approaches that can be used to tie
rewards to the accomplishment of strategic goals. The weighted
factor method involves the identification of "the behavior required
of each strategic business unit within the overall corporate invest- 
2
ment strategy." This approach is consistent with the concept of 
business portfolio management since SBUs are categorized as high, 
medium, or low growth. Strategic performance factors such as market
i
share, ROA, cash flow, etc. are then weighted according to each
3
factor's importance in achieving the desired performance level.
*Paul J. Stonich, "Using Rewards in Implementing Strategy," 
Strategic Management Journal Vol. 2 (1981): 345-348.
2Ibid., p. 348.
3Ibid.
Stonich believes that this method is particularly useful in multi­
industry organizations in which several discrete businesses are 
important to overall corporate performance. This method is also 
described by Rappaport who names it the strategic factors approach.1
Another approach for obtaining better integration of incen­
tives and strategy is the long-term evaluation method (or in 
Rappaport's terms, the extended performance evaluation approach). In 
this approach, the organization compensates managers for achieving 
strategic goals over several years rather than just one. This plan
involves the award of deferred stock that is contingent on reaching
2
various strategic goals. Thus, this method attempts to link
individual interest with the long term interest of the organization
through the choice of the financial instrument and the planning
horizon. Stonich believes that the long-term evaluation method is
particularly appropriate for rewarding top executives regardless of
3
the diversity of the business below them.
A third way for improving the incentive compensation system
is discussed by both Stonich and Rappaport. The strategic funds
deferral method (or in Rappaport's terms, the management accounting
approach) adjusts the financial accounting model by considering the
4
motivational implications of accounting measurements. In other
1Alfred Rappaport, "Executive Incentives vs. Corporate 
Growth," Harvard Business Review (July-August 1978): 85.
2ibid.
3
Stonich, "Using Rewards in Implementing Strategy," p. 350. 
^Rappaport, "Executive Incentives vs. Corporate Growth,"
p. 85.
words, the expense dollars that are used in the generation of current
revenues are distinguished from those that are invested in the future
of the business. In utilizing this approach, incentives can be given
to managers to invest strategic funds rather than holding them down
in the same way as operating expenses.^ In this way, critical
strategic investments such as pollution control are encouraged, while
current operations can be made as profitable as possible. Stonich
believes that this approach is particularly useful in large, complex
2
businesses that cannot be classified as simply low or high growth. 
By utilizing a combination of these three methods, reward systems can 
be designed to encourage future-oriented behavior, thereby enhancing 
the implementation of the firm's strategy.
From the above discussion it seems apparent that successful 
implementation of a firm’s strategy is dependent upon the ability of 
that organization to tie reward and measurement systems to that 
strategy. Andrews specifically addresses the role of the measurement 
and reward systems in the implementation of social strategy. Accord­
ing to Andrews, social strategy does not have a chance for implemen­
tation in organizations using conventional incentives and controls 
which force attention to short-term quantifiable results. He views 
the traditional measurement and reward systems as the "internal 
force" which resists efforts to make the organization more socially
^Stonich, "Using Rewards in Implementing Strategy," p. 350.
responsive.^ The first step in initiating a successful social 
strategy, according to Andrews, begins in the strategy formulation 
process where social objectives must be established with as much 
quantification as reasonable but also with qualitative objectives 
where appropriate. After plans become clearly defined, the measure­
ment system must incorporate the appropriate proportion of 
quantitative and qualitative measures of social performance. Then,
managers must be evaluated, promoted, shelved or discharged depending
2
on their accomplishments in relation to the plan. Thus, Andrews 
calls for modification of the measurement and reward system to 
include accomplishments other than those related to economic 
efficiency.
Phillip Drotning, Director of the Urban Affairs Department at 
Standard Oil (Indiana), also contends that a fully implemented social 
strategy is essential for managing the organization's external 
environment. He views several roadblocks in implementing social 
policies. First of all, he believes that without the revision of the 
performance measurement system to include social objectives, social 
policies will fail. "Even the most well-intentioned employee will 
devote his time and attention to the functions on which his career
^"Kenneth R. Andrews, "Can the Best Corporations Be Made 
Moral?" pp. 60-62.
^Ibid., pp. 61-63.
progress depends.^ Another important factor in successful imple­
mentation, according to Drotning, is the behavioral forms of 
communication within the organization. "In fact, behavioral forms of
communication are apt to have more credibility than spoken or written
2
forms. Consequently, a policy which isn't enforced isn't believed."
In essence, Drotning argues that performance measurement and accounta­
bility with respect to long-run social goals are critical because
3
they force management to test its own sincerity. He also discusses 
the conflict between short-run operating profits and long-run invest­
ments in creating an environment in which future profits will be 
enhanced. Like Banks and Wheelwritht, he contends that as long as 
short-run performance is the primary determinant of rewards and
careers, then the short-run will be favored at the expense of
4
long-run social strategies. Thus, Drotning believes that it is 
necessary for those systems which govern career progress to be 
revised to include social performance.
Social Strategy Implementation 
There have been two major descriptive works which have 
studied the internal process of implementing social strategies—  
Ackerman and Murray. Both studies trace the historical development
^Phillip T. Drotning, "Organizing the Company for Social 
Action," in The Unstable Ground: Corporate Social Policy in a
Dynamic Society, ed. by S. Prakash Sethi (Los Angeles: Melville
Publishing Co., 1974), p. 259.
2Ibid., p. 260.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., pp. 260-262.
of specific social strategies and the eventual implementation of
those strategies throughout the organization. It is the purpose of
the remainder of this section to discuss their findings with respect 
to the role of the performance evaluation and reward systems in
implementation.
As previously mentioned, Ackerman studied the social response
process in two large decentralized firms. Ackerman found that social
policies were not fully implemented throughout the organization until
rewards and sanctions for social responsiveness were related to
performance and incorporated into the evaluation of managers.* In
fact, he notes that this is one of the main characteristics of Phase
2
III. Ackerman observed the following during this phase:
Criteria used in performance evaluation at division levels 
began to incorporate responsiveness to the social demand.
The formality with which this was done varied widely, but the 
effects were similar; the division manager's subordinates 
became aware that the matter was of some personal sig­
nificance .
Top management, when prepared to move into Phase III, should com­
municate to the organization that performance expectations have 
changed. Ackerman notes, however, that a policy statement relating
social responsiveness to performance evaluations will usually seem
3
ambiguous to those who are affected by it. The implementation of 
the policy statement is difficult and time-consuming and is sur­
rounded with many problems: What should be used as the basis of
^"Ackerman, The Social Challenge to Business, p. 77. 
2Ibid., p. 80.
3Ibid., p. 306.
measurement? What percentage of the bonus should go to social 
objectives? etc. Regardless of these problems, "the personal stakes 
for managers must be raised to secure implementation of corporate 
policy.
Ackerman also observed that the number of social issues that
can be simultaneously placed in the evaluation system is limited.
This stems from the fact that the stock of incentives is usually
limited, especially in a low growth organization. But Ackerman
contends that there are other ways of tailoring the incentives in the
organization to foster compliance to corporate social policy that do
not depend on rapid growth. "They range from the magnitism of a
charismatic leader to the harshness of a reward system that grants
high benefits in terms of compensation and influence to those
executives who comply with corporate expectations and casts out the 
2
remainder." Ackerman points out, however, that the "realignment of
the bases for executive evaluation to give a heavier weighting to
performance in areas of social concern add to the complexity of
3
managing the organization."
Murray, in a follow-up study of centralized firms in the 
banking industry, found that effective implementation of social 
strategy and policies at the operating levels depended on corporate 
and division management's willingness to restructure financial
1Ibid., p. 307. 
2Ibid., p. 318.
planning procedures, measurement and control systems, and incentive
systems to take into account managers' efforts to accomplish social
objectives.^ New reporting and measurement systems had to be
developed in order to establish a basis for top management's revised
performance expectations. Then, the evaluation and reward system had
to be revised to include social performance. The result was not only
a fully implemented social strategy but also a more complicated
2
measurement, evaluation, and incentive system. Murray, like 
Ackerman, found that the actual institutionalization of social 
policies took approximately eight years. Both studies confirm the 
thesis that social strategy cannot be fully implemented throughout 
the organization until performance measures, evaluations, and rewards 
are modified to include social performance.
Focus of the Study 
In the literature reviewed, one important fact stands out: 
the performance measurement and reporting systems, the performance 
evaluation system, and the reward system must all be tied to the 
organization's social strategy in order for the strategy to be 
implemented. Ackerman and Murray both found that the evaluation
^Edwin A. Murray, "The Implementation of Social Policies," 
p. 11: 8-23.
and reward of managerial performance based largely on the results of 
economically-oriented information systems tended to impede the 
implementation of social policy. They both conclude that these 
administrative systems are critical to the implementation of social 
strategy.
Conspicuous by its almost complete absence from the litera­
ture is a descriptive study of the relationship between the 
performance measurement, reporting, evaluation, and reward systems 
and social strategy implementation. Since the literature indicates 
that these systems are key variables in implementation, a study of 
this relationship should be helpful to those organizations 
attempting to implement social strategies. Also, since this study 
will be conducted in an organic structure (as opposed to Ackerman and 
Murray's mechanistic structures) it should broaden the research base 
in social strategy implementation.
To fully explore the relationship of these systems to 
implementation, this study will specifically examine the following 
variables: the performance measurement and reporting systems, the
performance appraisal/evaluation system, and the reward system. 
Thus, the basic focus of this study will be to examine the 
relationship between these systems and the social strategy 
implementation process as well as examining the nature of the process 
itself in an organically structured organization. The methodology 
employed in this study will be presented in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodology 
suggested for use in investigating this relationship. This will 
entail an examination of the research case method and its 
applicability to the proposed study. The specific social programs to 
be studied will be defined, and a set of research questions with 
respect to the performance/control systems will be developed. This 
chapter will also include an examination of the data sources to be 
utilized, the methods of data collection, and the matrices to be used 
in the data analysis.
The Applicability of the Research Case 
Method to the Study
The research case method is an in-depth, detailed analysis of 
multiple variables in an ongoing organization over an extended period 
of time.^ Its distinguishing feature is that it places emphasis on 
the total situation by describing a sequence of events leading to a
"^Joseph Reitz, Behavior in Organizations (Homewood, 111. 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1981), p. 542.
particular organizational behavior. In essence, a research case
study employs a detailed and intensive investigation of a particular
situation. It involves complex and holistic descriptions of a large
2number of not highly isolated variables. The data are gathered by
structured and unstructured interviews, from organization files and
records, and from observation. Thus, this type of methodology is
essentially inductive and is very useful in hypothesis generating
studies. It is also useful in generating additional support for
theories (or to refute them) or to gain insight into a particular 
3
area of interest.
McClintock, Brannon, and Maynard-Moody contend that there are
4
three basic goals of the research case study:
1. to allow an indepth study of an organizational process,
2. to clarify those elements particular to the case that may 
permit a greater understanding of causality, and
3. to examine a situation in more depth than is permitted by 
standardized measurement procedures.
*J. Francis Rummel and Wesley C. Ballaine, Research Method­
ology in Business (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 172.
2
Robert E. Stake, "The Case Method in Social Inquiry," 
Educational Researcher vol. 7 (1978): 7.
3
Edmund R. Gray, "Case Research and the Potential for 
Scholarly Publications," in the Proceedings, Southern Case Research 
Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, Marrch 23, 1977, p. 36.
^Charles C. McClintock, Diane Brannon, and Steven Maynard- 
Moody, "Applying the Logic of Sample Surveys to Qualitative Case 
Studies: The Case Cluster Method," Administrative Science Quarterly
vol. 24 (1979): 612.
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The research case essentially has two parts, which are often 
but not necessarily separate. The first involves a description of 
the total observed situation or certain aspects of the total situa­
tion. The purpose is not to defend or present an issue but rather to 
describe the organizational forces at work.^" The second part 
involves making a systematic analysis of the situation making this
form of case useful as a research document. This additional analysis
2
differentiates the research case from the teaching case.
There are also various possible research strategies that can
be employed in case research methodology. According to Gray, there
3
are three possible research strategies:
1. Developing a case study which is a particular interest to 
others in a specific academic field.
2. Developing a series of latitudinal case studies. This 
strategy (which is more complicated than the one above) 
usually focuses on a specific problem in an attempt to 
develop insights, generalizations, and descriptive and 
analytical models.
3. Developing case studies involving the application of 
various theories and techniques.
^George F. Lombard, "From Clinical Research Reports in Human 
Relations," The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science vol. 4 (1968): 
246.
2Ibid.
O
Gray, "Case Research and the Potential" pp. 36-39.
As with every methodology, there are certain advantages and 
limitations associated with the research case which must be con­
sidered in light of the type and purpose of the research project 
being undertaken. The following are the basic advantages of the 
research case methodology:
1. The research case has the potential to expose new rela- 
tionships--stated in the form of hypotheses— which can be 
examined via statistical techniques in the future.^
2. If the case is typical of a class, the hypotheses
2
generated can be more generalized.
3. The descriptive nature of the research case allows for
data which is thick, rich and holistic. Thus, the data
generated from the research case can provide other 
researchers with the opportunity to assess its implica-
3
tions in light of other situations.
The research case methodology is limited in the following
ways:
1. The sample selected for a single case study is usually a 
member of a larger population and yet may not be complete­
ly representative of that population. This limits the
4
generalizability of the results of the research case.
■*"Rumel and Ballaine, Research Methodology, p. 172.
2Ibid.
3
Lombard, "From Clinical Research and Research Reports," 
pp. 241-246.
A
Stake, "The Case Study Method," pp. 6-7.
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2. Since a great deal of the data is collected by observa­
tion and interview, the researcher's objectivity may
often be strained.^ The researcher must guard against
drawing ethical or judgmental conclusions in these 
situations
The research case methodology provides an excellent approach 
for this study for several reasons:
1. Since this study is specifically designed to systematic­
ally gather and analyze data in an attempt to draw 
conclusions in the form of hypotheses generation, it can 
definitely be classified as a research case.
2. Hypotheses generation is an appropriate goal of this
study since little actual data exists in the area of the 
social policy implementation process.
3. Since this study has as a goal an in-depth examination of 
the corporate social policy implementation process, the 
thick, rich data provided by the research case methodol­
ogy is necessary and desirable.
4. This strategy fits two of the three research strategies 
discussed by Gray in that (a) the lack of data in this 
area should make the study valuable to other researchers 
in the field, and (b) the study applies the theories
"'■Reitz, Behavior in Organizations, p. 542.
2
Lombard, "From Clinical Research and Research Reports,"
p. 247.
espoused by Ackerman and Murray to the situation 
described.
The next section will describe the five social programs and policies 
which will be examined in this study.
The Social Programs and Policies of the 
Heath Corporation
As discussed in the introductory chapter, the firm’s social
strategy will be defined as those programs and policies designed to
address specific social issues in the organization's environment.
The programs chosen for the study are of two types: purely voluntary
and legally mandated. This section describes the social programs
chosen for the study.
Community Relations 
Community relations is a purely discretionary policy of the 
Heath Corporation. According to Mr. Randall Heath, CEO, it is a 
basic Heath policy to be a good corporate citizen and to develop 
community relations. Mr. Heath believes that "the corporation is 
part of the community and should participate in community activities 
whenever it can make a contribution."^ This policy, however, is not 
explicitly written but is communicated to Heath managers through 
verbal policy statements and through the example set by the top 
management group (in addition to Mr. Randall Heath, this includes Mr.
XMr. Randall Heath, July 14, 1982.
Bob Heath and Mr. Dick Edwards). These top managers expect their 
managers to be actively involved in the community both on and off the 
job."^ If a community activity takes up time during the work day, 
Heath managers are given time off (with pay) to participate in the 
activity.2
The example set by top management is a strong one. Mr. 
Randall Heath is extremely active* in the community both at the state 
and local level. Mr. Heath was named "Citizen of the Year" by the
Women's Committee of 100 and "Philanthropist of the Year" by the
Society of Fund-Raising Executives. He serves on the Executive 
Committee of the Area Council of the Boy Scouts of America, and in 
1975, he became the tenth state citizen to receive the Distinguished 
Eagle Scout Award. Additionally, he is the Chairman of the Board of 
Trustees for the Eye Foundation, Inc., serves on the National Council 
of the Salk Institute, and is President-Elect of the Downtown Rotary 
Club. He is also chairman of the state Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Board. Thus Randall Heath's policy statements are exemplified by his 
activities.
Mr. Dick Edwards and Mr. Bob Heath also believe that their 
corporation should do more than its share in the community. They
both feel that it is necessary to be a leader in the community in
1Ibid.
2Mr. Bob Heath, July 22, 1982.
order to give in return to the community that supports them.^ This
philosophy is evidenced by the fact that Heath makes purchases of
materials and equipment from local businesses thereby supporting the
local economy whenever possible. The Heath organization also strives
to be a leader in charitable causes and contributions within the com- 
2
munity. The top managers encourage their subordinates to become
involved in political and governmental activities and provide them
with time off to do so. This philosophy is communicated via example.
Mr. Edwards, for example, is the head of the State Personnel Board.
Mr. Edwards perceives that this example is very visable, leading to
3
high levels of political involvement by many managers.
In essence, the top managers consider community relations to 
be an integral part of their manager's responsibilities, both on and 
off the job. Heath has a very visible social image in the community 
and the top managers feel that this image is directly related to the 
organization's effectiveness. Thus, good community relations is a 
basic policy of Heath and is considered to be a very important factor 
in the corporate purpose.
■^ Mr. Dick Edwards and Mr. Bob Heath, July 22, 1982.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
Highway Clean-Up/Youth Employment Program 
This voluntary program originated in the summer of 1973 when
Mr. Heath became very concerned about the litter and trash along the
highways. He decided to combine this concern with the company's 
policy to provide summer employment for high school and college 
students. Last year this nine year old program employed 38 area 
teenagers (65% White and 35% Black), a general foreman, two field 
supervisors, two dump trucks, and two pick-up trucks. Last year's 
cost to Heath for the program was $113,612.
Mr. Heath had in mind several objectives when he initiated
the program. He said in a local newspaper article, "First of course,
we wanted to get some of this mess off the highways. Secondly, we 
felt by doing this we would also be supplying summer jobs for these 
young men. Another thing we wanted to do is keep careful figures of 
the costs involved in the operation so that when its over, we can 
supply the state Highway Department with estimates about highway 
cleanup on a mile to mile basis. We also hope that other businesses 
and groups might see what we're doing and voluntarily sponsor young 
men to do the same thing in other areas."'*'
The program has received commendation from the City Council, 
local newspapers, and residents. In fact, a "Hats Off to Heath" 
party sponsored by a local radio station at a local shopping center 
was given in recognition of the Heath program. This program has been 
so successful that a similar program was initiated in 1980 through a 
Heath subsidiary in another state. Heath partially financed 
(50%) this program. In sum, this nine year old, purely discretionary
program has now become a very visible trademark of the Heath Cor­
poration in the community.
Educational Assistance
Heath's educational assistance program is purely dis­
cretionary in nature and evokes a strong personal involvement on the 
part of Mr. Randall Heath. Mr. Heath believes that a good education 
is an essential element in a young person's success in life. This 
philosophy stems from his personal experiences while obtaining his 
civil engineering degree from the University of Illinois. His poor 
performance in his classes (especially freshman English 101 and 102) 
resulted in his "25 year struggle to develop his skills of oral and 
written communication... And the struggle continues."'*' Mr. Heath's 
deep personal feeling about education is evidenced by his and his 
organization's involvement with students and their institutions.
From an organizational perspective, Heath participates in a 
summer student work program employing an average of 12 college 
engineering students during the summer months and in the Co-op 
program (employing an average of 5 students). Heath also sponsors 
the Heath Writing Center at one of the regional state universities. 
The $15,000 annual contribution supports a remedial language 
composition lab which during the 1981-82 academic year saw 287 
different students for a total of 1,847 contact hours. Also during 
the summer highway clean-up program, Randall Heath sponsors an essay
^Mr. Randall Heath, July 14, 1982.
contest for his teenage employees. They are asked to submit their
suggestions, criticisms, and ideas for improving future clean-up 
programs. Their essays are expected to be "written legibly and to 
reflect basic writing techniques that have been learned in English 
classes."^ An award of $100 is given to the best essay, while awards 
of $65 and $35 are given to the second and third place winners.
Another aspect of the organization's involvement with educa­
tion is its contributions to educational institutions. For example, 
Mr. Randall Heath recently gave $5 million to the engineering school 
of his alma mater for construction of new facilities. Other con­
tributions to various schools and colleges for the 1980 fiscal year 
amounted to $15,032.
From a personal standpoint, Mr. Randall Heath devotes a great 
deal of his time to various educational activities. He serves as a 
trustee of several academic institutions located in the state. He is 
also a member of the state Commission on Higher Education. He has 
received an Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree and a Honorary Doctor of 
Science Degree from two state universities. He also served as an 
Executive-in-Residence for three universities on three separate 
occasions. He was named to the State Academy of Honor, Class of 
1980, and received the Exemplary Dedication to Higher Education 
Award, presented by the state Association of Colleges and Uni­
versities in 1981.
■*Mr. Randall Heath, Memo to Members of the 1978 Summer 
Clean-up Crews, July 15, 1978.
In sum, it is apparent from Mr. Heath's activities and awards 
that educational assistance is very much a policy of his organization 
and is communicated to his managers through his example.
Worker Safety
Heath operates in a relatively high-risk industry and worker
safety is a written Heath policy. According to Randall Heath, safety
originates with the leadership and he believes that Heath's most
valuable assets are its employees.^" The others in the top management
group echo Randall Heath's sentiments about safety. The overall
feeling of top management is that "a safe job is a profitable and 
2
well managed job." In essence, top management believes that safety 
is an integral part of every project it undertakes and that a project 
manager's effectiveness is directly related to his safety record.
Heath has had a safety director since the the mid-1950s and 
it is his responsibility to communicate Heath's safety policy to the 
project managers. Heath's safety goal is to reduce the incident rate 
of accidents below industry national averages. Heath expects each 
project manager to accept a personal responsibility to prevent 
accidents to people and equipment through careful pre-planned 
management. This entails abiding by the requirements stipulated in 
the organization's safety policy as well as those stipulated by OSHA.
"''Mr. Randall Heath, July 14, 1982. 
^Mr. Dick Edwards, July 22, 1982.
Equal Employment Opportunity
It is the policy of the Heath Corporation to comply with 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as well as with the provisions of 
Executive Order 11246 (amended by Executive order 11375). Since more 
than 66% of Heath's construction contracts are from public expendi­
tures, the provisions of the Executive Order apply to many of the 
organization's projects. The general provisions of the Executive 
Order are as follows:
1. The contractor will not discriminate against employees or 
applicants because of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.
2. The contractor will take affirmative action to insure 
that applicants and employees are employed without regard 
to such factors.
3. The contractor will comply with all provisions of the 
Executive Order and the rules, regulations and orders of 
the Secretary of Labor issued thereunder, including 
furnishing required information and reports.
4. In the event of noncompliance by the contractor with the 
nondiscrimination clauses of the contract or with any 
such rules, regulations or orders, the contract may be 
canceled, terminated or suspended and the contractor may 
be declared ineligible for further government contracts.
^Barbara L. Schlei and Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimina­
tion Law (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1976),
pp. 740-41.
5. The contractor will include the same requirements in 
every subcontract or purchase order so that such pro­
visions shall be binding upon each subcontractor or 
vendor.
It is the responsibility of Heath's personnel director, Mr. 
Frank Donland, to communicate the specific, mandated hiring require­
ments for each locale to the project manager.^" It is the project
manager's responsibility to recruit and hire according to his
specific goal.
In summary then, this study will examine five social programs 
of the Heath Corporation. Three of these— Community Relations, 
Highway Clean-up/Youth Employment, and Educational Assistance— are 
purely voluntary. The other two— Worker Safety and Equal Employment 
Opportunity— are mandated by law. The next section will develop a 
set of research questions to be used in examining the performance
control systems as they relate to these social programs.
Performance/Control Systems
The literature suggests that implementation of the firm's 
social strategy is dependent upon tying (either formally or 
informally) the performance measurement, reporting, evaluation, and 
reward systems to the specific strategy. It is the purpose of this 
section to specifically develop a set of research questions for each 
of these systems.
^Mr. Frank Donland, July 22, 1982.
Social Performance Measurement 
According to the literature, the first step in tying the per­
formance/control systems to a specific social strategy is to 
incorporate social performance into the performance measurement 
system. Therefore, it is important to determine if managerial 
performance is measured with respect to the previously defined social 
programs and policies. After this determination is made, it is then 
essential to know "how" their performance is measured. The method of 
performance measurement will probably vary depending on the social 
program being studied. For example, some programs such as EEO and 
worker safety may utilize quantitative measures, i.e., employment 
statistics and accident frequency. Performance in other programs 
such as community relations may be measured qualitatively. Qualita­
tive measures, however, are more difficult to represent than 
quantitative measures, but are none-the-less important.
Social Performance Reporting 
The literature suggests that social performance, like 
economic performance, should be incorporated into management informa­
tion systems. It is therefore important to determine whether or not 
reports on managerial performance in the previously defined social 
programs are required. If they are required, then it is essential to 
know how such reporting is done as well as whether it is a part of 
the regular financial reporting system. Ackerman and Murray both 
found that the evaluation and reward of performance based largely on 
the results of economically-oriented information systems tended to
impede the implementation of social policy. Both of these studies 
conclude that the financial reporting system alone was inadequate and 
ineffective in measuring social performance.
Social Performance Evaluation 
The literature points out that it is essential to tie the 
evaluation system to the firm's social strategy. Thus, the 
literature indicates that implementation is dependent on whether or 
not the involved managers are evaluated in terms of their social 
performance. It is therefore critical to determine whether or not 
managerial responsibilities have been altered to reflect the firm's 
social policies, and whether or not managers are evaluated on the 
basis of their social performance. As Ackerman points out, the only 
way to obtain managers support for social policies is to have their 
careers depend on their social performance.
Social Performance Reward 
If managers are evaluated in terms of their social per­
formance, then it must be determined how these evaluations affect 
their compensation and promotion opportunities within the firm. The 
literature suggests that it is essential to work social policy into 
the process through which rewards are allocated and careers decided. 
Thus, an essential question is whether or not managers are rewarded 
through compensation for their involvement in the previously defined 
social programs. Along this same line, it must be determined whether 
or not their promotion opportunities are affected by their social 
performance.
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In sum, Table 2 presents the basic research questions which 
will be examined in this study.
Data Sources
The basic data sources utilized in answering the research 
questions developed in the preceding section were those of inter­
viewing informants at all levels in the organization's hierarchy 
including top management, staff and corporate level general manage­
ment, division managers and project managers. Company archives were 
also used to supplement the informant interviews. It is the purpose 
of this section to examine these data sources as well as the means 
that were used in gathering the data from these sources.
Top Management
The Heath organization has a top management triad (see Figure 
1 in Introduction) which is solely responsible for developing the 
firm's policies. Mr. Randall Heath is the Chairman of the Board and 
CEO. As previously mentioned, Mr. Heath is involved in many acti­
vities external to the organization. Mr. Bob Heath is President and 
focuses most of his attention on the international operations of the 
Company, while Mr. Dick Edwards spends most of his time on the 
domestic, day-to-day operations. Together this management triad 
formulates the Heath Corporation's business strategy. Therefore, it 
is extremely important to interview all three men in the top 
management group--Mr. Randall Heath, Mr. Bob Heath and Mr. Dick 
Edwards— to determine their basic social philosophies and policies. 
This is especially important since Heath Corporation is privately
TABLE 2 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Social Performance 
Measurement
Social Performance 
Reporting
Social Performance 
Evaluation
Social Performance 
Reward System
1. Is social performance 1. Are regular reports on
measured? If so
2. How is it measured?
- Quantitative measures? 
• Qualitative measures?
- Mixture?
1. Have managers job re­
social performance required? sponsibilities been
2 .
3.
Who is responsible for 
such reporting and 
how is it done?
Is this reporting a 
part of the regular 
financial reporting 
system?
altered in any way to 
reflect the organiza­
tion's social policies?
Are managers evaluated 
on the basis of their 
social performance?
1. Do the evaluations 
in the social per­
formance area affect 
compensation? How?
2. Do the evaluations 
in the social per­
formance area affect 
promotion opportuni­
ties within the 
firm? How?
4. Is this reporting a 
part of any regular 
nonfinancial report­
ing system?
owned and closely held. The interviews with top management (see 
Appendix A) were designed to determine what the firm's objectives are 
with respect to each program as well as determining what top manage­
ment's expectations of their managers are. The interviews also 
attempted to obtain top management's perceptions of the means through 
which these objectives are communicated to their managers as well as 
their perceptions of whether or not managerial social performance 
affects evaluations, rewards, or promotions. In sum, the purpose 
here is to establish what the objectives and policies are with 
respect to the social programs being studied.
Staff Specialists
Those staff specialists who are directly associated with the 
various programs being studied (i.e., Personnel Officer and Loss 
Control Officer or safety specialist) were basic data sources in this 
project. The objective to be accomplished by these interviews were 
twofold. First of all, the staff specialist responsible for each 
program asked specific questions about the program's origin, 
development, funding, and administration (see Appendix B for inter­
view guide). In this way, the researcher was able to obtain a better 
understanding of each of the programs being studied.
The second objective was to investigate the performance/ 
control systems themselves. This entailed ascertaining from the 
staff specialists exactly how performance in these programs was 
measured, reported, evaluated, and rewarded within the organization. 
The interviews with staff specialists associated with the various
programs (along with information gathered from the interviews with 
top management) helped to serve the basic task of determining "what 
is" with respect to the firm's social programs.
Corporate Officers, Division Managers and 
Project Managers
Managers at three other levels in the organization’s 
hierarchy were also interviewed. At the corporate level, the 
managers interviewed held offices responsible for finances, new 
ventures, engineering, equipment, and international operations. At 
the division level, the managers interviewed were responsible for 
pipeline, heavy utility, and highway construction. The project 
managers interviewed were responsible for individual projects, from 
bidding to completion.
The main objective to be accomplished by interviews at these 
levels was to determine managerial perceptions concerning the imple­
mentation of the social programs described previously. Specifically, 
managers at each of these levels (32 total) were interviewed to 
ascertain the nature of their involvement in the firm's social 
programs and whether or not they feel that this involvement is 
measured and reported and whether or not it affects their evaluation, 
rewards and promotion opportunities (certain staff specialists will 
be interviewed in this regard also). Each of these managers was 
given a pre-interview questionnaire which included the basic 
questions that were explored during the interview. The pre-interview 
questionnaire (Appendix C), which was presented to the Corporate 
Officer in charge of coordinating this study and was distributed for
comments to several other randomly selected managers in order to 
insure its accuracy, is basically designed to allow the participating 
managers to think through the questions in advance of the interview, 
thus insuring more accurate, higher quality data.
As previously pointed out, the literature suggests that 
implementation of social policies is dependent on the managers' 
perception that his social performance is important in his career 
progress. Therefore, the purpose here is to establish "what is per­
ceived" with respect to the performance/control systems.
Archival Sources
Archival sources were also a data source. The researcher 
explored organizational files, brochures, speeches, reports, memos, 
board meeting minutes, and written policy statements in an attempt to 
gather more information on the social programs and their 
implementation.
In summary, the data for this study was gathered by con­
ducting in-depth interviews at all four levels of the organization 
--top management, corporate officers, division managers and project 
managers— as well as with various staff specialists and by examining 
the available archival data. This provided the researcher with 
information concerning both "what is" and "what is perceived" with 
respect to the social programs being examined.
Data Analysis
The purpose of this section is to develop several analytical 
matrices for analyzing the social programs chosen for this study.
Five social programs (as previously identified) were examined--two 
being legally mandated and three being purely discretionary. As 
previously discussed, the primary focus of this study is on the 
performance/control systems as they relate to social program 
implementation. Thus, the first matrix to be developed depicts the 
overall design of the study. Additional matrices will also be 
developed to aid in the evaluation of the implementation process.
The Design Matrix
The research design proposed for this study will produce data 
that are real, deep and thick (the objectives of the case method) 
while utilizing systematic and replicable procedures. This will be 
accomplished by:'*'
1. defining and sampling the units of analysis, which will 
be defined as the performance/control systems;
2 . stratified sampling of the data sources crossed with a 
stratified sampling of the units of analysis; and
3. crossing the stratified sampling of the data sources and 
units of analysis with each social program.
This research design is depicted in Matrix 1.
This research design should overcome some of the limitations 
of the case method. The units of analysis, which have been defined 
as the performance measurement, reporting, evaluation, and reward 
systems, make theoretical sense and are stable enough to sample. The
^McClintock, Brannon and Maynard-Moody, "Applying the Logic 
of Sample Surveys," pp. 612-629.
Matrix i 
Design Matrix
Programs Data Sources:
PI “ Cosnunity Relations 
P2 " Highway Clean-up 
P3 ■ Educational Assistance 
P4 “ Worker Safety 
P5 - EEO
D1 » Top Mgt.
D2 - Corporate Mgt.
D3 " Division Mgt.
D4 ■ Project Mgt.
D5 » Staff Specialists 
D6 “ Written/Archival 
Sources
P5
P4
P3
P2
PI
R2R1 EH
Performance/Control Systems;
Units of Analysis
M - Measurement 
R1 - Reporting 
E ■ Evaluation 
R2 ■ Reward
data sources— informant interviews at five levels in the hierarchy 
plus archival data— are the basic case data collection techniques. 
Thus, for each program the units of analysis can be cross-stratified 
with various data sources, thereby sorting out the effects of per­
spective among levels. For example, the cell *-n the design
matrix indicates top management's perceptions of how managerial 
performance is measured in community relations, while cell 
indicates the division managers' perceptions of how their performance 
is measured in community relations. By sorting out the effects of 
perspective, the accuracy of the data is increased.
Supplemental Matrices
Four additional analytical matrices were also used in 
analyzing the data. The objective was to compare and contrast the 
various programs with respect to their implementation in hope of 
generating further hypotheses. Specifically, four supplemental 
matrices will be developed in this section for use in the data
analysis.
Matrix 2 is designed to provide an analytical framework for 
comparing the programs based on the degree to which social per­
formance has been incorporated into the performance/control systems. 
The cells of the matrix will include descriptive information derived 
from the data gathered utilizing the basic research questions in
Table 2. Therefore, by utilizing this matrix, the basic variables in
this study and the possible interrelationships among these variables 
can be more closely examined.
Matrix 2 
Performance/Control Systems
Performance/Control Systems
Social Programs
Measurement Reporting Evaluation Reward
Community
Relations
Safety
EEO
Highway
Clean-up
Educational
Assistance
Another factor utilized in the comparison of social programs 
will be the phase of organizational involvement with respect to each 
program. The phase of organizational involvement refers to the three 
phase Ackerman model which traces the conversion of social 
responsiveness from policy to action. According to Ackerman and 
Murray, the phase of organizational involvement can be determined by 
the following characteristics:^
Phase I, the policy phase, can be characterized by the
following:
1) CEO’s recognition of the social issue and its impact on 
the organization.
2) Formulation of a corporate position on the social issue 
and the communication of it throughout the organization.
Phase II, the technical and administrative learning phase,
can he characterized by the following:
1) Appointment of a specialist for the purpose of developing 
a program designed to address the specific social issue.
2) Emphasis is on obtaining knowledge and skills relating 
to the specific issue.
3) Development of data systems to track and analyze social 
performance.
^Edwin A. Murray, "The Implementation of Social Policies," p.
6-17.
Phase III, the institutionalization phase, can be charac­
terized by the following:
1) Change performance expectations to take into account 
managerial performance relative to specific, measureable 
social objectives.
2) Modification of the reporting, evaluation, and reward 
systems to take into account social objectives.
3) Sustained organizational commitment to a specific issue.
Institutionalization, as defined by Ackerman and Murray,
refers to instilling a commitment to a specific issue by working it 
into the normative structure of the organization. Ackerman quotes 
Selznick when he discusses the institutionalization of social 
policies. According to Selznick, "Institutionalization is a process 
that happens to an organization over time, reflecting the organiza­
tion's own distinctive history, the people who have been in it, the 
groups it embodied and the vested interests they have created, and 
the way it has adapted to its environment."^ Institutionalization 
involves working the specific social policy into the norms and values 
of organizational members through modifying the performance/control 
systems to include managerial social performance. In this way, a 
sustained organizational commitment is obtained by reinforcing the 
appropriate managerial behaviors.
Matrix 3 will be utilized in analyzing the data gathered 
so that the specific phase of organizational involvement in each
^Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 16-17.
Matrix 3
Phase of Organizational Involvement
Phase of
Organizational
Involvement
Social Programs
Comminlty
Relations Safety EEO
Highway
Clean-up
Educational
Assistance
Phase I
Policy
Phase II 
Learning
Phase III
Institutionalization
of the programs can be determined. Each cell will include descrip­
tive data gathered from the various data sources described above.
The social programs will also be compared with respect to 
their impact on the regular operations of the organization. Impact 
on operations will be measured by the rate of managerial involvement 
in the various social programs. Some social programs (such as worker 
safety and equal employment opportunity) may have a direct impact on 
day-to-day operations, i.e. manufacturing or personnel procedures. 
Other programs may not affect the regular operations of the organiza­
tion. Thus, the question here is whether there is a difference 
between social programs with respect to their impact on operations. 
Matrix 4 below will be used as a guide for the comparison of the 
social programs in terms of their specific impact on the operations 
of the organization.
Matrix 5 is a summary of the four previous matrices. Such a 
matrix provides a broad framework for systematically comparing and 
contrasting the programs being examined. This matrix can be 
especially useful for hypothesis generation purposes which is, as 
mentioned earlier, one of the primary goals of exploratory research 
case studies such as this one. The next six chapters will use these 
matrices to analyze the data.
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Matrix 4 
Impact on Operations
Social
Programs
Impact on Organizations
No Significant 
Impact
Directly Affects 
Regular Operations
Community Relations
Highway Clean-up
Educational Assistance
Work Safety
EEO
Matrix 5
Summary Matrix
Performance/Control Systems Phase of Organizational 
Involvement
Impact on 
Operations
dOClBX
Programs
Measurement Reporting Evaluation Reward I II III No Impact Significant
Impact
Conmmlty
Relations
Safety
EEO
Highway
Clean-up
Educational
Assistance
vooo
CHAPTER 4
AN ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY RELATIONS AT HEATH
Community relations at the Heath Corporation is a purely 
discretionary program. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine 
the community relations program of the Heath Corporation employing 
the matrices developed in the preceding chapter. The chapter first 
examines the phase of organizational involvement Heath has achieved 
in its community relations program. Next is an examination of the 
role that the performance/control systems play in this program 
followed by an examination of the impact the program has had on 
operations. The final section of the chapter will relate the 
community relations data gathered at the Heath Corporation to the 
relevant literature in the field.
Phase of Organizational Involvement 
The purpose of this section is to examine the Heath Corpora­
tion's community relations program from the standpoint of the phase 
of organizational involvement it has achieved. In order to do this, 
the evolution of the program through the phases of involvement as 
defined by the Ackerman model of corporate responsiveness will be 
used. Phase I of the model is the policy phase in which the CEO 
decides what position the organization will adopt with respect to a
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particular issue and, in particular, whether or not the organization
will lead social expectations.^
Although Mr. Heath says that community relations has always
been a philosophy of his organization it appears that the River Ridge
Expressway project awarded to Heath in 1965 was the primary external
stimulus affecting Mr. Heath's motivation in the community relations 
2
area. This project had numerous community relations problems. They 
started in the courtroom with lengthy battles over condemnation
proceedings long before any construction began. The state highway
department expected that there would be over $2 million worth of 
lawsuits and claims filed before the project was completed.
After reviewing all the problem areas in an effort to antici­
pate everything that might happen, Mr. Heath concluded that an
educated, and therefore knowledgeable, public would more readily 
accept inconveniences and changes in travel routes than a public that 
did not know or understand what was going on. With this in mind, the 
company developed a program to inform every concerned citizen what 
it was trying to do and to explain why the delays and inconveniences 
were required. In other words, a policy decision was made to lead 
public expectations with respect to this project.
"^Ackerman, The Social Challenge to Business, p. 62. 
o
The review of this project comes from a speech given by Mr. 
Randall Heath entitled, "Community Relations in the Highway Construc­
tion Industry," given before the Association of State Highway
Officials, October 8, 1968.
101
The program was implemented as follows:
(1) Over 600 personal letters to community leaders were 
mailed outlining the plan for executing the work re­
quired in the contract.
(2) Weekly "Plan Ahead" notices were placed in the Sunday 
newspaper, calling attention to street closings and 
changes in detour routes.
(3) Radio and television media were used to alert the 
traveling public to all major traffic interruptions.
(4) Automobile bumper stickers bearing the Expressway 
construction slogan "Slow Go Today. Go— Go Tomorrow" 
were given away.
(5) Two elaborate cocktail parties were given to the resi­
dents of two major apartment buildings that had to be 
tunneled under.
(6) Weekly progress bulletins were published and placed on 
prominent corners adjacent to the work.
(7) The Heath Company workers were identified to the people 
living in the area. Everybody knew everybody.
(8) Bleachers for the public to sit in were constructed and 
programs were provided to explain the work. Free soft 
drinks were served.
The results? Not only did the Heath Corporation not receive 
a suit or claim for damages, it did not receive a single complaint. 
On the contrary, most of the 150 letters received praised Heath's
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thoughtfulness in keeping the community informed about the construc­
tion process. The project was also finished almost a year ahead of 
schedule. National engineering publications have applauded the Heath 
Corporation's handling of the project, maintaining that the Heath 
organization's friendship with the local community is a boon to the 
construction industry in general.* According to Heath's Chief 
Domestic Operations Officer, Dick Edwards, "A lot of contractors 
don't think community relations is worth much because it doesn't
directly win them bids— low bidding does that. But we've found that
2
good community relations has definite dollar and cents rewards."
This experience provided the foundation for Mr. Heath's current
3
philosophy that good community relations is good business.
According to the Ackerman model, Phase II is a learning phase 
which is marked by the addition of a specialist to the corporate 
staff, usually at the request of the CEO. In the Heath Corporation's 
community relations program this phase has been completed but not 
precisely as described by Ackerman. Although the firm went through a 
learning phase in terms of community relations (as is evident from 
the preceding example of the River Ridge Expressway), Heath has never 
appointed a staff specialist for community relations. The implica­
tions of this divergence from the Ackerman model will be discussed in 
detail later in this chapter.
* Engineering News Record, September 8, 1966, pp. 45-46.
2Ibid.
2Mr. Randall Heath, July 14, 1982.
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Phase 111 is characterized by Ackerman as one of sustained 
commitment or institutionalization. As Ackerman points out, "the 
chief executive has the ultimate responsibility for the definition 
and institutionalization of corporate purpose."^ The institutionali­
zation phase as defined by Ackerman, therefore, seems to require a 
sustained commitment to the specific issue by incorporating that 
particular issue into the corporate purpose of the organization.
In the Heath Corporation, it appears that community relations 
has become part of the normative structure of the organization. Of 
the 32 managers interviewed, 75 percent recognized that the organiza­
tion wants them involved in community relations activities and 68.75 
percent were involved in such activities, both on and off the job. 
(The involvement of Heath's managers will be more closely analyzed in 
more detail in a later section of this chapter.) This degree of 
involvement on the part of the Heath managers is probably a result of 
Mr. Randall Heath's philosophy that the corporation is part of the 
community and should participate whenever it can make a contribution 
and that good community relations means good business.
Figure 3 summarizes the development of the phases of organi­
zational involvement of the community relations program at Heath. The 
next section will examine the performance/control systems as they 
relate to community relations in the Heath Corporation.
*Ackerman, The Social Challenge to Business, p. 289.
Figure 3
Phase of Organizational Involvement 
In Community Relations
Phase I - Phase II - Phase III -
Recognition/Policy Development Learning Institutionalization
Recognition of Problem 
in 1965 - River Ridge 
Expressway Project
Development of verbal policy 
that good community relations 
is good business and that 
the company is a member of 
the community and thus must 
contribute to the community 
when it can help.
River Ridge Expressway Project 
completed without a claim.
Techniques developed (such as 
those at River Ridge Express­
way Project) in order to 
generate positive community 
relations.
No staff specialists 
appointed.
Each manager made responsible 
for positive community rela­
tions on project they are 
involved.
75 percent of Heath's managers 
perceive that the organization 
wants them involved in com­
munity activities.
68.75 percent of Heath's
managers are actually involved 
in community activities.
51.14 percent of Heath's involved 
managers perceived the per­
formance control systems to be 
modified.
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Performance/Control Systems
The purpose of this section is to analyze the interview data 
with respect to the role the performance/control systems play in the 
community relations program. The performance measurement, reporting, 
evaluation, and reward systems are cross-stratified with the data 
sources in an effort to establish "what is" and "what is perceived" 
with respect to the community relations program at Heath. These data
(analyzed in detail in the following discussion) are summarized in
Matrix 6.
At the top management level, community relations is con­
sidered an important aspect of the corporate purpose. According to 
Randall Heath, "Community involvement is part of doing the job. Why 
spend money on advertising when your employees convey the appropriate 
image and it doesn't cost anything? We get image advertising by the 
things we do."'*' Mr. Heath contends that his employees know that the 
corporation has a highly visible social image and that he encourages 
community participation both on and off the job. When asked about 
how his employee's community relations activities were incorporated 
within the performance/control system, Heath replied "very 
informally." Heath says that he receives letters from people in the 
community every week concerning his employees community relations 
activities. He always sends a copy of the letter to the employee 
with a personal note of appreciation attached. He considers 
reporting from the community and his informal observations as .the
XMr. Randall Heath, July 14, 1982.
Matrix 6
An Analysis of the Coranunity Relations Data
Data Degree of Involvement Performance/Control S/stems
Sources
Perceived Actual - Measurement Reporting Evaluation Reward Overall
Top
Managers
(3)
1002 1002 1002 1002 1002 . 1002 1002
Corporate
Managers
(4)
1002 1002 02 02 02 502 12.52
Division
Managers
(11)
72.722 63.632 71.422 85.712 42.862 71.422 71.422
Project/
Support
Managers
(9)
44.442 44.442 502 752 752 252 56.252
Staff
(5) 1002 802 02 502 02 02 12.52
Total
(32)
752 68.752 45.452 63.632 45.452 502 51.142
o
ON
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main components of the measurement and reporting systems with respect 
to community relations. In terms of evaluation and reward, Heath 
maintains that it is a totally subjective, autocratic process in 
which community relations is a component part, although not well 
defined.
The other two members of the management triad also reiterate 
Randall Heath's views concerning community relations. Both Dick 
Edwards and Bob Heath consider community relations to be an integral 
part of their managers' responsibilities, both on and off the job. 
The top managers feel that Heath's visible social image in the com­
munity is directly related to the organization's effectiveness. 
According to Dick Edwards, "Since many of Heath's projects are public 
(66+%), an effective relationship with the communities in which we 
operate is an absolute requirement to do the job. Community rela­
tions is good business. It opens doors and increases goodwill, both 
with other businesses and the community in general."^" Both men agree 
that their employees' community relations activities are implicitly 
rewarded.
It appears that there are no formal performance/ control 
systems with respect to community relations. The top management 
triad, however, feels that community relations is extremely important 
in the organization's effectiveness and is part of doing the job. 
They expect their employees to be involved with the community, both
■^ Mr. Dick Edwards, July 22, 1982.
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on and off the job. This is an important component in the corporate 
purpose of the organization.
Interestingly, although all four corporate level officers
interviewed participated in community activities and all four 
indicated that they were aware that the corporation wanted them to be 
involved in such activities, none of the four felt that their com­
munity relations activities were measured, reported or evaluated. 
Two of those interviewed, however, perceived that 
community relations affected their reward and promotion opportunities 
within the firm. Considering all performance/control variables to­
gether, only 12.5 percent of the corporate level responses indicated 
that the performance/control system was modified in some way to 
incorporate community relations activities.
At the division level, 72.72 percent of those interviewed
perceived that the corporation wanted them involved in community
activities and 63.63 percent were actually involved in such activi­
ties. Of those involved, 71.42 percent felt that their activities
were measured in some way (generally informally), and 85.71 percent 
felt that their community activities were reported to higher manage­
ment. One manager commented that, "Being not involved is noticed." 
With respect to evaluation, 57.14 percent felt that their community 
relations activities were evaluated. To quote another manager, 
"Community relations is like an overshadowing thought in the back of 
top management's mind." In terms of reward and promotion opportuni­
ties, 71.42 percent perceived that community relations activities
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were important. One manager commented that a high degree of involve­
ment would indeed enhance his career, while another manager was a bit 
more explicit: "Mr. Heath stresses these activities and he decides
who will get promoted. Since it is his decision and he thinks they 
are important, then they are." Another manager commented that, 
"Community relations affects my compensation if it affects profita­
bility and Heath's image in the community is important in the 
profitability of the firm." Overall, 71.42 percent of the division 
level responses supported the idea that community activities are 
included in the performance/control systems.
The project managers and support unit managers were not as 
involved as upper level managers in community relations activities 
with only 44.44 percent both perceiving that involvement was con­
sidered important and actually participating in various community 
activities. Of those involved, 50 percent felt that their participa­
tion was measured very informally, and 75 percent felt that their 
activities were reported through letters, phone calls, etc. from the 
community. In terms of evaluation, 75 percent perceived that com­
munity relations was evaluated in terms of their overall job 
performance. One manager commented that "Heath employees are 
expected to help out communities in which they operate." Only 25 
percent, however, felt that community relations affected their reward 
and promotion opportunities. In the aggregate, 56.25 percent of the 
project manager responses indicated that the performance/control 
system is affected by community relations activities.
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One hundred percent of the staff members interviewed were 
aware that the organization wanted them involved in community activi­
ties, and 80 percent of those were actually involved in such
activities in some way. None of those interviewed, however, per­
ceived that their community activities were measured in any way, and 
only two out of five (40 percent) perceived that such activities were 
reported informally to higher level management. Also, none of the 
staff felt that promotion and reward opportunities within the firm
were affected by their community activities. Overall, only 12.5
percent of the staff responses supported the idea that community 
activities affected the performance/control system.
When all of the responses are considered, a total of 75 
percent of all those managers interviewed indicated that they felt 
the organization wanted them to participate in community activities 
and 68.75 percent actually participated in such activities. Of those 
participating in such activities, 63.63 percent felt that their 
community activities were reported to higher management, 45.45 per­
cent felt that these activities were measured, 45.45 percent felt 
they were evaluated and 50 percent felt they were rewarded. In 
total, 51.14 percent of the responses from managers involved in 
community relations activities supported the idea that the 
performance/control system was structured to include community rela­
tions activities.
Figures 4 through 9 graphically depict by level the degree to 
which the managers of the Heath Corporation perceive that the
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Figure 4
Perceived Impact of Community
Relations on Measurement by Level
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Figure 5
Perceived Impact of Community
Relations on Reporting by Level
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Figure 6
Perceived Impact of Community
Relations on Evaluation by Level
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Figure 7
Perceived Impact of Community
Relations on Reward/Promotion by Level
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Figure 8
Perceived Impact of Community Relations on
Performance/Control Systems by Level
Level
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Figure 9
Overall Positive Response Pattern 
by Performance/Control Variable
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company's performance/control system is modified to incorporate the 
community relations activities of the managers.
Impact on Operations
The impact on operations will be analyzed in terms of the 
degree of involvement of the managers within the community relations 
program. As previously mentioned, 68.75 percent of all those 
managers interviewed were directly involved in community relations 
activities. This degree of involvement, however, varies sig­
nificantly among levels. At the top management level, as would be
expected, there is a 100 percent involvement with community
relations. Further, the extent of involvement by the top management 
triad is quite extensive— especially the involvement of Mr. Randall 
Heath. According to the top management triad, significant
involvement on their part is the primary means of communicating their 
expectations to their managers. All three are in agreement that good 
community relations is an important factor in their organization's 
effectiveness.
At the corporate level, there is also a 100 percent involve­
ment of those interviewed; however, the extent of involvement at this 
level is not as great or time consuming as that of top management. 
In interviewing the division managers it was found that there was a 
63.63 percent involvement in community relations, while at the 
project manager level only 44.44 percent were involved. In terms of 
the staff, there was an 80 percent involvement rate. Figure 10
depicts these findings.
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Involvement in Community Relations
By Hierarchial Level
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With such a great deal of top management time and energy 
occupied with community activities added to the fact that 68.75 
percent of all managers interviewed actually participate in some way 
in such activities, it must be concluded that Heath's community 
relations program has a significant impact on the day-to-day opera­
tions of the firm. Further, with 68.75 percent actually involved and 
75 percent recognizing that the corporation desires such involvement, 
it must also be concluded that the community relations program has 
definitely become a part of Heath's normative structure. As can be 
seen by examining Figure 10, the rate of involvement in community 
activities and the perception of their performance go down as one 
moves down the hierarchy.
Analysis in Terms of Relevant Literature
The purpose of this section is to examine the community 
relations data gathered in this study in terms of the relevant 
current literature in the field. In examining Heath's community 
relations program, it seems apparent that the CEO made a basic policy 
decision to lead public expectations in the community relations area 
in 1965 after receiving the bid to construct the River Ridge Express­
way. This proactive response pattern in community relations 
established a highly visible social image for Heath in the com­
munities in which it operates, is evidenced by not only the voluntary 
civic projects undertaken by the CEO and his organization but also by 
the involvement of 68.75 percent of Heath's managers in community 
relations activities.
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Why does a proactive response pattern exist in community
relations at Heath? It appears that the answer to this question is
the CEO's commitment to the idea that his organization is a part of
the community and therefore should make a meaningful contribution to
the community. According to Ackerman, "How the CEO conceives of the
company's obligation to society and his affinity for a particular
issue at hand are the critical determinants in the emergence of
corporate policy."* Thus, Ackerman argues that social policy should
be a concern at the corporate level and that the response tends to be
a "top-down" affair in terms of initiative, analysis, and commit- 
2
ment. This certainly appears to be the case at Heath.
The structure of response to community relations, however,
varies from the response process outlined by both Ackerman and 
Murray. Phase II (the learning phase) is characterized by the
appointment and development of a staff specialist. As previously 
mentioned, there is no community/public relations specialist at 
Heath. Randall Heath maintains that his employees know what is 
expected of them and that there is no need for a special staff person 
to guide their activities when community relations should be a part 
of their job. This philosophy is consistent with the organic nature 
of the firm. As Burns and Stalker note, in the organic system tasks 
and requirements for action "cannot be broken down and distributed
*Ackerman, The Social Challenge to Business, p. 66. 
2Ibid., p. 287.
^Mr. Randall Heath, July 14, 1982.
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among specialist roles within a clearly defined hierarchy. 
Individuals have to perform their special tasks in light of their 
knowledge of the tasks of the firm as a w h o l e . T h i s  characteristic 
is quite evident at Heath in that each project manager is responsible 
for his project’s impact on the community, whatever it may be. Thus, 
it appears that the omission of a staff specialist in the response 
process may be attributed to the organic nature of the firm.
With respect to the institutionalization of the community 
relations program at Heath, it seems that it has become a part of the
normative structure of the organization measured by the high degree
of participation. With respect to Ackerman's definition of institu­
tionalization, it appears that the community relation program has 
achieved sustained organizational commitment with 68.75 percent of 
the managers interviewed involved in and commited to maintaining 
Heath's highly visible social image.
With respect to the performance/control system's role in 
institutionalization, the results are interesting. As was noted 
extensively in Chapter 2, the literature strongly suggests that an 
activity must be supported by these systems if it is to be fully 
institutionalized. Of all the managers interviewed, 75 percent 
perceived that the organization wanted them to be involved in com­
munity activities and 68.75 percent were actually involved. Yet of
those involved, only 63.63 percent felt that their community rela­
tions were reported in some way while only 45.45 percent felt that
^"Burns and Stalker, The Management of Innovation, pp. 5-6.
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such activities were measured. Also, only 45.45 percent of those
involved perceived that their community activities were part of their
evaluation, and only 50 percent felt that these activities were
rewarded or affected their promotion opportunities in some way.
There is information in the literature that may partially explain
this phenomenon.
In Murray's research in the banking industry, he delineated
ten factors that he thought might affect social responsiveness.
(These factors are size, visibility, profitability, policy,
organization, measurement and control systems, long range planning,
incentive systems, organization culture, and leadership.) Of these
ten factors Murray found that "leadership by the chief executive
seemed to be the most closely and consistently related with the
effective implementation of social policies .... In order to be
effective, commitment had to be demonstrated by the chief executive's
shaping of corporate strategy to include social responsibility as
well as setting a personal example for other officers."* And
Ackerman found that "the corporate response to a social demand hinged
2
on the CEO's interest in pursuing it." With respect to the Heath 
Corporation, it is apparent that Randall Heath's commitment to his 
community and his personal example have been instrumental to the 
implementation of the community relations program. Mr. Heath
3
believes that "most things stem from the leadership." The
^Murray. "The Implementation of Social Policies," p. 3-37. 
o
Ackerman, The Social Challenge to Business," p. 290.
^Mr. Randall Heath, July 14, 1982.
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leadership at Heath has played a major role in the implementation 
process.
Another factor influencing the institutionalization of 
community relations at Heath is the convergence between social 
policy and other business policies. Murray found that implementation 
depended a great deal on "how effectively social policy (written or 
unwritten) is integrated with other business policies."^ Murray 
noted in the banks he studied that managerial perceptions of the 
situations encountered in the environment affected the degree of 
organizational responses to social issues. He observed four ways of 
looking at a situation (perceptual contexts) and a sequenced pro­
gression through the different perceptual contexts. Initially, the 
bank managers perceived the issue as an economic threat and soon as a
social threat. Over time they began to perceive the issue as a
2
social opportunity and finally as an economic opportunity. This
convergence graduatlly took place over time in the banks. Murray
observed " a progression of organizational adaptations which helped
transform what was at the outset essentially a social issue into more
3
a routine form of banking activity." Murray concludes:
■^Murray, "The Implementation of Social Policies," p. 3-21.
2Ibid, p. 10-4.
3Ibid., p. 6-24.
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Within certain limits— both social and economic— there may 
actually be a response which serves both social and economic 
needs in an optimal balance which in the past has been 
referred to as ’long-term profitability1. In effect, one 
could argue that a person working for long-term profitability 
might end up doing the same thing another person would do in 
the course of working for social responsibility. This would 
suggest that the earning of profits and fulfillment of social 
needs are not necessarily contradictory or mutually exclusive 
activities, but rather potentially compatible.
At the Heath Corporation, it appears that the convergence 
between community relations and economic/business policies took place 
early in the evolution of the community relations program. It was 
during the River Ridge Expressway project in 1965 that Randall Heath 
perceived that good community relations was good business in terms of 
dollars and cents. In other words, Randall Heath's perception of 
community relations was initially from the context of an economic 
opportunity. From that time on, the philosophy at the top has been 
that community relations is a part of the job. This view permeates 
the organization and may account for why many of the Heath managers 
do not believe that community relations is rewarded separately from 
good job performance. One project manager, for example, told how he 
called the historical society and museum when his men pulled 
petrified trees from a port they were constructing. The museum ended 
up using the trees in a project and wrote Randall Heath expressing 
its appreciation. This project manager felt that this was just part 
of his job. Another division manager said, "Heath's image is such 
that we are expected to be involved and concerned with the 
community— much more than other companies."
1Ibid., p. 6-27.
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It appears that community relations is implicitly tied into 
the reward system at Heath. In other words, it seems that community 
relations objectives and economic objectives converged early in the 
development phase of the program and that good performance is 
rewarded at the Heath Corporation. This means good economic as well 
as social performance.
CHAPTER 5
AN ANALYSIS OF WORKER SAFETY AT HEATH
Worker safety at the Heath Corporation is a legally mandated 
program, although it was in existence long before the passage of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970. As in Chapter 4, the 
format to analyze the worker safety program is an examination of the 
phase of organizational involvement, the role of the performance/ 
control systems, the impact on operations and an analysis with 
respect to the literature.
Phase of Organizational Involvement
The purpose of this section is to examine Heath's worker 
safety program from the standpoint of the phase of organizational 
involvement it has achieved. This will be accomplished by examining 
the evolution of the program utilizing the Ackerman model as a 
framework.
Since the inception of the firm in 1946, safety has been a 
major concern for the CEO, Randall Heath. Because Mr. Heath served 
as general superintendent, concrete mixer, operator, carpenter, and 
laborer on his first projects, he experienced first hand that a "safe 
job was a profitable job."
Over the next several years, as the organization 
grew in size, complexity and projects, Mr. Heath realized that his
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organition needed a specialist in charge of safety. Thus, during the 
mid-1950s the Heath Corporation moved into Phase II of the Ackerman 
model with the appointment of a safety director.
Initially it was the safety director's responsibility to 
communicate top management's concern for safety to the managers at 
the project site and to develop safety policies and procedures. When 
Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970, those 
requirements specifically aimed at the construction industry were 
incorporated directly into the existing safety program. During these 
years, with the appointment of a specialist and the development of a 
safety program, the organization certainly experienced the learning 
(technical and administrative) which is characteristic of Phase II as 
defined by Ackerman and Murray.
Today the organization has a detailed, written safety policy 
which goes beyond the basic requirements of OSHA. Mr. Heath feels 
that:
Heath's most valuable assets are our employees. Accidents 
extract a needless toll in hardship and suffering for our 
people and their families. I truly believe that accidents 
are preventable. It is our goal to reduce the incident rate 
of accidents below industry national averages. To reach this 
goal and then maintain it, each project manager must accept a 
personal responsibility to prevent accidents to people and 
equipment through careful pre-planned management. Everyone 
should strive to establish the most efficient and safest work 
environment possible, thereby protecting our employees, 
equipment, and the public. The costs of compensation, 
medical benefits, liability claims, damage to equipment and 
property often determine the success of a project.
*Mr. Randall Heath, forward to the Heath Corporation's safety 
policy.
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Thus, it is Mr. Heath's belief that accidents not only cause 
suffering to the people involved and their families but also can 
determine whether a project will be profitable. Therefore, the 
organization puts a great deal of emphasis on safety management.
The safety program establishes general guidelines to be 
followed on all projects. In addition to the guidelines established 
by Heath, the specific regulations stipulated by OSHA according to
the particular project are also carefully reviewed and followed.
This is accomplished through supervisory safety meetings once a month 
as well as employee safety meetings each week. The suggested format 
of the weekly safety meetings includes:*-
(1) A review of a recent accident that relates to the 
present operation.
(2) Using group participation, a review of any near accident
that could have caused injury or property damage.
(3) A call upon a person to review safe operating practices 
within his field of work or trade.
(4) A call upon an individual to review some phase of 
emergency medical treatment or first aid.
(5) A call upon a key person to review some portion of state
or federal safety requirements that apply to the
particular project at hand. OSHA regulations are a 
source document.
*Heath's Safety Management Program, p. 7.
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(6) Review current and future operations for hazards and 
discuss means to avoid or eliminate them.
(7) Hold an open discussion session as appropriate to obtain 
employee safety input.
(8) Request safety recommendations from the crew.
These weekly safety meetings are separated from other company busi­
ness and announcements to insure that employees recognize the 
organization's emphasis on safety.
In addition to the safety meetings, educational programs in
the field are delivered to help employees become aware of proper work
procedures and how they can contribute to safe job performance and 
avoid accidents. A safety suggestion program has also been imple­
mented to obtain input from employees in establishing controls for 
safe work practices and conditions. Thus, the current safety policy 
at Heath includes a great deal of employee participation since it is 
of the utmost importance to the employees that they work in the 
safest environment possible.
Although it is really impossible to delineate exactly when 
the program moved from Phase II into Phase III, it is apparent
that the program is indeed institutionalized today with 84.38
percent of those interviewed recognizing that the organization wanted 
them involved with safety and 78.13 percent actually involved. 
Figure 11 summarizes the development of the phases of organizational 
involvement of the safety program at Heath.
Figure 11
Phase of Organizational Involvement in Safety
Phase I - Phase II - Phase III -
Recognition/Policy Development Learning Institutionalization
Recognition of issue in 1946 
with the inception of the 
firm.
Development of verbal policy 
that a safe job is a 
profitable job. A written 
safety policy eventually 
developed.
Appointment of a staff 
specialist during the 
mid 1950s.
Data gathering and reporting 
systems developed for 
safety.
Each project manager 
made responsible for 
safety on project 
sites.
84.38 percent of Heath's 
managers perceive that the 
organization wants them 
involved in safety.
78.13 percent of Heath's 
managers are actually 
involved.
81 percent of managers feel 
that performance/control 
system is modified to 
include safety.
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Performance/Control Systems
This section will report the findings gathered from inter­
viewing informants at all five levels in the organization with 
respect to the role the performance/control systems play in the 
safety program. First, an attempt will be made to establish "what 
is" with respect to these systems by analyzing the data gathered from 
the top management triad and the staff safety specialist. Then the 
findings of "what is perceived" will be reported from analyzing the 
data from the other three levels. This research design is depicted 
in Matrix 7.
At the top, there is agreement that a "safe job is a
profitable, well managed job." According to Randall Heath, "You have 
to have an accident free work place to make money. Safety must 
originate with the leadership."'*' Top management is therefore in full 
agreement that their managers’ evaluations and rewards are affected
in the sense that a manager's effectiveness is directly related to
his safety record. Thus, the top managers feel that they reward good 
performance, and good performance is directly related to safety in 
the workplace.
Since safety is a legally mandated program, Mr. Heath was
asked about the impact of OSHA on his program. "Laws don't make
people do right. People do right because they want to do right.
2
They believe it is the thing to do." Therefore, OSHA is viewed as
XMr. Randall Heath, July 14, 1982. 
2Ibid.
Matrix 7 
An Analysis of the Safety Data
Degree of Involvement Performance/Control Systems
Sources Perceived Actual Measurement Reporting Evaluation Reward Overall
Top
Managers
(3)
1002 1002 1002 1002 1002 1002 1002
Corporate
Managers
(4)
752 752 66.672 66.672 66.672 1002 752
Division
Managers
(11)
90.92 81.812 88.892 88.892 88.892 77.782 86.112
Project/
Support
Managers
(»)
1002 1002. 88.892 55.552 1002 55.552 752
Staff
(5) 402 202 1002 1002 02 02
502
Total
(32)
84.382 78.132 882 762 ‘ 882 722 812
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totally unnecessary at the top since Heath had its own safety program 
some fifteen years before the passage of the Act.
To ascertain the specifics of how safety is incorporated into 
the performance/control systems, the Loss Control Officer (safety 
specialist), Ed Koontz, was interviewed in depth. According to 
Koontz, the safety program is funded strictly out of project overhead 
rather than being funded from some form of supplemental or specially 
earmarked account. This follows the basic Heath philosophy that 
safety is considered just part of the job.
Koontz indicated that several basic measurements are used to 
monitor workplace safety at Heath. For accidents and injuries to 
employees the incident rate is used. The incident rate, which is the 
equivalent number of injuries and illnesses per 100 employees, is 
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. These rates are 
published according to specific occupational classes within the 
industry. Heath's rates are compared to the industry average to 
determine the effectiveness of its safety management program. (It 
should be noted that Heath's computation is more stringent than that 
of the BLS because Heath's incident rates include any employee who 
sees a doctor while BLS only counts injuries with lost work days.) 
Regardless of the differences in computation, Heath's goal is to be 
below the industry average and according to Ed Koontz, Heath 
generally achieves this goal. Another measure utilized by Heath is a 
computerized list of accidents by project. This listing includes 
damages to both people and property. This report entails such 
items as the details of the accident, third party damage, damage to
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equipment, etc. (The insurance department at Heath is responsible 
for compiling both the incident rate and accident reports.)
Another measure of effectiveness is the experience modifica­
tion rating, an insurance rating that reports how safe a company is 
as compared to others in its industry. A 100 rating is what would be 
expected for the average company— meaning that the company pays 100 
percent of the premium that an average company pays. The rating is 
then adjusted according to the firm's safety record. (For example, a 
61 rating means that because of the safety record of the firm, it 
only pays 61 percent of the premium the average firm would pay.) The 
current experience modification rating for the Heath Corporation is 
56. Thus, the safety program is quite effective in terms of the 
experience modification measure. In sum, the measurement system used 
in safety management is fairly structured and formalized.
Reporting is also a fairly structured system. Each month Ed 
Koontz receives the incident rate report and the detailed list of 
accidents. He evaluates these reports and reports his findings to 
division and top management. He also receives on a monthly basis an 
inspection report from the field on equipment. After each weekly 
safety meeting, the project manager also writes up a report. These 
reports are kept on site, but are often seen by Mr. Koontz when 
visiting the project site. (See Appendix D for copies of reports.)
The evaluation and reward systems are much less formal than 
the measurment and reporting systems. According to Ed Koontz, the
135
project managers are held accountable for their safety record, but 
safety is not considered separately from economic performance within 
these systems. (It is Mr. Koontzfs feelings that these systems need 
to be a bit more structured with respect to safety.)
It appears that the measurement and reporting systems are 
fairly structured with respect to safety, while the evaluation and 
reward systems are very informal in this respect. The remainder of 
this section will deal with managerial perceptions about the modi­
fication of performance/control systems to incorporate safety.
At the corporate level, 75 percent (3 out of 4) of the 
corporate officers were involved with safety and all three indicated 
that they were aware that the corporation wanted them to be involved. 
Of these, 66.67 (two) percent felt that safety was measured and 66.67 
percent also felt that safety was reported. The same percentage
(66.67) also felt that safety was evaluated but not in a measured 
way. But with respect to reward, 100 percent of those involved per­
ceived that safety was rewarded to the extent that it affects
profitability and overall performance. Considering all performance/ 
control variables in the aggregate, 75 percent of the corporate level 
responses indicated that the performance/control system was modified 
in some way to incorporate managerial safety performance.
At the division level, 90.9 percent of those interviewed
perceived that the corporation wanted them involved in safety and 
81.81 percent were actually involved. Of those involved, 88.89 
percent perceived that safety was measured— usually by written
reports through the insurance department. Twenty-five percent of
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these, however, felt that safety was only measured when their safety 
record was unsatisfactory. In terms of reporting, 88.89 percent of 
the division managers felt that safety was reported through incident 
rate and accident insurance reports. The same percentage (88.89) 
also felt that safety was evaluated. One manager commented that
safety was an integral part of the job which certainly affected 
profitability. Twenty-five percent of these managers, however, per­
ceived that safety was only negatively incorporated into the 
evaluation system. "Only my failures and bad records are evaluated," 
commented one manager. With respect to reward, 77.77 percent felt 
that safety affected their compensation and promotion opportunities. 
Comments such as "safety is rewarded through profitability" and 
"safety has a tendency to say a lot about how effectively you are 
working" were common among the division managers. Again, 28.57 
percent perceived that safety was negatively rewarded. For example, 
one manager expressed the following: "No one recognizes the dif­
ference between a good and average safety record. Promotion 
opportunities will only be affected if a bad record exists." 
Overall, 86.11 percent of the division level responses supported the 
idea that managerial safety performance was included in the per­
formance/control systems.
At the project level 100 percent of the managers perceived
that the corporation wanted them involved in safety management
and 100 percent were actually involved. The perception at this 
level was that safety was measured--88.89 percent of the managers had 
this perception. Fifty percent, however, felt that it was measured
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in a negative sense. The term management by reaction was used by 
several managers, while comments such as "noncompliance is only 
measured" were also common. Only 55.5 percent of the managers felt 
that safety was reported. All of the managers (100 percent) however 
perceived that safety was evaluated. "Safety affects profits" and 
"always an important part of the job" were common comments. Yet 
44.44 percent felt that it was tied to the evaluation system in a 
negative manner. One manager said, "I'm only evaluated in terms of 
the frequency of accidents on projects." Interestingly, only 55.55 
percent believed that safety affected reward and promotion opportuni­
ties and 40 percent said it was negative. "Only noncompliance 
affects promotion" was one common comment. In the aggregate, how­
ever, 75 percent of project/support unit responses indicated that 
safety performance was incorporated into the performance/control 
systems.
When all the responses are considered together, a total of
84.38 of all managers interviewed indicated that they felt that the 
organization wanted them to be involved with safety management and
78.13 percent were actually involved. Of those participating in the 
safety program, 88 percent perceived that their safety performance 
was measured; 76 percent felt that their performance was reported to 
higher management; 88 percent felt that it was evaluted; and 72 per­
cent felt that it was rewarded. In total, 81 percent of the 
responses from managers involved in the safety management program 
supported the idea that safety performance was incorporated into the 
performance/control systems. Interestingly, 25.93 percent of these
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managers perceived that their safety performance was negatively tied 
into these systems.
Figures 12 through 17 graphically depict by level the degree 
to which the managers of the Heath Corporation perceive that the 
company's performance/control systems are modified to include the 
safety performance of the managers.
Impact on Operations
The impact on operations, measured in terms of the degree of 
involvement of line managers, indicates that 78.13 percent were 
directly involved in the safety management program. The percentages, 
however, did vary according to organizational level.
All of the top management triad were involved in the safety 
management program. This, of course, is not a direct involvement as 
with the lower level managers, but an involvement in a policy 
formulation sense. Top management feels that safety is directly 
related to profitability and therefore is of the utmost importance. 
This policy is communicated verbally and in writing.
At the corporate level, 75 percent of the managers were 
involved with safety, while at the division level 81.81 percent were 
involved. At the project level there was a 100 percent involvement 
rate. Figure 18 shows the involvement according to hierarchial 
level. When only considering line positions, there was an 88.89 
percent involvement rate in safety management.
Since project managers are responsible (according to 
Heath's safety policy) for the safety of the workplace, it is 
reasonable to find a 100 percent involvement of those interviewed.
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Figure 12
Perceived Impact of Safety
on Measurement by Level
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Figure 13
Perceived Impact of Safety on
Reporting by Level
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Level0
Corporate Division Project StaffTop
Pe
rc
en
t 
of
 
Po
si
ti
ve
 
Re
sp
on
se
s
141
Figure 14
Perceived Impact of Safety on
Evaluation by Level
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Figure 15
Perceived Impact of Safety on 
Reward/Promotion by Level
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Figure 16
Perceived Impact of Safety on
Performance/Control Systems by Level
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Figure 17
Overall Positive Response Pattern by 
Performance/Control Variable
Measurement Reporting Evaluation Reward
Performance/
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Figure 18
Involvement of Line Management in Safety 
by Hierarchial Level
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As the levels become more removed from the project site, it is not 
surprising that the rate of involvement declines— 81.81 percent for 
division managers and 75 percent for corporate officers. As would 
be expected, those not involved in the safety program tend to be 
those who have no direct policy making or operational responsibility 
for it.
With 78.13 percent of all managers interviewed actually 
involved in safety management and 84.38 percent recognizing that the 
corporation desires such involvement, it must be concluded that 
Heath's safety management program has a significant impact on the 
day-to-day operations of the organization.
Analysis in Terms of Relevant Literature 
In examining Heath's safety management program, it seems 
apparent that the Heath Corporation has adopted a proactive response 
strategy with respect to worker safety. The organization chose to 
lead public expectations in that its safety management program had 
been established some fifteen years before it was required by law. 
In Ackerman's terminology, the organization proactively planned and 
implemented its safety program during the zone of discretion when 
uncertainties existed with respect to the issue. Thus, Heath had 
more freedom in formulating its safety program than it would have 
after the 1970 legislation. This response strategy may be charac­
terized as anticipatory and proactive in nature or socially 
1
responsive.
^Sethi, "Dimensions of Corporate Social Performance," p. 60.
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The structure of the organization's response to the worker 
safety issue essentially followed the Ackerman model of responsive­
ness. From the beginning of the organization, the CEO was cognizant 
of the importance of safety, not only as a social concern but also an 
economic one as well. After his organization began experiencing 
growth, he appointed a staff specialist. Today the safety management 
program is institutionalized, with 88.89 percent of the line managers 
actually involved.
It appears that the performance/control systems have been 
modified to include safety performance. Of all the managers 
interviewed, 84.38 percent perceived that the organization wanted 
them involved in safety management and 78.13 percent were actually 
involved. Of those involved, 88 percent felt that their safety 
performance was measured, while 76 percent believed that it was 
reported to higher management. With respect to evaluation and 
reward, 88 percent felt safety to be a part of their evaluation and 
72 percent perceived it to affect their reward and promotion 
opportunities.
The interesting aspect of these findings is that many 
managers felt that safety was negatively tied into these systems. In 
other words, many managers perceived that only accidents were 
measured and reported, and that it was only a bad safety record which 
had an impact on their evaluation and reward opportunities. Of the 
88 percent who perceived it was measured, 31.84 percent said it was 
negatively measured; of the 76 percent who perceived it to be 
reported, 10.5 percent said it was negatively reported; of the 88
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percent who perceived it was evaluated, 31.8 percent said it was 
evaluated negatively; and of the 72 percent who perceived it was 
rewarded, 27.78 percent said it negatively affected rewards. In 
light of the fact that the measurement and reporting systems focus on 
accident occurences rather than prevention and also that the 
exception principle appears to be a management philosophy permeating 
the firm, the high percentage of respondents who feel that it is tied 
to these systems in a negative manner should not be surprising. 
Thus, whether positively or negatively, safety does indeed appear to 
be tied to the performance/control systems.
Another factor which probably influenced the high percentage 
of managers perceiving that safety was tied to the performance/ 
control systems is the fact that there is a convergence between 
economic and social objectives. As previously noted in the chapter, 
Mr. Randall Heath initially perceived the safety issue as an economic 
opportunity. It is not suprising then that a common perception among 
the managers was that safety directly impacted profits. Therefore, 
to have a profitable project it must be a safe one. This is con­
sistent with the philosophy at the top management level. Thus, it 
appears that the legally mandated safety program at Heath is both 
tied to the performance/control systems and fully institutionalized 
within the organization.
CHAPTER 6
AN ANALYSIS OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AT HEATH
Equal employment opportunity (EEO) is the second of two 
legally required programs of the Heath Corporation to be discussed. 
The phase of organizational involvement the program has achieved is 
presented first. Next the role the performance/control systems 
played in implementation will be examined, followed by an analysis of 
the impact the program has had on operations. Finally, the relevant 
literature will be examined.
Phase of Organizational Involvement
The purpose of this section is to analyze Heath's EEO program 
from the perspective of the phase of organizational involvement it 
has achieved. This will be accomplished through examining the 
evolution of the program utilizing the Ackerman model as a framework.
The passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the signing 
of Executive Order 11246 (amended by Executive Order 11375) in 1965 
were the external stimuli which brought the issue of EEO to the 
attention of the Heath Corporation. Thus, it was federal legislation 
that determined the position that the corporation adopted with regard 
to EEO— to obey the law. This was the motivation which moved the 
organization into Phase I of the Ackerman model.
To comply with the federal regulations (i.e., to fill out 
necessary forms, quotas, etc.), the EEO requirements were integrated
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into the normal duties of the personnel director, Frank Donland. 
Therefore, Mr. Donland became the staff specialist in charge of the 
EEO program. Most of the technical and administrative learning, 
which involved developing an understanding of the law as it relates 
to the construction industry, developing advertising procedures, etc. 
necessary in recruiting quotas of minorities on the job, learning the 
proper governmental reporting procedures, etc., has been primarily 
related to fulfilling the requirements of the civil rights legisla­
tion. This is in keeping with the goal to obey the law espoused by 
the management of Heath.
It appears from the data that Heath's EEO program has moved 
into Phase III of the Ackerman model but has not become fully insti­
tutionalized. Only 53.13 percent of the managers interviewed 
perceived that the organization wanted them involved with EEO and 
that same percentage (53.13) were actually involved. Of those 
involved, only 55.88 percent perceived that the performance/control 
systems had been modified to include managerial EEO performance. 
Figure 19 summarizes the development of the phases of organizational 
involvement of the EEO program at Heath.
Performance/Control Systems
This section will report the findings gathered from informant 
interviews at all five hierarchial levels in the organization with 
respect to the role the performance/control systems play in the EEO 
program. Interviews with top management and the personnel director 
will attempt to establish "what is" with respect to these systems,
Figure 19
Phase of Organizational Involvement in EEO
Phase I - 
Recognition/Policy Development
Recognition of issue in 1964/ 
1965 with passage of Civil 
Rights Act and Signing of 
Executive Order 11246.
Development of verbal policy 
to comply with the law.
Phase II - 
Learning
Personnel Director appointed 
EEO staff person.
Technical learning concerning 
the law as it relates to 
the construction industry 
occured.
Administrative learning
involving quota filling pro­
cedures occured.
Project managers given 
responsibility of filling 
quotas.
Phase III - 
Institutionalization
53.13 percent of Heath's 
managers perceive that the 
organization wants them 
involved with EEO.
53.13 percent of Heath's 
managers are actually 
involved in EEO.
Of those involved, 55.88 percent 
perceive the performance/ 
control systems to include 
managerial EEO performance.
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while interviews with the corporate, division, and project levels 
will attempt to establish "what is perceived." Matrix 8 depicts this 
research design.
In an effort to establish corporate policy with respect to 
EEO, the top management triad was interviewed. The CEO, Mr. Randall 
Heath, refused to comment on EEO. Mr. Dick Edwards and Mr. Bob 
Heath, however, were in agreement that the basic policy of the organ­
ization was to comply with the law. Mr. Edwards said that managerial 
rewards were generally negative for noncompliance rather than 
positive for compliance.
The personnel director, Mr. Frank Donland, was also inter­
viewed to establish the relationship between EEO and the performance/ 
control systems. According to Mr. Donland, measuring the effective­
ness of the EEO program at Heath primarily involves keeping track of 
the number of EEO complaints filed and the disposition of those 
claims. (This seems quite consistent with its basic policy of com­
plying with the law.) In this regard, Mr. Donland said that since 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act the firm has had a total of six 
(6) complaints, all of which had been satisfactorily settled without 
going to court. With respect to individual manager performance, Mr. 
Donland indicated that this was in no way measured. With respect to 
reporting, EEO performance is reported to him through computerized 
personnel records which are coded by race and sex. Each month he 
sends a 257 contract compliance report for each project to the Labor 
Department. (See Appendix D for a copy of the report.) With respect
Matrix 8 
An Analysis of the EEO Data
'Data Degree of [nvolvement Perfo rmsnce/Control Sys terns
Sources
Perceived Actual Measurement Reporting Evaluation Reward Overall
Top
Managers
(3)
66.67% 66.67Z 100Z 100Z 100% 100% 100%
Corporate
Managers
(4)
25% 25Z OZ OZ OZ OZ 0%
Division
Managers
(11)
63.63Z 63.67% 57.14% 71.42% 71.42Z 28.57% 57.14%
Project/
Support
Managers
(9)
66.67Z 66.67Z 83.33Z 50% 50Z 33.33Z 54.17Z
Staff
(5)
20Z 20Z OZ 100Z OZ OZ 25%
Total
(32) 53.13Z S3.13Z 64.7Z 64.7% 58.82Z 35.29Z 55.88Z
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to the evaluation and reward systems, EEO performance is not 
incorporated. The managerial perceptions of these systems with 
respect to EEO follows.
At the corporate level there was only one officer out of four 
involved in EEO. It was his perception that EEO was not measured, 
reported, evaluated, or rewarded.
At the division level, 63.63 percent perceived the organiza­
tion wanted them involved with EEO and 63.63 percent were actually 
involved. Of these, 57.14 percent perceived that EEO performance was 
measured. With respect to reporting, 71.42 percent felt that their 
EEO performance was reported (50 percent of these perceiving it was 
negatively reported). Reporting through personnel records was the 
common perception of how the reporting was done. With respect to 
evaluation, 71.42 percent felt that their EEO performance was 
evaluated (40 percent negatively), while only 28.57 percent perceived 
it was rewarded (50 percent negatively). Overall, 57.14 percent of 
the division level responses indicated that the performance/control 
systems had been modified to include EEO performance.
According to top management, it is the project manager's 
responsibility to comply with the law. Interestingly, only 66.67 
percent of these managers perceived that the corporation wanted them 
involved with EEO and 66.67 percent were actually involved. Of 
these, 83.33 percent felt that their EEO performance was measured, 
with 60 percent saying it was negatively measured. Comments like 
"its measured only when you screw up" were common. In terms of 
reporting, 50 percent perceived that EEO performance was reported.
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The same 50 percent believed that their EEO performance affected 
evaluations (33 percent negatively), while only 33 percent perceived 
that it had an effect on their compensation and promotion opportuni­
ties within the firm. One project manager commented, "EEO non- 
compliance does not affect promotions. Well, maybe it would if I had 
an EEO suit." Overall, 54.17 percent of the project level responses 
supported the idea that EEO performance is included in the
performance/control systems.
When considering all the responses together, a total of 53.13 
percent of the managers interviewed indicated that they perceived 
that the organization wanted them involved in EEO and 53.13 percent
were actually involved. Of those involved, 64.7 percent felt that
their EEO performance was measured; 64.7 percent felt that their
performance was reported to higher management; 58.82 percent per­
ceived that it was evaluated; and 35.29 percent felt that it was 
rewarded. In total, 55.88 percent of the responses from managers
involved in EEO supported the idea that the performance/control 
systems were structured to include EEO performance.
Figures 20 through 25 graphically depict by level the degree 
to which managers at the Heath Corporation perceive that the
company's performance/control systems are modified to include
managerial EEO performance.
Impact on Operations 
Using the degree of involvement in EEO of managers as a
measure of impact on operations, it appears that the EEO program
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Figure 20
Perceived Impact of EEO on Measurement by Level
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Figure 21
Perceived Impact of EEO on Reporting by Level
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Figure 22
Perceived Impact of EEO on Evaluation by Level
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Figure 23
Perceived Impact of EEO on Reward by Level
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Figure 24
Perceived Impact of EEO on Performance/Control
Systems by Level
Top Corporate Division Project Staff
f
Pe
rc
en
t 
of
 
Po
si
ti
ve
 
Re
sp
on
se
s
161
Figure 25
Overall Positive Response Pattern by 
Performance/Control Variable
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has had less of an impact on operations than community relations or 
safety. Of all the managers interviewed, only 53.15 percent 
perceived that the organization wanted them to be involved with EEO 
and 53.13 percent were actually involved (compared to a 68.75 percent 
involvement rate in community relations and a 78.13 percent involve­
ment rate in safety). The rate of involvement in EEO, however, did 
vary according to organizational level.
At the top, there was only 66.67 percent (2 out of 3) 
involvement in EEO. Mr. Randall Heath, the CEO, apparently has no 
involvement in EEO. (Since Mr. Heath refused to comment on EEO, this 
perception was ascertained through observation and informal conversa­
tions.) This is significant in light of Murray's research which will 
be discussed in the next section. Therefore, at the top management 
level there are only two of the three top level managers involved 
with EEO (in a policy formulation sense).
At the corporate level, 25 percent (1 out of 4) of the cor­
porate officers were involved in EEO, while at the division level 
there was a 63.63 percent (7 out of 11) involvement rate.
An interesting aspect of these findings is that there was 
only a 66.67 percent involvement of the project managers in EEO. 
This is significant in the light that it is these managers that are 
solely responsible for recruiting and hiring to fill the specific 
quotas for each project. The perception of these managers, 
however, is that EEO is not a very important concern at the top. 
This probably helps explain why EEO has much less of an impact on
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operations than community relations or safety. Figure 26 depicts the 
involvement in EEO of Heath's managers by level.
In sum, with only 53.13 percent of Heath's managers involved 
with EEO as compared to 78.13 percent in safety and 68.75 percent in 
community relations, it can be concluded that the EEO program does 
have an impact on operations but it is not as significant as safety 
or community relations.
Analysis in Terms of Relevant Literature
The purpose of this section is to analyze the EEO data 
gathered in this study in terms of the current literature in the 
field. In examining the EEO program at Heath, it seems apparent that 
the organization has adopted a reactive response strategy. In other 
words, the organization's strategy has been to let public expecta­
tions change and then to react to those expectations. In Ackerman's 
terms, the organization allowed the EEO issue to pass through the 
zone of discretion before addressing the issue. Dealing with the EEO 
issue late in its life cycle resulted in less freedom in the formula­
tion of the EEO program at Heath. This type of strategy may be 
described in McAdam's terms of "do what is required."^ The stimulus 
underlying this type of response strategy has been described by
Hinckley and Post as a legal mandate which creates an involuntary 
2
response. Thus, top management at Heath allowed the external
^McAdam, "How to Put Corporate Social Responsibility into 
Practice," p. 12.
2
Hinckley and Post, "The Performance Context of Corporate 
Responsibility," p. 295.
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environment to change first and then responded to that change, i.e. 
federal legislation.
The structure of the response to EEO does not explicitly
follow the three-phase response process described by Ackerman and 
Murray. The response was essentially an involuntary one; thus the 
policy established during Phase I was one of mere compliance. This 
type of response is discussed by Sethi and Votaw in their pressure- 
response model.^ Although there is a staff specialist whose duties 
include EEO, there was apparently little administrative learning with 
respect to the issue. The technical learning phase consisted of 
familiarizing the organization with the specific governmental regula­
tions. Thus, Phase II was not fully completed in the sense described
by Murray and Ackerman. With only 53.13 percent of the managers 
interviewed involved and only 55.88 percent of these managers
perceiving that the performance control systems have been modified to 
include EEO performance, it can be concluded that the EEO program at 
Heath has not completed Phase III.
This finding is not surprising in light of the research 
conducted by Murray and Ackerman. As previously mentioned, Murray 
found that leadership on part of the CEO was the single most 
important factor influencing responsiveness. Ackerman also contends 
that commitment by the CEO is one of the most important factors in 
implementation. The reactive response strategy at Heath is directly 
related to the lack of commitment to EEO of the CEO. This is no
^Sethi and Votaw, "Do We Need A New Corporate Response,"
p. 13.
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doubt a major reason why the EEO program has not generated the 
involvement of management that the community relations and safety 
programs have. Thus, it appears that leadership is a critical
element in the incomplete institutionalization of EEO at Heath.
A related factor which seems to have had an impact on the 
incomplete institutionalization of Heath's EEO program is the fact 
that, unlike the safety and community relations programs, there does 
not appear to be a congruence between EEO objectives and economic 
objectives. The top management group views EEO as an economic and 
social threat not as an economic or social opportunity.
i
CHAPTER 7
AN ANALYSIS OF THE HIGHWAY CLEAN-UP/YOUTH
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM AT HEATH
As previously discussed, Heath's highway clean-up/youth 
employment program is a purely discretionary program. The purpose of 
this chapter is to analyze this program with respect to the phase of 
organizational involvement, the role of the performance/control 
systems, the impact on operations, and its relevancy to the 
literature.
Phase of Organizational Involvement
This voluntary program originated in 1973 when Mr. Randall 
Heath was driving to work one morning and noticed trash all along the 
side of the highway. Having built a number of Illinois highways and 
roads, Mr. Heath had a certain pride in them and was appalled at the 
amount of trash and debris tossed from automobiles by careless 
citizens. He decided to combine this concern with the company's 
policy to provide summer employment for high school and college 
students. This was the external stimulus which motivated Mr. Heath 
to institute a social program which would lead public expectations 
with respect to litter and youth unemployment. Thus, the program 
moved into Phase I of the Ackerman model.
Phase II was immediately entered in that Mr. Heath appointed 
the personnel director, Mr. Frank Donland, as the staff person
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responsible for the program. The program was implemented in the 
summer of 1973. Mr. Donland hired eleven high school students and a 
football coach, placed them in company overalls, and equipped them 
with tools and trucks.
In 1982 the program employed 38 area teenagers, a general 
foreman, two field supervisors, two dump trucks, and two pick up 
trucks. In 1981 the cost to Heath for the program was $113,612. 
Although there is only a 9.4 percent involvement rate (the CEO and 
two staff) in this program, it appears that this nine year old, 
purely discretionary program is a part of the normative structure of 
the organization and has therefore entered Phase III of the Ackerman 
model. More will be said on this in the next section. Figure 27 
traces the development of the phase of organizational involvement of 
the highway clean-up program at Heath.
Performance/Control Systems and Impact on Operations
It is the purpose of this section to analyze the interview 
data with respect to the role the performance/control systems play in 
the highway clean-up program and the impact the program has on 
operations. As previously mentioned, there was only a 9.4 percent 
involvement rate in the program— the CEO and two staff members.
It is the belief of the CEO that the highway clean-up program 
is a contribution the organization can make to the community in which 
it operates. This program is consistent with the community relations 
philosophy of top management which was discussed in Chapter 4.
The other organizational members involved in the program are 
both staff members. Mr. Donland, who oversees the program, perceived
Figure 27
Phase of Organizational Involvement in Highway
Clean-Up/Youth Employment
Phase I - Phase II - Phase III -
Recognition/Policy Development Learning Institutionalization
Recognition of litter problem Appointment of personnel Program has been in existence
in 1973 (company already director as staff person for 9 years.
had a policy for employ­ in charge of the
ing area youth). program. 9.4 percent of Heath managers
are involved in highway
Program was implemented in clean-up.
1973.
58.88 percent of involved
managers perceive the per­
formance/control systems
modified.
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that his performance was measured, reported, and evaluated, but not 
rewarded. Mr. Koontz, the loss control officer, was only involved in 
the program with respect to safety and considered it just to be part 
of his job. Thus, by examining the degree of involvement and the 
performance/control systems, it became apparent that the clean-up 
program had little impact on operations and was essentially staff 
related.
Can a totally staff related social program enter into 
Phase III and become a part of the normative structure of the whole 
organization? It appears so at Heath. Although none of the line 
managers (except the CEO) were directly involved with the clean-up 
program, most took a great sense of pride in the program sponsored by 
their organization in the Peoria community. During the summer of 
1982 when this data was collected, there was little work in the 
construction industry and the $113,612 spent on the clean-up program 
was an expense that could have been cut. No one in the organization, 
however, would consider eliminating the nine year old program. It is 
a trademark of the Heath organization in the Peoria community. One 
manager commented, "The community now expects us to do this each 
summer. It's our image— we couldn't eliminate this program." Thus, 
it appears that the highway clean-up program is institutionalized 
within the organization even though it is an essentially staff 
administered program. The next section will analyze the clean-up 
program in terms of the relevant literature in the field.
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Analysis in Terms of Relevant Literature 
In analyzing the implementation of the clean-up program, it 
again became obvious that leadership and commitment of the CEO were 
critical factors in implementation. Mr. Heath's commitment to clean 
up the litter on the highways, employ area youth, and his feeling 
that his organization is a part of the community were essential to 
the quick implementation of the clean-up program. As Ackerman points 
out, "Corporate response to a social demand hinges on the CEO's 
interest in pursuing it."^ This appears to be the most important 
variable in the implementation of this program. Another factor which 
played a role in implementation was the philosophy at the top that 
good community relations is good business. By employing a proactive 
response strategy with respect to litter and youfh employment, the 
Heath organization established a very visible social image in the 
community. This program is used as image advertising for the company 
and is an important element in the corporate purpose. For example, 
at the end of each day the bags of litter collected from the roadside 
are taken to a central location which is selected for its visibility 
to motorists. The litter is allowed to pile up at this location for 
as long as it takes to clean up the area. The trash pile is 
accompanied by a sign which identifies the Heath Corporation and the 
clean up project itself, as well as pointing out to the community the 
amount of trash that is disposed of on the highway and encouraging 
more socially responsible behavior by highway users. Thus, like the
^Ackerman, The Social Challenge to Business, p. 290.
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other institutionalized programs which have been examined (community 
relations and safety), the highway clean-up program represents the 
merger of social and economic objectives. It is essentially good 
business. One corporate officer commented, "When someone wants 
to sue us, we always tell them to do it in Peoria." His point, of 
course, is that Heath's image is so positive in the community that a 
law suit would be hard to win against them.
In sum, it appears that the clean-up program is indeed a part 
of the normative structure of the organization, although it is staff 
related. The commitment of the CEO to the program as well as the 
congruence of economic and social objectives were the two most 
important factors in implementation.
}
CHAPTER 8
AN ANALYSIS OF THE EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM AT HEATH .
As documented in the methodology chapter, the educational 
assistance program at the Heath Corporation is a purely discretionary 
program. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze this program with 
respect to the phase of organizational involvement, the role of the 
performance/control systems, the impact on operations, and its 
relevancy to the literature.
Phase of Organizational Involvement 
Mr. Heath's experiences at the University of Illinois while 
obtaining his civil engineering degree are the basis of his personal 
commitment to education. It was after his graduation that he 
realized that a background in oral and written communication was
I
essential for anyone, engineers included, to be successful in life. 
This realization was the personal stimulus for the educational 
assistance program at Heath. Therefore, the CEO recognized the issue 
that schools and universities needed assistance to have the necessary 
resources to educate those desiring a good education. This 
recognition took place early in the life of the organization and the 
CEO developed a verbal policy to give educational institutions 
assistance whenever possible. Thus, the educational assistance 
program moved into Phase I of the Ackerman model.
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As mentioned in the methodology chapter, Mr. Heath has a 
direct personal involvement with educational institutions and activi­
ties in Illinois. And as previously stated, the organization also 
participates in educational assistance activities, such as the Co-op 
program and summer student work program. There has not, however, 
been an appointment of a staff specialist to handle this program. 
Mr. Heath himself administers most of the facets of the educational 
assistance program. Therefore, Mr. Heath is technically the staff 
specialist in charge of the program. The only learning with respect 
to the program has been on the administrative level. The small 
degree of administrative learning has been in terms of filling out 
reports on Co-op students. It does appear that Phase II has been 
completed, but not in the precise manner described by Ackerman and 
Murray.
The institutionalization phase does not appear to have been 
entered. The performance/control systems have not been structured to 
include educational assistance and the managers interviewed did not 
as closely associate themselves with the educational assistance pro­
gram as they did with the highway clean-up program. Thus, it appears 
that the educational assistance program is not really a part of the 
normative structure of the organization. Figure 28 summarizes the 
phase of organizational involvement of the educational assistance 
program at Heath.
Figure 28
Phase I - 
Recognition/Policy Development
CEO's personal commitment to 
education was the stimulus 
which led to the verbal 
policy to assist educational 
institutions.
Phase of Organizational Involvement 
in Educational Assistance
Phase II - 
Learning
No staff specialist appointed. 
The CEO serves in this 
capacity.
Relatively little technical 
and administrative learning.
Phase III - 
Institutionalization
25 percent of Heath's managers 
are involved in educational 
assistance program.
12.5 percent of involved Heath's 
managers perceive that 
educational assistance is 
incorporated in the per­
formance/control systems.
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Performance/Control Systems and Impact 
on Operations
The purpose of this section is to analyze the impact the
educational assistance program has had on the performance/control
systems and the daily operations of the firm. Overall, there were 25
percent of the Heath managers involved with the program and 12.5
percent of those involved perceived that the performance/control 
systems had been modified to include educational assistance 
activities.
At the top management level, the CEO, Mr. Randall Heath, as 
previously documented, played a major role in the educational 
assistance program. Mr. Heath perceived that the performance/control 
systems did include his performance in this area (as much as any 
CEO's performance is incorporated into these systems).
At the corporate level, there was a 25 percent involvement 
rate, while at the divisional level 27.27 percent of the managers 
were involved. All of the division managers who were involved were 
in charge of filling out reports on Co-op students. At the project 
level there was a 22.22 percent involvement rate, while at the 
staff level 20 percent were involved. The involvement at all 
levels (except the division level) consisted of making contributions 
to schools and colleges. None of those involved (except the CEO) 
perceived that their educational assistance activities were 
incorporated into the performance/control systems. Figure 29 depicts 
the degree of involvement of the Heath managers in the educational 
assistance program.
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Figure 29
Rate of Involvement in Educational Assistance
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It is apparent that the most involvement in the program is at 
the top management level. It is the CEO who is the cornerstone of 
the program. Thus, the educational assistance program at Heath has 
relatively little impact on operations and is not a component of the 
performance/control systems. The next section will attempt to 
analyze the educational assistance program in terms of the relevant 
literature.
Analysis in Terms of Relevant Literature
The organization has adopted a proactive response strategy 
with respect to educational assistance. This is evidenced by such 
activities as various grants and contributions to schools and 
colleges, an establishment of a writing lab in a regional college, 
generous contributions of the CEO's time to educational activities, 
etc. Therefore this response strategy can be characterized in 
McAdam's terms of "lead the industry."'*' Sethi also describes this 
type of response strategy as socially responsive and anticipatory in 
nature.^
The structure of the response does not explicitly follow the 
Ackerman model. Phase I, the decision of what position the corpora-
i
tion should adopt with regard to educational assistance, was entered 
early in the life of the organization. The commitment to education
^McAdam, "How to Put Corporate Social Responsibility into 
Practice," p. 12.
o
Sethi, "Dimensions of Corporate Social Performance," p. 60.
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of the CEO is the sole factor in the establishment of the proactive 
posture of the organization. The CEO can also be considered the 
staff specialist in charge of the educational assistance program 
since he administers the program himself. It appears that Phase II 
has been completed. Phase III, however, has not been entered and it 
does not appear that the CEO had any intentions to have the educa­
tional assistance program become part of the normative structure of 
the organization. In other words, the program has achieved its 
intended objectives— assistance to educational institutions in the 
Midwest— without having to have a sustained organizational commitment 
from the managers at Heath. This deviation from the Ackerman model 
suggests that not all social policies need to become part of the 
normative structure of the organization to be implemented as planned. 
Thus, the objective of some social programs may be only the 
completion of Phase II as described by Ackerman and Murray. (More 
will be said on this in Chapter 10.)
In sum, it can be concluded that the educational assistance 
program has been implemented as planned by the CEO without being 
institutionalized within the organization.
CHAPTER 9
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL
PROGRAMS AT HEATH
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overall compara­
tive analysis of the five social programs examined in this study. 
The Summary Matrix (Matrix 5) developed in the methodology chapter 
will be used as the framework for this analysis. Specifically, the 
analysis will entail a comparative examination of the programs with 
respect to the performance/control systems, phase of organizational 
involvement, and impact on operations.
Performance/Control Systems 
In examining the overall impact of the programs on the per­
formance/control systems, it became apparent that the safety program 
had been incorporated into these systems to a larger degree than any 
other of the programs. More managers were actually involved in 
safety then in any other program, and of all those involved (78.13 
percent), 81 percent perceived that the performance/control systems 
had been structured to include managerial safety performance. The 
highway clean-up program had the next largest impact with 58.33 
percent of the managers perceiving that their performance within the 
program was incorporated within these systems. (It should be noted,
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however, that there was only a 9.4 percent involvement rate in the 
program.) The EEO program, with 55.88 percent, and the community 
relations program, with 51.14 percent, followed in terms of 
managerial perceptions of the impact of the program on the 
performance/control systems. The educational assistance program, 
with 12.5 percent, was perceived to have the least impact on the 
performance/control systems. Figure 30 compares these programs in 
terms of their impact on the performance/control systems.
In examining each system separately, the safety program was 
perceived to have the greatest impact on the measurement system, with 
88 percent of the managers involved perceiving that their safety 
performance was measured. The highway clean-up program followed with 
66.67 percent (2 out of 3) of the managers perceiving that their 
performance was measured. With respect to EEO, 64.7 percent of the 
involved managers perceived that their EEO performance was 
incorporated within the measurement system, and 45.5 percent of the 
managers involved with community relations perceived that their 
activities were measured. The educational assistance program had the 
least impact on the measurement system with 12.5 percent perceiving 
their activities were incorporated within the system. Figure 31 
summarizes these programs' impact on the measurement system.
The safety program had the greatest impact on the reporting 
system, with 76 percent of the managers perceiving that their 
safety performance was reported. The next three programs were 
clustered together with respect to their impact on the reporting
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A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Social
Program on Performance/Control Systems
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Figure 31
A Comparative Analysis of the Perceived Impact
of Social Program on Measurement
Highway Educational
Clean-Up Assistance
Community Worker
Social
Program
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system. Highway clean-up, with 66.67 percent, EEO with 64.7 percent, 
and community relations with 63.6 percent all had about the same 
impact on the reporting system. Educational assistance, with 12.5 
percent, had the least impact on reporting. Figure 32 compares the 
perceived impact of each program on the reporting system.
In terms of the evaluation system, safety again had the 
greatest impact, with 88 percent of the managers involved perceiving 
that their safety performance was evaluated. The highway clean-up 
program, with 66.67 percent of the involved managers perceiving their 
performance was evaluated, had the next greatest impact on the 
system. The EEO program, with 58.22 percent, and the community 
relations program, with 45.45 percent, followed in terms of perceived 
impact. The educational assistance program again had the least 
impact on the evaluation system, with 12.5 percent of the involved 
managers perceiving that their performance was evaluated. Figure 33 
summarizes the perceived impact these programs had on the evaluation 
system.
With respect to the reward and promotion system, safety 
had the greatest impact, with 72 percent of the involved managers 
feeling that their safety performance affected their reward and pro­
motion within the firm. Interestingly, the community relations 
program had the next greatest impact, with 50 percent of the involved 
managers perceiving that their community relations activities 
affected their reward and promotion. Of those managers involved in 
the EEO program, only 35.29 percent perceived that their EEO per­
formance affected their reward and promotion opportunities, while
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Figure 32
A Comparative Analysis of the Perceived Impact of
Social Program on Reporting
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Figure 33
A Comparative Analysis of the Perceived Impact
of Social Program on Evaluation
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33.33 percent (1 out of 3) of the managers involved with the highway 
clean-up program felt that their performance affected their rewards. 
Again, the educational assistance program had the least impact, with
12.5 percent of the involved managers perceiving that their activi­
ties had an impact on the reward system. Figure 34 compares the 
perceived impact of the social programs on the reward and promotion 
system.
After examining each of the performance/control systems 
separately and overall, it can be concluded that the safety program 
has been incorporated within these systems to the greatest degree.
Phase of Organizational Involvement
The purpose of this section is to compare the social programs 
at Heath with respect to the phase of organizational involvement each 
has achieved. Figure 35 summarizes the phase each program has 
achieved.
Of the five programs studied, it appears that three programs 
— community relations, safety, and highway clean-up--are institu­
tionalized within the firm. The EEO program, although not fully 
institutionalized, does meet its stated objectives— to comply with 
the law. The educational assistance program is the result of a 
specific commitment to education of the CEO and is not institutional­
ized in the sense described by Ackerman. It does, however, meet its 
stated objectives— assistance to State of Illinois educational 
institutions. Figure 36 compares the social programs studied in 
terms of the percentage of managers perceiving that the organization 
wants them involved.
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Figure 34
A Comparative Analysis of the Perceived Impact
of Social Program on Reward and Promotion
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Figure 35
A Comparative Analysis of the Phase of Organizational Involvement
Achieved by Each Program
Phase III
Phase II
Phase I
751 perceived that 
organization wanted 
them involved.
68.75% of managers 
involved.
51.16% of involved 
managers perceive 
P/C Systems 
modified.
Integrated into 
managers'- job.
Techniques 
developed. (River 
Ridge Expressway).
learned that good 
community rela­
tions was good 
business.
Issue recognized 
in 1965.
86.4% perceive that 
organization wanted 
them involved.
78.13% of managers 
involved.
81% of involved 
managers perceive 
P/C systems modified.
Reporting and 
measurement systems 
developed.
Safety director 
appointed in mid 
1950s.
Issue recognized 
in 1946.
53.13% perceive that 
organization wanted 
them involved.
53.13% of managers 
involved.
55.88% of involved 
managers perceive P/C 
systems modified.
EEO requirements 
integrated into the 
duties of personnel 
director. .
Issue recognized 
when legislation was 
passed in 1964/65.
9.4% perceive that 
organization wanted 
them involved.
9.5% of managers 
involved.
58.33% of involved 
managers perceive 
P/C systems modified
Program implemented 
in summer of 1973.
Personnel director 
appointed to 
administer program.
Issue recognized 
in 1973 by CEO.
Community Relations Worker Safety EEO Highway Clean-up
25% of managers 
involved.
12.5% of involved 
managers perceive 
P/C systems modified.
Personal Commit­
ment of CEO.
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Figure 36
Percentage of Managers Perceiving that the Organization 
Wants Them Involved in the Firm's Social Programs
Community Worker EEO Highway Educational
Relations Safety Clean-Up Assistance
Social
Program
(
191
Impact On Operations
The purpose of the section is to examine the degree of impact 
each social program had on the operations of the firm. The degree of 
impact was measured in terms of the number of managers involved in 
the program.
Of all the programs studied, the safety management program 
had the greatest impact on operations with an overall rate of 
involvement of 78.13 percent. This impact included the involvement 
of 88.89 percent of the line managers. Since this program is 
institutionalized and since safety is primarily a concern of the 
line, this high percentage of involvement is not surprising.
The community relations program had the next largest impact 
on operations, with 68.75 percent of the managers involved. Of the 
managers interviewed, 75 percent, however, perceived that the 
organization wanted them involved. This relatively high percentage 
is not surprising in light of the fact that the company considered 
community relations to be part of the job.
The EEO program did have an impact on the operations of the 
firm. The degree of impact, however, was not as great as safety or 
community relations. Of those managers interviewed, 53.13 percent 
were involved with EEO. This involvement rate included 59.26 percent 
of the line managers. Since EEO is primarily a concern of the line 
and since there is only a 59.26 percent rate of involvement of the 
line, it is not surprising that the EEO program is not completely 
institutionalized in the sense described by Ackerman.
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The highway clean-up program is essentially a staff
administered program and therefore the rate of involvement was low—  
9.4 percent. The educational assistance program is primarily the 
concern of the CEO, but 25 percent of the managers were involved with 
educational activities (primarily contributions). Both of these 
programs had primarily a financial impact rather than an operational 
impact on the firm.
Figure 37 compares the degree of impact each social program 
had on the operations of the firm. It can be concluded that of the 
programs studied, safety had the greatest impact on daily operations.
Thus, in sum, it can be concluded that the five social
programs had varying impacts on the performance/control systems and 
the daily operations of the firm. The safety, community relations, 
and highway clean-up programs completed Phase III of the Ackerman
model while EEO and educational assistance did not. The next chapter
will attempt to analyze the factors influencing the various stages of 
implementation and to generate some research questions with respect 
to social strategy implementation.
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A Comparative Analysis of Impact on Operations
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CHAPTER 10
SUMMARY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the findings of 
this study in order to pose pertinent research questions with respect 
to social strategy implementation. The initial section of the 
chapter will deal with the important role that the organic structure 
of the Heath Corporation played in this investigation. Next, the 
chapter will examine the nature of the implementation process itself. 
This will be followed by sections which present a look at the role of 
the performance/control systems and other factors in social strategy 
implementation. A discussion of the differences found to exist 
between proactive and reactive strategies at the Heath Corporation 
will next be presented. The information examined in all of these 
sections will then be sythesized into pertinent future research 
issues in the form of hypotheses and other questions.
The Role of Heath's Organic Structure in 
this Investigation
Although the nature of the organizational structure 
was initially viewed as a limitation because organic systems are
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relatively unstructured and thus difficult to measure, the organic 
structure has also provided some distinct benefits to this study. 
The only available research on social strategy implementation 
(Ackerman and Murray) was carried out in mechanisticly structured 
organizations. Ackerman studied the process in two, highly 
decentralized, manufacturing firms and Murray focused on two 
commercial banks with centralized, functional structures. Although 
it is recognized that many organizations today have various forms of 
bureaucratic and/or mechanistic structures, there are also many 
organically structured firms facing similar environment's as the 
construction industry. Further, because many experts predict 
increasing environmental turbulence and complexity for the upcoming 
decades,^" many business organizations will likely be moving toward
more organic structures. This reasoning follows the research
2 3findings of Burns and Stalker and Lawrence and Lorsch which
suggests that organizations facing turbulent environments should
employ a more organic structure to ensure effectiveness and long-term
survival. Thus, based on the fact that the business environment is
predicted to become even more turbulent and that the organic form is
the best suited organizational structure for organizations facing
^Stephen P. Robbins, Organization Theory, pp. 147-148. 
2
Burns and Stalker, The Management of Innovation.
3
Lawrence and Lorsch, Organization and Environment.
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environmental turbulence, it seems that research on social strategy 
implementation in organically structured organizations such as the 
Heath Corporation should be invaluable to social policy researchers.
Further (and more important to this study per se), the
organic nature of the organization broadens the research base in 
social strategy implementation by expanding the limited structural 
scope of the previous studies to include those organizations 
employing more organic systems. This provides a research base which 
spans a very broad range in terms of the structural settings in which 
the studies have been conducted. Thus, any of the findings of this 
study which support those of Ackerman and Murray will expand the 
generalizability of their findings beyond the bounds of highly 
structured organizations. Because of this broad range, these
consistencies will be stated in the form of hypotheses at the end of 
the chapter. Also, any differences which may be found to exist 
between this study and those of Ackerman and Murray will be presented 
in the form of research questions which must yet be addressed in the 
development of a viable model of the social strategy implementation 
process.
i
The Nature of the Implementation Process
The basic focus of this study has been on the implementation
of corporate social policy in an organically structured organization. 
The conceptual framework used to analyze this process is the one 
described by Ackerman (and later expanded by Murray) as the social 
response process. Since Ackerman and Murray have done the primary
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research in this area and have identified three distinct phases of 
the social response process, it was one purpose of this study to 
examine whether this process is similar in all organizations. Murray 
found that the process in commercial banks (with centralized func­
tional structures) was "broadly similar" to that one found in 
Ackerman's highly decentralized, manufacturing firms.^ Like 
Ackerman's model, Murray's response process consisted of three phases 
(policy, learning, and institutionalization), and spanned a period of 
six to eight years. He did find that the process in banks differed 
in three ways from Ackerman's manufacturing firms— top management
intervention, two types of learning, and lack of organization 
2
trauma. . Murray concludes, however, that the process in banks was 
basically the same as the one found by Ackerman.
This study has examined this process in an organization which 
is organically structured and has found some differences as well as 
similarities with Ackerman's conceptual model. Overall this study 
revealed an implementation process which generally followed the three 
phases outlined by Ackerman. These phases, however, were not as 
distinctly evident as those described by Ackerman and Murray.
Phase I
According to Ackerman, Phase I of the social response process 
is considered a policy phase. It is during this time that the CEO
^Murray, "The Implementation of Social Policies," p. 11-13. 
2Ibid., p. 11-14.
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becomes personally committed to the idea that his firm should take an 
active part in addressing a specific social issue. Therefore, the 
critical issue at this point appears to be whether the CEO chooses to 
take a proactive or reactive posture with respect to the specific 
social issue. In other words, it is a matter of strategic choice on 
part of the CEO as to when his firm will enter Phase I. If the CEO 
chooses to employ a proactive strategy, Phase I will be entered 
during the early phases of the social issue's life cycle. This was 
vividly demonstrated at the Heath Corporation where Mr. Randall Heath 
chose to employ a proactive posture with respect to safety, community 
relations, highway clean-up and educational assistance. This concept 
of strategic choice was particularly evident when comparing the 
firm's response to the two legally mandated programs. In regard to 
the safety program, the organization had effectively planned and 
implemented its program some fifteen years before it was required to 
do so by OSHA (early in the issue's life cycle). On the other hand, 
the CEO chose a reactive strategy with respect to EEO and waited 
until the Civil Rights Act was passed to react to the issue of equal 
employment opportunity (late in the issue's life cycle). Thus from 
the research data gathered in this study, it appears that strategic 
choice is the essence of Phase I. This finding is consistent with 
the findings of Ackerman and Murray.
Phase II
Phase II is characterized by Ackerman and Murray as one 
of learning both the technical nature of the issue as well as the
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administrative learning of the organization itself. Learning with 
respect to the social issues at Heath did occur but not in the 
delineated fashion described by Murray. "The initiation of Phase II, 
or the learning phase, was marked by senior management's designation 
of specialists to head up a unit."^ This process was not nearly as 
clear at the Heath Corporation. Of the five programs studied, only 
one— safety— was characterized by the appointment of a specific staff 
specialist whose sole responsibility was administering the program, 
and his appointment occured several years after initiation of the 
program. In the EEO and highway clean-up programs the role of the 
staff specialist was incorporated in the duties of the personnel 
director. The responsibility for administering the community 
relations and educational assistance program were never actually 
assigned to any staff specialist. Instead, the CEO himself assumed 
the responsibility for their administration. Although this deviation 
from the findings of Ackerman and Murray may be related to such 
factors as the size of the program itself or the size of the firm, 
these explanations seem unlikely in this case since (1) those 
programs which seem to compare favorably in size (i.e., safety, EEO 
and community relations) vary significantly in terms of staff 
specialist appointment and (2) the Heath Corporation is certainly 
large enough to hire staff specialists it if perceives the need. 
This deviation of not appointing a specific staff person in charge of 
each program can more likely be attributed to the organic nature of
1Ibid., p. 6-14.
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the firm. As noted by Burns and Stalker, in the organic system,
tasks "cannot be broken down and distributed among specialist roles
within a clearly defined hierarchy. Individuals have to perform
their special tasks in light of their knowledge of the tasks of the
firm as a w h o l e . T h i s  characteristic is particularly evident at
Heath in that the personnel director was required to perform his
specific tasks with respect to the EEO and highway clean-up programs
in light of his knowledge of the Heath corporation's goals and
operations. Thus, it appears that in organic organizations such as
the Heath Corporation the appointment of a staff specialist for each
program may not be a necessary requirement for the learning phase.
Administrative learning, according to Murray, was one "in
which an improved understanding of the organization itself was 
2
acquired." Murray found that this phase evolved due to the complex 
interaction of administrative systems. "To deal with this problem, 
senior management broadened the scope of designated staff specialists 
in order to attack organizational resistence on a more comprehensive 
basis. An important staff activity in this regard was the develop­
ment of data systems with which to track and analyze social
3
performance of the organizaton." At the Heath Corporation with its 
unstructured administrative systems, administrative learning appeared
^Burns and Stalker, The Management of Innovation, pp. 5-6. 
o
Murray, "The Implementation of Social Policies," p. 6-15. 
^Ibid., p. 6-16.
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to be an ongoing process with the organizational member closest to 
the issue becoming the primary agent of the organization dealing with 
the issue. In the safety program, for example, the loss control 
officer developed data systems as he saw the need for them arise. 
The personnel officer as well would have the freedom to develop a 
more sophisticated system of data gathering than the personnel 
records he now uses for EEO if he deemed them necessary. Top manage­
ment has played no role in "broadening the scope" of their activities 
but rather left it up to the person in charge to decide on the data 
systems used to track social peformance. This is clearly a charac­
teristic of an organic system. According to Burns and Stalker, any 
individual's job in the organic system should be as little defined as 
possible, so that it will shape, itself to his special abilities and 
initiative.^ Thus, due to the organic nature of the firm, top 
management made no attempt to "broaden the scope" of the activities 
of the safety staff specialist or the personnel director because the 
nature of the individual task in an organic system is determined by
that individual's knowledge of the common task of the organization as 
2
a whole. This deviation from the administrative learning phase as 
described by Murray can be attributed to the organic nature of the 
Heath Corporation.
As previously stated, it appears that the learning phase at 
Heath is an ongoing process rather than a sequenced progression from
^Burns and Stalker, The Management of Innovation, p. 92. 
2Ibid., p. 122.
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technical to administrative learning. The project managers at Heath,
for example, are ultimately responsible for the implementation of the
organization's social programs affecting the line and are therefore
the primary agents of the organization dealing with the issue. In
the community relations area, for example, it is up to each project
manager to decide how his project will impact the community and take
the appropriate action. In other words, the project managers at
Heath perform two important functions: (1) the internal functions
which consist of the technical and managerial functions and (2) the
boundary spanning function. In particular, the project manager's
boundary spanning function includes representing the organization to
the communities in which it operates, scanning and monitoring the
environment, and information processing and gatekeeping.'*' Since the
environment of the organization can be characterized as turbulent,
the boundary spanning roles of the project managers are quite auto-
2
nomous and flexible. Thus, the project managers as the agent of the 
organization dealing with community relations have the freedom to 
decide the degree of impact their project has on the community and to 
take the appropriate action. This is charactistic of an organic 
organization facing a turbulent environment in which boundary 
spanning roles are nonroutine, informal, and tend to have increased 
decision-making and autonomy. Therefore, learning on part of the
^■Robert H. Miles, Macro Organizational Behavior (Santa
Monica, Cal.: Goodyear, 1980), p. 320.
2Ibid., pp. 341-342.
3Ibid.
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project managers was not a sequenced progression but rather an 
ongoing process on each project they managed. Thus, the learning 
phase as observed at Heath is not characteristic of Phase II as 
described by Ackerman and Murray.
Phase III
Phase III is described by both Ackerman and Murray as the 
institutionalization phase which results in a sustained organiza­
tional commitment to a specific issue. This phase is characterized 
by working the specific social issue into the normative structure of 
the organization through modifying the performance/control systems to 
include managerial social performance. In other words, managerial 
norms are modified to include commitment to the issue by reinforcing 
the appropriate managerial behaviors within the performance/control 
systems. Ackerman and Murray both contend that this institutionali­
zation is essential for effective implementation. According to 
Murray, the institutionalization phase is where the actual imple­
mentation of the social policy occurs at the operational level.'*' 
Since both Ackerman and Murray focused on only those social policies 
affecting the line, they maintained that working the specific social 
policy into the normative structure of the operating managers through 
modification of the performance/ control systems was essential for 
effective implementation.
At the Heath Corporation three programs were found to 
have full sustained commitment as described by Ackerman and Murray:
^"Murray, "The Implementation of Social Policies," p. 1-24.
204
community relations, safety and highway clean-up (see figure 35). 
Community relations and safety directly impacted line operations. 
Institutionalization, as described by Murray and Ackerman, seemed to 
play a very important role in the implementation of these programs. 
Highway clean-up, a staff administered program, did appear to be a 
part of the normative structure of the whole organization although 
modification of the performance/control systems was not essential.
The other two programs of EEO and educational assistance were 
not institutionalized in the sense described by Ackerman and Murray 
(see figure 35). However, both programs were being implemented as 
planned by the organization. In other words, both were achieving 
their intended objectives. As previously noted, the EEO program, 
which directly impacted line operations, was a reactive strategy 
designed to comply with the law. The educational assistance program 
which was administered by the CEO also was achieving its intended 
objectives— assistance to Midwest educational institutions. In both 
of these programs, full institutionalization was not necessary for 
effective implementation. This finding differs from those of 
Ackerman and Murray and brings into question the exact role insti­
tutionalization plays in implementation.
Speed of the Response
Both Ackerman and Murray found in their research that the 
process of implementation of social policies spanned six to eight 
years. The time frame of implementation found in this study, how­
ever, appeared less than this. The highway clean-up program, for 
example, only took several months to be implemented. The River Ridge
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Expressway experience provided enough stimulus for the recognition 
that community relations was good business (in monetary terms) that 
each project manager was immediately made responsible for community 
relations on the project he supervised. The early perception that a 
safe workplace added to profitability enhanced the speed of 
implementation of the safety program. Each project manager was made 
responsible for the profitability of his project and it was 
recognized early that safety impacted the profits. Although a 
specific time frame for implementation cannot be determined for the 
institutionalized programs, the speed of the response was certainly 
faster than eight years.
Several factors may account for this. First of all, Murray 
points out that if the convergence between economic and social 
opportunities had been perceived at the outset "the final response of 
the banks may very well have been arrived at more quickly and more 
efficiently."^ At Heath this perception did take place in the early 
development phases of the institutionalized programs thereby speeding 
up the response process. Another factor which played a role in the 
speed of the response was the fact that the Heath Corporation is 
privately owned (85 percent by Randall Heath), and the CEO therefore 
had more freedom and flexibility in dealing with social issues than 
he would have had in a publicly held corporation. And finally, the 
nature of the organizational structure appeared to enhance the speed 
of implementation. Murray found that "the tendency to attend to
1Ibid., p. 10-14.
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functional and product line specialties as well as the distinction 
between line and staff management posed problems of coordination 
among various areas of the bank."'*' Thus, Murray contended that the 
highly centralized, functional structure of the banks he studied 
posed as formidable organizational barrier to social policy imple­
mentation as the decentralized, diversified manufacturing companies
2
studied by Ackerman. The organic structure of the Heath 
Corporation, however, posed no organizational barrier to overcome in 
the implementation of the firm's social policies.
It can therefore be concluded from this study that the early 
convergence of economic and social objectives, the nature of private 
ownership, and the organic organizational structure of Heath all 
played a role in speeding up the response process. Thus, the speed 
of the response was found to be much quicker than the time frame 
observed by Ackerman and Murray. The next section will examine the 
role of the performance/control systems in the implementation 
process.
The Role of Performance/Control Systems in Social 
Strategy Institutionalization/Implementation
Murray points out in his research that the effectiveness of
the performance/control systems did not hinge on their sophis- 
3
tication. Due to the organic nature of the Heath Corporation, by
1Ibid., p. 3-21. 
2Ibid., p. 3-25. 
3Ibid., p. 3-28.
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definition, these systems were very unstructured and informal. Since 
these systems were not sophisticated or well-structured, each manager 
has his own set of perceptions of what managerial behaviors were 
incorporated within these systems. It was therefore important to 
examine these managerial perceptions to determine the relationship 
between the performance/control systems and social policy 
implementation.
Of the three programs which directly impacted line operations 
(safety, community relations, and EEO), over 50 percent of all 
involved managers perceived that the performance/control systems were 
modified to include their social performance. Of these programs, 
community relations and safety were considered to be fully institu­
tionalized. Safety, with a 78.13 percent involvement rate, had 81 
percent of the involved managers perceive that these systems were 
modified. Community relations, with a 68.75 percent involvement 
rate, had 51.14 percent of the involved managers perceive these 
systems to be modified. The EEO program, although not fully insti­
tutionalized but achieving intended objectives, had 55.88 percent of 
the involved managers (53.13 percent) perceive that the systems were 
modified. Thus, it appears that these informal performance/control 
systems have been perceived to be significantly modified to include 
these programs and therefore have played a role in the implementation 
process to the degree that institutionalization is important for 
effective implementation. The performance/ control system, however, 
was not the only factor influencing institutionalization/implementa­
tion. The next section will examine these other factors.
Role of the CEO in Influencing 
Institutionalization/Implementation
As pointed out above, the performance/control systems did 
play an important role in implementation to the degree that it is 
affected by institutionalization. Another factor found to influence 
program institutionalization/implementation were CEO commitment.
As previously discussed, Murray found that "leadership by the
chief executive seemed to be the most closely and consistently
related factor with the effective implementation [again equated with
institutionalization] of social policies."^ Ackerman also found that
"the corporate response to a social demand hinged on the CEO's
2
interest in pursuing it." The findings of this study reaffirm 
Murray and Ackerman's contention that CEO commitment and leadership 
are critical factors in institutionalization. Of the three social 
programs found to be fully institutionalized (community relations, 
safety, and highway clean-up), the CEO demonstrated his personal 
commitment through example and policy statements. His interest in 
these programs appeared to be a critical factor in their 
institutionalization. On the other hand, the reactive posture of 
the CEO with respect to EEO was considered to be a major factor in 
that program's incomplete institutionalization. It should be 
noted, however, that the EEO program's objectives were being imple­
mented— compliance with the law. The commitment of the CEO was also
1Ibid, p. 3-37.
9
Ackerman, The Social Challenge to Business, p. 290.
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instrumental to the effective implementation of the educational 
assistance program even though that program was not institu­
tionalized. Therefore, the exact role of institutionalization in 
effective program implementation is again questioned.
Role of the Convergence of Social and Economic 
Objectives in Influencing Institutionalization/Implementation
Another important factor found to influence institutionali­
zation was the early convergence of economic and social objectives. 
Murray found that implementation (institutionalization) depended a 
great deal on how effectively social and economic policies were 
integrated.^ As noted in Chapter 4, he observed four perceptual 
contexts through which the bank managers viewed specific social 
issues and a sequenced progression through these perceptual contexts. 
This progression consisted of the initial perception of the social 
issue as an economic threat then as a social threat followed by a 
social opportunity and finally as an economic opportunity. Murray
found, however, that this final perception of the convergence between
2
economic and social objectives took place over time. This early 
perception of both social as well as economic opportunities took 
place in the institutionalized programs of the Heath Corporation. It 
has been well documented in the analysis chapters that top management 
viewed this congruence in the early development phases of the 
community relations program ("Good community relations is good 
business"), the safety program ("A safe job is a profitable job"),
^Murray, "The Implementation of Social Policies," p. 3-21. 
2Ibid., p. 10-3.
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and the highway clean-up program ("We get free image advertising from 
the things we do"). Thus, by viewing their environment from the
perspective of both social and economic opportunities, the top 
management group enhanced the institutionalization of these programs. 
This suggests that social responsibility and profitability are not 
inherently contradictory but are rather potentially compatible.
The perception of EEO, however, was from the perspective of 
being an economic and social threat. Top management's reactive 
strategy was to obey the law, nothing more. Thus, top management 
perceived no social or economic opportunities with respect to EEO. 
This is considered to be one of the primary reasons for the 
incomplete institutionalization of EEO. It should be noted, however, 
that the reactive EEO strategy was being implemented as planned by 
the organization.
Overall it can be concluded that CEO commitment, the early 
convergence of social and economic objectives, and the modification 
of the performance/control systems all played a major role in program 
institutionalization. These findings essentially reaffirm those of 
Murray and Ackerman.
Proactive Versus Reactive Response Strategies 
As previously mentioned, it is a matter of strategic choice 
on part of the CEO as to whether the organization will take a pro­
active or reactive posture with respect to a particular social issue. 
In other words, the choice is at what phase in the social issue's
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life cycle will the organization begin to formulate a policy with 
respect to the issue. At the Heath Corporation, the researcher 
identified four proactive strategies--community relations, safety, 
highway clean-up, and educational assistance— and one reactive 
strategy— EEO.
The proactive strategies appeared to have several common 
threads. In all of the proactive strategies the CEO was directly 
involved and commited to the particular issue. Another common 
element was the early convergence between economic and social 
objectives. (This was true in all of the proactive strategies except 
educational assistance which was the "baby" of the CEO and whose 
success was directly related to the time and energy expended by him.) 
In the strategies directly affecting the line, the proactive 
strategies of community relations and safety, had a high level of 
managerial involvement, 68.75 percent and 78.13 percent respectively. 
The performance/control systems were also percieved to be sig­
nificantly modified in the community relations and safety programs 
with 51.14 percent and 81 percent respectively.
The reactive EEO strategy, on the other hand, did not exhibit 
the above characteristics. The top managers were only commited to 
obeying the law, and they did not perceive the congruence between EEO 
objectives and economic objectives. Although EEO should directly 
impact line operations, only 53.13 percent of the managers were 
involved and only 55.88 percent of those involved perceived the per­
formance/control systems to be modified to include their EEO 
performance.
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In sum, it appears from this study that the following charac­
teristics differentiate proactive and reactive response strategies:
(1) Commitment of the CEO, which directly affects the timing 
of strategic choice;
(2) Perception of the convergence of economic and social 
objectives;
(3) Rate of managerial involvement in strategies affecting 
the line; and
(4) Modification of the performance/control systems of 
strategies affecting the line.
Areas for Future Research
As previously discussed in the methodology chapter, the 
purpose of an exploratory case study such as this one is to generate 
hypotheses and research questions. Therefore this section will pro­
pose hypotheses and research questions concerning the social strategy 
implementation process. As noted throughout this study, the primary 
research on social strategy implementation is quite limited, with 
Ackerman examining two manufacturing firms and Murray two banks. 
From their research, however, they have concluded that the social 
response process involves three distinct phases. This study has 
found some similarities as well as differences with this conceptual 
model:
(1) The policy phase, Phase I, was essentially one of 
strategic choice. It was during this phase that the CEO 
became committed to the issue and decided that his firm 
should take an active role in addressing the issue.
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This finding is consistent with those of Ackerman and 
Murray.
(2) The learning phase, Phase II, took place but not in the 
delineated fashion as described by Ackerman and Murray. 
The appointment of a staff specialist solely for 
administering the program was not seen as a necessary 
requirement for learning. Technical and administrative 
learning were on-going processes rather than a 
sequential progression.
(3) The institutionalization phase, Phase III, differed in 
one major way from the previous research. Both Ackerman 
and Murray contend that the institutionalization phase 
is where , the actual implementation of social policy 
occurs. This study found that institutionalization was 
not a necessary requirement for effective implementation 
in all programs. Thus, the social strategy implementa­
tion process may not require institutionalization for 
all strategies and therefore may be somewhat different 
from the corporate social response process in this 
respect. The completion of Phase II may be all that is 
necessary for successful implementation in some programs
From the above findings, the following hypotheses and
research questions are proposed:
The timing of the CEO's decision to enter Phase I 
along with the timing of the convergence of economic 
and social objectives will determine whether the 
response strategy will be proactive or reactive.
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In addition, these findings lead to two further research questions:
(1) To what degree do convergence of economic and social 
objectives and the timing of the CEO's decision 
influence the type of response strategy employed?
(2) What other factors influence the type of response 
strategy employed?
As noted above, some basic differences in Phase II were found 
in this study when compared with the previous research. Because of 
these differences, the following research questions can be asked:
(1) Is it necessary for effective technical and administra­
tive learning that a separate staff specialist or 
special unit be created or can the same results be 
achieved through less formalized (more organic) 
structural changes?
(2) Can learning be realistically viewed in terms of a 
sequential progression from technical to administrative 
learning or should this be considered as an ongoing 
process rather than a clear, distinct phase?
This study also found some similarities as well as dif­
ferences with respectt to Phase III. Based on the similarities the 
following hypothesis is proposed:
The factors of CEO commitment and leadership, modi­
fication of the performance/control systems, and the
convergence of economic and social objectives must be
present to achieve full program institutionalization.
Based on the differences found with respect to Phase III, the 
following research question can be asked:
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Is it necessary to institutionalize all social 
programs within the organization in order for them to 
be effectively implemented? In other words, must a 
social program be a part of the normative structure 
to achieve its intended objectives?
This question can be broken down further into several relevant 
research questions:
(1) Is effective implementation always equated with Phase 
III (Institutionalization)?
(2) Can certain types of programs achieve effective 
implementation upon acquiring a necessary degree of 
technical and administrative learning (Phase II)?
(3) Is the social response process necessarily synonomous 
with the social strategy implementation process?
As earlier, the speed of the implementation process observed 
in this study was somewhat faster than the one observed by Ackerman 
and Murray. Because of this difference, the following research 
question can be asked:
To what degree do structure, ownership, and timing of 
the convergence of economic and social objectives 
influence the speed of the response? What other 
factors influence the speed of the implementation 
process?
The differences identified above lead to the conclusion that 
the implementation process cannot be identified by a specific time 
frame, does not necessarily involve a sequential learning process,
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etc. Rather the process is contingent upon various elements within 
the organization and its environment. This study has identified 
several possible contingencies. These include:
(1) the structure of the organization,
(2) the ownership of the firm,
(3) the timing of the convergence of social and economic 
objectives,
(4) CEO commitment, and
(5) the organization's performance/control systems.
These findings imply that future research needs to be performed in 
order to (1) examine more specifically the degree to which the 
variables influence and/or influenced by the social strategy 
implementation process, and (2) identify any other variables which 
may have influence and/or be influenced by this process.
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Interview Guide for Top Management
I. Objective: To ascertain the basic philosophies and policies of
top management with respect to the social programs chosen for 
this study.
II. Questions:
A. Would you describe what your basic philosophy is concerning 
your firm's role in society?
B. Would you comment on the following Heath social programs:
1. Safety management:
a) Purposes?
b) Policies concerning manager's role?
c) Are evaluations/rewards/promotions of involved 
managers affected?
d) How are these policies communicated?
2. Community Relations:
a) Purposes?
b) Policies concerning manager's role?
c) Are evaluations/rewards/promotions of involved 
managers affected?
d) How are these policies communicated?
3. Educational Assistance:
a) Purposes?
b) Policies concerning manager's role?
c) Are evaluations/rewards/promotions of involved 
managers affected?
d) How are these policies communicated?
4. Highway Clean-up/Youth Employment:
a) Purposes?
b) Policies concerning manager's role?
c) Are evaluations/rewards/promotions of involved 
{managers affected?
d) How are these policies communicated?
5. Equal Employment Opportunity:
a) Purposes?
b) Policies concerning manager's role?
c) Are evaluations/rewards/promotions of involved 
managers affected?
d) How are these policies communicated?
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C. I have read in several documents that the evaluations/ 
rewards/promotions of managers at Heath are based on 
performance. I wonder if you could:
1. Give me your basic definition of performance?
2. List for me those factors which you feel are important 
for effective managerial performance?
3. Of those factors, give me some idea as to the relative 
importance of each?
APPENDIX B
Interview Guide for Staff Specialists
229
I. Objectives: To ask specific questions about the organization's
social programs and to determine if and how managerial social
performance is incorporated into the performance/control 
systems.
II. Questions:
A. Are there formally stated corporate objectives with respect 
to the program?
B. When did the program originate and why?
C. What number of people in what areas of the organization are 
involved in the program?
D. Are specific divisions/individuals assigned responsibility?
E. How is the program funded?
1. Are supplemental or specially earmarked funds required 
to implement program?
2. How are such funds made available?
F. Is managerial performance with respect to the program 
incorporated into:
1. the performance measurement system? 
a) how?
2. the performance reporting system? 
a) how?
3. the performance evaluation system? 
a) how?
4. the reward system?
a . how?
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Pre-Interview Questionnaire
The primary purpose of this questionnaire is to serve as a pre­
paratory document for the interview. Essentially, the questions 
covered in this questionnaire are the same ones that will be explored 
when we meet. By completing the questionnaire, the interviewee will 
have more of an opportunity to think through the questions in
advance, increasing the potential that the interview will be 
smoother, more meaningful and less time consuming.
Therefore, please complete the questionnaire prior to the interview. 
Answer each question as honestly and completely as you possibly can. 
Rest assured that your individual answers will be held in the 
strictest confidence. No questionnaire will be made available to
other organizational members, and no data will be reported in any way 
that would identify specific individuals. (In this regard, please do 
not place your name on this questionnaire. As you might note, they 
have already been numerically coded. This code, as all other infor­
mation, will remain confidential.) Although many of the questions 
require only yes/no answers, any explanatory information in these 
areas may also be beneficial.
Several questions will ask you to comment about the extent of your 
involvement in ,some specific activities or programs. In order to 
help you answer these questions, the following descriptions are 
provided for these activities/programs:
Safety Management - Maintaining a safe workplace and
thus protecting corporate assets by complying with the
stipulations of Heath's safety policies and OSHA's 
regulations for the construction industry.
Community Relations - A direct involvement in com­
munity activities such as civic organizations (Rotary,
Scouts, etc.), state or local government activities, 
political activities, church activities, charity fund 
raising activities, etc. Making contributions to 
various charitable organizations (United Way, Heart 
Fund, Cancer Society, etc.).
Educational Assistance - A direct involvement with 
students and schools at all levels including speeches, 
coaching activities, membership/leadership in educa­
tional organizations, etc. Also making contributions 
to schools for scholarships, research, facility im­
provement , etc.
Highway Clean-Up/Summar Youth Employment - Involvement 
in the annual highway clean-up program employing 
area teenagers.
Equal Employment Opportunity - Maintaining a workforce 
which meets the minority recruiting and hiring 
standards established by the Federal government.
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1. Please check the following areas in which you are actively 
involved:
 Safety Management
 Community Relations
Educational Assistance
 Highway Clean-Up/Summer Youth Employment
 Equal Employment Opportunity
2. Do you perceive that the corporation wants you to be involved in 
the activities/programs described above?
3. What is the source of this perception? (i.e., written policy, 
verbal policy, examples set by other organizational members)
4. Do you feel that your involvement in any of the above activities/ 
programs is measured or recognized by the organization?
A. If yes,
1) Which ones (specify) do you feel are measured/recognized?
2) How are they measured/recognized?
5. Do you feel that your involvement in any of the above activites/ 
programs is reported to higher management?
A. If yes,
1) Which ones do you feel are reported?
2) How are they reported?
6. Do you feel that your involvement in any of these activities/ 
programs is in some way evaluated by the organization?
A. If yes,
1) Which ones do you feel are evaluated?
2) How are they evaluated?
7. Do you feel that your involvement in any of these activities/ 
programs affects your compensation?
A. If yes,
1) Which ones do you feel you are compensated for?
2) How do these activities affect your compensation?
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8. Do you feel that your promotion opportunities within the firm are 
affected by your involvement in any of these activities/programs?
A. If yes,
1) Involvement in which areas affects your promotion 
opportunities?
2) How do these affect your promotion opportunities?
9. Do you feel that your involvement in any of these activities/ 
programs is recognized in any other ways?
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JOB SITE 
SAFETY MEETING REPORT
T Y P E  MEETING:
MANAGEMENT □
SUPERVISOR'S | |
FOREMEN'S  
TOOL BOX □
MEETING DAT E.
NUMBER AT TENDI NG.  
NUMBER IN CREW____
C O M P A N Y ___
L O C A T IO N ___
T Y P E  OF J O B .
-O R D E R  OF BUSINESS -
SUBJECTS DISCUSSED________________________
SUGGESTIONS O F F E R E D .
ACTI ON TO BE TAKEN.
I N J U R I E S - A C C I D E N T S  REVIEWED-
— S U P E R V IS O R 'S  R E M A R K S  —
Signature. 
T it le --------
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VITA
Jean Garner Stead was born on the snowy night of February 7, 
1949, in Birmingham, Alabama to Marion and Tom Garner. She stayed in 
Birmingham until her graduation from The Brook Hill School for Girls 
in 1967. Her ambition after graduation from high school was to 
attend a co-ed college, so off to Auburn University in Auburn, 
Alabama she went. At Auburn she received her Bachelor of Science in 
Business Administration in 1971 and her Master of Arts in College 
Teaching in Economics in 1973. After leaving Auburn, she moved to 
the mountains of Southwest Virginia and served as an Instructor of 
Economics at Clinch Valley College of the University of Virginia in 
Wise, Virginia. She stayed there only a semester because she fell in 
love with a debonair banker, Ed Stead, from Birmingham, Alabama. 
They were married on the rainy morning of January 6, 1973.
The couple moved to Baton Rouge, Louisiana so that Ed could 
work toward his Ph.D. in Management at LSU. It was during this 
period (1973-1976) that Jean worked as an Urban Planner for the City 
of Baton Rouge and as a Technical Researcher for Economic and 
Industrial Research, Inc. In 1976, Jean and Ed moved to Macomb, 
Illinois where they served on the faculty of Western Illinois 
University. Jean served as an Instructor of Economics from 1976-1979 
and earned a Master of Business Administration in 1979 from Western 
Illinois University. It became obvious to Jean that it would be 
necessary to pursue a Ph.D. in order to further her teaching career. 
After planning to enter LSU in 1979, Jean and Ed were surprised to
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find that their family was expanding and plans were delayed. On the 
cold night of February 1, 1980, a six pound, four ounce, little girl 
named Garner Lee came into their family.
In the Fall of 1980, all three Steads moved to Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana where Jean enrolled in the Doctor of Philosophy Program in 
Business at Louisiana State University. In the Fall of 1982, the 
Steads moved to the mountains of East Tennessee where Jean is serving 
as an Assistant Professor of Management at East Tennessee State 
University.
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